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ABSTRACT
I take psycholo~ism with respect to logic to be an endorse-
ment of the slogan that the laws of logic are (in some sense)
laws of thought. My interest in psychologism is this: on the
one hand there are lots of implausible and unacceptable ways of
interpreting this slogan; but on the other hand we have strong
intuitions that deductive logic is an important part of what it
is to think or reason correctly. The interesting problem is to
e>:pl ai n the rol e of 1 ogi c incorrect reasoni ng wi thOL~t fall i ng
into the trap of an erroneous form of psychologism.
In Part One I di sti ngL\i sh several metaphysi, cal i nterpreta-
tions of the psychologistic claim~ and examine a series of argu-
ments presented by B~adley, Frege, and Moore directed against
them. While most metaphysical versions of psychologism are re-
futed by their arguments, I present Bradley's own position which
can be understood to be a more sophisticated form of psychologism
that apparently escapes these arguments. I conclude by outlining
a set of considerations which~ if fully defended~ legislate
against any metaphysical version of psychologism.
In Part Two I distinguish between two uses of the term
"principles of reasoning ll • The first refe,.-s to the traditional
idea that there may be principles that direct reasoning --- for
example, principles that tell us what we ought to believe in
l:ert ai n c i r-cl·.ffistanc:es. The sec: ond ref ers to pr inc i pIes of dedL'c-
tive validity. Since the first kinds of principles would be
about beliefs or other psychological states, then if no distinc-
tion is mads between the two kinds of principle it is almost
inevitable that laws of deductive logic will be interpreted as
being about psychological entities.
These points are made in the conteHt of J.S. Mill='s work on
logic. I show that Mill e>:plic:itly ma~::es this· distinction and so
avoids psyc:hologistic conclusions. I endorse his conclusion that
principles of deductive logic neither are nor provide principles
for directing reasoning. Some headway is made in charact~rizing
the relation between deductive logic and reasoning.
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What is psychologism with respect to logic, and what is
wrong with it? It used to be common for philosohers and
logicians to make remarks like the following:
Logic ... is the science of the operations of the
understanding which are subservient to the estima-
tion of evidence. [lJ
Logic may be considered as the Science, and
also as the Art, of Reasoning. Its most appro-
priate office .•• is that of instituting an analy-
sis of the process of the mind in Reasoning. [2]
Logic ••• is the science which studies the general
principles in accordance with which we think about
things, whatever things they may b~. [3J
Logicis
thOLtght. [4]
the analysis and criticism of
Very similar statements occur in the introductory chapters
of almost any logic book published prior to 1930 --- and
most philosophers would unhesitatingly brand these claims as
IIpsychologistic:lI. Here logic is said to be a sc:ience; its
subject matter is a certain set of operations of the under-
standing --- those we call reasoning or thinking.
plausible to summarize these claims in the slogan:
of logic are (in some sense) laws of thought.
I think that there is something to this slogan.
It is
the laws
There
does seem to be an important and close relation between
logic: and thought, between logic: and certain capacities of
human understanding, and so there may be some interpretation
of the slogan that makes it true.
relation between logic and thought,
5
After all, isn't it this
or between logic and
correct thinking~ that makes logic of special i.nterest to
L\S? Of COL\rSe ~ we can and do treat logic formally~ as a
cal eLll LlS (Boole would say) for determining the correctness
and st rength of dedL,ct i ve and i ndLlct i ve argLlmE'nts. Bl-,t
Both these stL,di, es have al so an i nrterest of ano-
ther kind, derived from the light which they shed
upon the intellectual powers. They instruct us
concerning the mode in which language and number
selr""ve as i nstrLlmental ai dE. to the process of rea-
soning; they reveal to us in some degree the
conne>:ion between different powers of DL', common
intellect; they set before us what, in the twa
domai ns of demonstrat i ve and of probabl e ~~now­
ledge~ are the essential standards of truth and
correctness, --- standards not derived from with-
out~ but deeply founded in the constitution of the
human f~culties. [5]
AlthOLtgh Boale's t-emark is not ve.y clear:- i t does sLlggest
several possible ~nterpretationsof the slogan: the laws of
logic are aids or guides for reasoning, the laws of logic
are standards of cor.ect thin~cing; and the laws of logic are
founded upon or derived from the human faculty of thought
(the human mind).
For ease of eHposition I will say that any commitment
to this slogan is a form of psychologism with respect to
logic .. Perhaps there are psychologistic theses about logic
that do not embody an interpretation of the slogan, bLtt for-
the most part they will not concern me here. My inter-est in
psychologism with respect to logic focusses on this: on the
one hand there are clearly lots of implausible and unaccept-
able ways of interpreting the psychologistic slogan; bLlt on
the other hand the slogan has some plausibility, and I would
like to find a true interpretation of it.
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If no true inter-
pret at i on i 5 f orthcomi ng I WOLt 1 d at 1 east 1 i ke an e>: p 1 ana-
tion of the relation between logic and thought or logic and
correct thinhing, and an Ltnderstandi ng of ,,~hy ther-e cannot
be such an interpretation,
Some of the discussions in this thesis, par-ticularly in
Part II~ show how difficult it is to produce any substantive
gene~alizations that codify ~elations between logic and
thought~ And this task is made more difficult by the histo~
ry of psychologism. For one thing!, few philosophers have
given any cohe~erlt def ence of a pI aL,si b 1 e versi on of psycho-
logism about logic. It is rather a thesis that is often
.. ref Ltted" --- an opponent i s branded as havi ng a psycholo-
gistic position, or as making psychologistic claims, and
that position or those claims are shown to be problematic~
This situation forces the methodology of this thesis. The
fact that few philosophe,s have defended psychologism means
that there are few sympathetic and studied attempts to
interpret the slogan or explain the relation between logic
and thin~~ing. And in most of the cases where I have tried
to track down psychologi~tic theses that are claimed by one
philosopher to be held by another, it has turned out that
the cl ai ms are based on mi si nterpretati ons and fili SLlnder'-
standings, or at best on unsympathetic readings. Thus I
have often had to reconstruct psychologistic positions
perhaps held by no o~e at all --- by looking at
tions" of psychologism.
7
"refL,ta-
This thesis is divided into two parts. In the fi"'st
part I look at metaphysical interpr-etations of the slogan.
Given that thoughts are mental or psychological
then the slogan becomes:
processes,
Laws of logic are (in some sense) laws of psycho-
logical processes.
Laws of logic might be laws about psychological processes
either because laws of logic are 9~Q~t the very same things
that laws of psychology are about, or because laws of logic
actually are (or follow from) laws of psycholDgy. I call
the first i nter-pretati on "psychol ogi sm abOL\t concept,s and
truth-bearers", because it maintains that concepts or truth-
bearers~ the things that logical laws are about, are psycho-
log i cal or mental entities. Versions of the second inter-
pretation I call identification theses~ for it would follow
from such claims that logic is really part of psychology.
By and large it is these metaphysical theses that
formed the psychologism so fiercely attacked by Bradley,
Frege, and Moore. And these theses have to be reconstructed
from their "refL,tations"~ because it is difficult to find
proponents of them. I construct the positions, and show why
psychologism about concepts and truth-bearers is the cent~al
thesis of metaphysic~l psychologism. Then I e>; ami ne a se-
ries of arguments presented by Bradley, Frege, and Moore
against these positions.
(
I suggest that while most versions
of the metaphysical theses are pretty clearly refuted by
these philosophers~ there is at least one sophisticated
8
position held hy Bradley that is not easily refuted. How-
ever the question does arise as to whether that position~
when stated in a way that avoids certain pitfalls that Moore
emph~5izes, really is psychologistic in any interesting
sense. By way of conclL\sion I sketch tile oL\tlines of a
position which, if properly defended~ would legislate
against any form of metaphysical psychologism.
In the second part of this thesis I focus on questions
aboLlt reason i ng. I th ink that terms SL\ch as II pr i nc i pIes of
reasoning" or IIprinciples of inference lf have an important
ambiguity that is often not noticed. In our traditional
sense a "principle of reasoning" is a "principle that di-
rects reasoning-· --- a principle that tells me what I ought
to believe or conclude, depending on what other things I
believe. I actually have some misgivings about whether we
will ever find substantive general principles of this kind
(this question surfaces at the end of section 6 of Part II),
but let me set that aside for now. A second sense of the
term is that which is intended by contemporary philosophers
and logicians, who often use the term simply to mean IIl aws
of dedL\ctive validity" --- laws or principles that descr-ibe
deductively valid argument forms. Without this disti~ction,
psychologism about logic becomes almost inevitable. For it
is very natural to think that laws of reasoning in the first
sense are laws about mental entities --- the associationist
or his forbears would say that principles of reasoning are
principles of association. And if no distinction is made
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between the two notions of "principles of reasoning"~ then
laws of deductive logic will almost certainly be interpreted
as psychological O~ associationist laws too. This may re-
suIt in a metaphysical interpretation of the psycholagistic
slogan: laws of logic are laws of reasoning, bL\t 1 aws of
reasoning are laws aboLlt thoL,ghts or abOL{t thinking. Dis-
tinguishing laws of deductive validity may prevent this
slide.
Mill is one of the fi~st philosophers to go some way
towards making this distinction. Hi 5 famOLtS <and often
mi SLlnderstood) c 1 ai m that all syll og isms are a pet i tiD pt"- i, n-
cipii is based on this distinction. For Mill denies nat
that syllogisms are deductively valid argument forms, but
that they ar-e, or provide, principles of reasoning in the
fi.rst sense. While I disagree with some of his arguments to
this conclLlsion, I agree with the conclusion itself. The
central
car-efLll
line of argumentation in Part II is based on a
examination of Mill's system as a way of motivating
and ma~~ing the distinction between the two notions of "prin-
ciples
direct
of r-easoni ng". I go on to show that ther-e i s no
connection between these two notions. There are
varioLls ways in which "principles of reasoning ll in the first
sense might arise: as principles of justification, as pres-
criptions about what one ought to believe, and as principles
of rationality. I argue that in none of these cases is
there any way in which laws of deductive validity are~ or
can be transformed into,
ing.
SLtbstantive principles of I-eason-
The upshot for the psychologistic slogan is that I find
no substantive correct interpretation of it. However- some
of my resL\lts go some way towards e>:plaining what r-ole
deductive logic, or facts about the deductive relations
between propositions~ have in correct reasoning or thinking.
1 • Mill, J.S.~ B §~§~§m Qf b99i£, London~ 1843~ Intro.~
sec. 7. Henceforth I will refer to this work as ~SL~.
2. Whately, Richard, S!§m~D~§ gf bQgi£~
Co., London and Cambridge, 1852, p. 1.
J ames Monroe 8~
3~ Joseph, H.W.B.~ en !ntcQ~~£iiQQ ~Q bQgi£~ Oxford~ 1906~
p. 3 ..
4. Johnson, W. E.,
1964 , p • >: iii.
Part 1(1921). Dover Edition,
5. Boole, George, In§ betl§ Q£ IUQyght Dove~, 1958, p. 2.
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PART I:
METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT PSYCHDLOGISM IN LOGIC
12
It is rather difficult to find any clearly elaborated
view that is plaL\sibly called psychologism aboL,t logi.c. In
light of this it is striking that three philosophers with
SL\ch d iff er-er,t bac hgrOL\nds and interests as Bradl ey, Frege,
and Moore should agree as to what are the central doctrines
of psychologism abol.\t logic,
similar"" kinds of criticism.
and shoL\l d sLtbmi t thenl to ver'Y
Thus Bradley sets the tone of IQ~ Ecin£~el~§ Qf bggi£
in the opening pages with a complaint about the pervasive-
ness of empiricist psychology in British philosophy and
logic the psychological attitude as he calls it.
We take it for gr-anted and as a matter of COL\rSe
that, like sensations and emotions, ideas are
phenomena. And, considering these phenomena as
psychical facts, we have tried (with what success
I will not ask) to distingLlish between ideas and
sensations. But, intent on this, we have as good
as forgotten the way in which logic uses ideas.
[ 1 ]
Bradley suggests that there is at least one fundamental
pr-ob 1 em f or those who ignore II the way in wh i ch log i C L\SeS
ideas": .. if an idea were treated as a psychical reali-
ty:w if it were taken by i tsel f as an actL,al phenomenon, then
i t WOllI d not represent ei ther trL\th or f al sehood ... (FILII p.
2) But logic treats of truth and falsehood, and of rela-
tions between truths and falsehoods. Consequently the ideas
of logic (concepts, and things that represent truth and
falsehood) cannot be psychical phenomena.
This is intriguing. We can agree that if actual pheno-
mena cannot represent truth and falsehood, then any doctrine
which has it that psychical phenomena represent truth and
falsehood must be wrong. So if this is Bradley's train of
thOLtght we can e>:pect a defence of the premi se that actL,al
phenomena cannot represent truth and falsehood. Even if
this is not the form of Bradley=-s argl_tment ~Ie can e>:pect a
defence of a weaker claim, that psychical phenomena, at
least~ are not concepts and do nat represent truth and
falsehood.
published just one year after Bradley~s Ecin£i~l~§ Qf bQgi£,
Fr-ege begi ns wi th si mi 1ar comp 1ai nt s e>: pressed i n mLtch the
Frege suggests that the investigation of the
foundations of arithmetic, and of the concept of nLtmber i n
part i eLl! ar, is of concern to both philosophy and mathema-
ti cs; but he acknowledges that in the past~ e>:changes be-
tween philosophers and mathematicians have not been fruit-
fL\l. "Thi sis dLte ll ~ Fr-ege c:l ai ms, II... to the predomi nance
in philosophy of psychological methods of argument~ which
[2J
have penetrated even to the field of logic. 1I The effect
of these methods is that philosophers
suppose ••• that concepts sprout in the individual
mind like leaves on a tree, and we thin~, to dis-
cover their nature by studying their birth: we
see~~ to def i ne them psychol ogi call y, i n terms of
the nature of the human mind. But'this account
makes everything subjective, and if we follow it
thrOLtgh to the end, does away wit;l trLtth. (FA, p.
vii.)
Again what is problematic is the assumption that concepts
14
are psychical particLtlars, things that OCCLtr- i.n tile ntind and
have a 'birth'. The suggested consequence of the assumption
i s that it;' does a""ay ''Ii th trLlth'.
To take one final example, it is well known that anti-
psychol og i sm abOLtt 1 og i c: i 5 promi nent i n the ear 1 y wor ~( of
Moore and Russell. It first surfaces, ironically~ as part
of Moore~s reaction to Bradley's theory of judgement. Moo.e
argLles to the cone 1 L,si on that II the idea Llsed in j Ltdgement
cannot ••• be described as part of the content of any
[3J
psycho! og i c: al idea what soever U , and that prob 1 ems ar i se
for any theory that tri es lito e>:pl ai n the concept in terms
of some existent fact, whether mental or of any other na-
tLlre. II (NJ, p. 179) It is only with the rejection of any
attempt to identify conc:epts with particulars~
Qci with mental particulars, that one can explain the natu.e
of judgements (propositions or truth-bearers)~
ticn, and of truth itself.
of predica-
All three philosophers deny that concepts are mental
parti eLll ars. JL\st how. far th i s apparent agr~ement eH tends
is moot. Both Bradley and Moore suppose that truth-bearers
are, or are composed of, concepts or ~logical ideas~; but as
Frege develops his notion of a concept in the light of his
sense-reference distinction this is not the case. On the
other hand, it is clear that in his later wor~( Frege denies
that truth-bearers, and senses in general, are sL\bjec:ti ve.~
psychical particulars: "for me, what is true is something
objective and independent of the judging subject;
15
for psy-
[4J
chological logicians it is not. II I will use this latter
point as an e~~CL,se for- sliding over the fact that there is
no shared view as to what concepts are~ for these philoso-
phers cer-tainly agre~ about the incorrectness of particLtlar
views. In order to have a label at my disposal I will say
that any doctrine which entails that concepts and truth-
bearers are psychi cal par-ti CLll ars entai 1 s e.2~£t!Q!,gg!.§m e~Q!:!i
~QO£§et§ ~D~ t~~tb=~§~~~C§. Notice that psychologism about
concepts and truth-bearers does yield an interpretation of
the psychologistic slogan. Laws of IDgic are generBliza-
tions about propositions or truth-bearers. But if truth-
bearers a,e psychical pa,tic:ulars then laws of logic are
laws about psychical particulars.
There are a number of interesting arguments against
psychologism about concepts and truth-bearers, or versions
of such a thesis, to be found in the work of Bradley, Frege,
and Moore. The arguments, and the questions they raise, are
historically important, but they are also philosophically
interesting in their own right. In subsequent sections I
will look at several of the arguments against psychologism
about concepts and truth bearers. But there are other ~incs
of psychologistic theses about logic~ most of which are not
ta~~:en as seri oLlsl y by these phi losophers. What I want to do
first is to suggest and examine a second psychologistic
thesis about logic. For I want to show that Bradley, Frege,
and Moore really are justified in placing so much emphasis
16
on this first psychologistic thesis. They a~e right to
concentrate on this issue because (as I will argue) it
real 1 'y i 5 a centr-al component of one obvi OLlS ver"si on of
psychologism about logic; moreover it is an issue that is
mo~e tractable than many others. It is a central issue even
if the traditional questions about logic (questions such as:
what is the nature of logical truth, necessity, and implica-
tion; what is the nature of the laws of logic; and, of
COLt,'-Se, what are the laws of logic) do not explicitly raise
the question of the ontological status of concepts and
trLlth-bearers.
1. Bradley, F.H., In~ ~~iQ£~~1~2 Qi bQgt£~ Vol I (1883),
2nd Edition, Oxford U. P, 1922, p. 2. I will refer to
this work as ~PL'.
2. Frege, Gottlob, Ib~ EQ~QQei~Qn~ 2f a~~tbm~i~£ (trans.
AL\stin), Basil Blackwell g( Matt!' Ltd., 1959, p. v. I
will refer to this work as ~FA'.
3. Moore, G.E., liThe NatLlre of JLtdgement ll , Mind 3(1. 1899,
p. 179. I will refer to this paper as ~NJ'.
Frege,
FLtrth) ,
Angeles,
"BLA".
4. Gottlob~ Ih~ §e~1£ b~~~ ei ac~~bm~~~~, (trans.
Univ. of California Press, Berkeley and Los
1964, p. 15. I wi 11 refer to thi 5 boC'h as
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I want to contrast psychologism about concepts and
truth-bearers with another,
psychologistic conclusion.
stronger interpretation of the
This is the thesis that the laws
of logic actually ~C§, or fQ!lQ~ f~Qm, the laws of psycholo-
gy, as opposed to being laws about the same things that
psychological 1 aws are aboLlt. By way of e>: amp 1e, let me
amplify some remarks that Joseph makes. Logic is a science,
and the point of a science is to uncover principles --- laws
Here the term ~law' is not to be understood in
any prescriptive sense. For instance, when we say that the
planets follow astronomical laws, we mean that those laws
are ~il1ustrated~ by the behaviour of the planets.
Such laws, the general principles to which things
in their properties and their behaviour do actual-
ly conform, are what the physical sciences seek to
discover, each in its own department, and if logic
is a science, it must have a subject of its own,
in which it seeks for principles and laws. (Jo-
seph, p. 2)
So there a~e two basic ideas: a science has a subject~ and
it generates laws about that subject.
Now, Joseph says that the subject of logic is thought.
By this he means that logic is supposed to characterize
thOLlght as it OCCL,rs --- e>;amples of thin~::ing~ cases of a
person thinking this or that.
the study of motion in physics.
This is quite analagous to
The subject of a theory of
dynamics is motion, that is, cases of objects moving here or
there. So just as the physicist tries to discover laws that
particular cases of motion illustrate,
18
so logic "is the
science which studies the general principles in accordance
with which we think about things~ whatever things they may
be .. (Joseph, p. 3)
The natural assumption, and the assumption that Joseph
pretty clearly makes, is that all c~ses of thinking are
occurrences of mental phenom~na, psycholgical events or
processes. It is true that we often characterize differ-
ences in thoughts via differences in what the thoughts are
aboL,t; in f act Joseph contends that .. all thOL\ght i 5 ~ th i n ~::­
ing this or that:' It. (Joseph, p. 12) ThL\S lithe operations of
the mind are unintelligible, if we disregard altogether the
natL,re of their objects". (Joseph, p. 12) Still, thinl~ing
this or that is an operation of the mind, a mental process.
But psychology studies occurrences of mental phenomena.
Indeed the subject of psychology is presumably the set of
~!.!. OCCLlrrences of mental phenomerla. ThL'S, on Joseph:' s
view, the subject of logic is included in the subject of
psychology. I take it that to claim that the subject of
logic is included in the subject of psychology is just
psychologism about concepts and truth-bearers. But there
i 5 another step that can be ta~(en. One can SLlppose not onl y
that the subject of logic is included in the subject of
psychology, but that the laws of logic are psychological
laws, or follow from psychological laws. In other words one
can suppose that logic: iE' or ~2 C~QY£~ei~ tg, psychology.
This is a stronger version of psychologism about logic, and
19
is surely another way of interpreting the psychologisti=
slogan.
There are a number of conditions that have to be met in
order fo~ it to be plausible that a theory A is part of~
identical with, or reducible to a theory B. For e>:ampl e~
consider the following two conditions that are both necessa-
ry, though not jointly sufficient: the first I will call
condition S, that the subject of theory A is included in the
subject of theory B; and the second I will call condition T~
that each sentence of theory A has the same truth conditions
as the sentence of theory B that it is identified with.
What should be quite clear is that the subject of one theory
can be inclL\ded in the sLlbject of another" (condition Scan
be met) without it thereby being identical with, or part of,
the other, and in particular without condition T being met.
For two theories can say different but compatible things
about the same class of entities.
The point here is not to attempt to list all the condi-
tions of a succesful identification of two theories~ but
rather to distinguish several importantly different ways in
which proposed reductions or identifications can be chal-
lenged. Thus in the first place one could try to demon-
strate that the subject of the theory to be reduced is not
included in the subject of the reducing theory that
condition S is not met. In the second place one could try
to show that the truth conditions of a sentence to be re-
duced differ from those of its reducing sentence that
condition T is not met. Of COLlrse th i 5 second kind of
argument would be rather unusual because the question of a
possible identification o"f two theories (or more likely, of
two kinds of theories) would only be broached given the
supposition that the two <kinds of) theories in question are
both trLte. But this second type of argument suggests a
whole additional range of possible arguments against an
identification of two theories. For in general one may try
to demonstrate that the sentences of one theory may lack (or
have) some property that the sentences of the second theory
have (or lac~::). For e}·:ample, the sentences of one may not
[1 J
be !~~§ ~Mile the sentences of the other are, or the
sentences of one theory may be necessary (if true) but the
sentences of the other only contingent <if true), and so on.
Thus I will say that some condition P is being challenged
when 'i tis argL\ed that the sentences of one theory have some
property P that sentences of the other lack.
While it is possible to suppose that logic is part of
or reducible to psychology,
emphasis in the right place.
it is important to put the
It is not that I think that an
identification of logic with some part of psychology is
either very interesting or plausible. It is rather, on the
one hand, that some philosophers have made claims that can
be legitimately interpreted as a £Qmm!tm~Dt to such an
identification, although to my knowledge no serious attempt
has ever been made to carry out such a programme.
21
And~ on
the other hand~ philosophers have offered principled objec-
tions and arguments against the possibility of any such
identification --- for e>:ample, that the sentences of one of
logic or psychology must have some property P that the
sentences of the other lack. Whether or not any such argu-
ments are ultimately successful, the important point for now
is to be clear about the relation between psychologism about
concepts and truth-bea~ers and other possible psychologistic
posi t ions. I take it that in denyi ng the trL\th of psycll010-
gism about concepts and t~uth-bearers, Bradley, Frege, and
Moore are denying that the subject of logic is included in
the sLtbject of psychology. Certai n1 y if thei r argLtments
succeed, it follows that there can be no identification of
logic with psychology. On the other hand, from the fact
that one has a demonstration that there can be no identifi-
cati on of 1 ogi c wi th psyc;1101ogy it does not foIl o,~ that
psychologism about concepts and truth-bearers is false. For
it may be possible to argue in any particular case that
condition T is not met, or that there is some condition P
that (in principle) cannot be met, without thereby raising
the question of whether or not the subject of logic is
included in the subject of psychology. Thus a thesis that
maintains an identification of logic with some part of
psychology is much stronger than a thesis that merely main-
tains psycholcgism about concepts and truth-bearers~ in the
sense that the former implies, but is not implied by~ the
latter ..
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1. Consider the proposal that psychology is redu~ible to
physics. One traditional question is whether the laws
of psychology will be mapped onto the laws of physics~
or merely that the laws of psychology will be mapped
onto true sentences (but not necessarily laws) of phy-
sics. The former meets the paradigm of an empiricist
reduction, but perhaps the latter deserves to be called
a redL'ct i on as well. Both kinds of redL'ct i on pr'esLlp-
pose that conditions Sand T are satisfied~ but they
differ in what further conditions have to be met. For
example, the strong empiricist reduction involves type
identities (psychological types are really physical
types), and so on. Often these questions are discussed
in terms of what the bridge laws (or generalizations)
between psychology and physi cs are like. My poi rlt i 5
that to suppose that there ~~g bridge laws (or genera-
lizations if there are no laws> is to suppose that
conditions Sand T are met.
It could be that condition S is met by psychology
and physics while condition T is not --- but this is
not an initially attractive position fo~ philosophers
of mind. The result would be that there are properties
and events that are not physical properties and physi-
cal events. In the case of psychology and physics it
does not seem possible that condition T could be satis-
fied but not condition S.
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I mentioned ear"lier that the main concern of E~radleY!l
Frege!l and Moore is with psychologism about concepts and
trLlth bearers. But Frege does briefly discuss a version of
an identification thesis with respect to mathematics and
psychology. For when Frege asserts that .. i f nL,mber- were an
idea, mathemat i cs WOLtl d be psychology" (FA:- p. 37), i tis
natural to suppose that he is worried about an identifica-
tion of arithmetic with psychology. The e>:ample is interest-
ing in its own right, but it also leads directly to ques-
tions about psychologism with respect to logic as well as to
mathematics. Perhaps more importantly, the example shows
the difficulty of arguing for or against an identification
thesis; certainly when Frege's observations are taken as
arguments against such an identification they vary in merit.
However, some of Frege:-s r-emarks ar-e directed against
the claim that the subject of arithmetic is included in the
subject of psychology, and it is interesting to see the
progression from arguments against this weaker claim to
arguments against the stronger identification thesis. By
and large, I thi n~~ that the argL,ments that Frege tnakes
against the weaker thesis are unsuccessful.
example, that
He writes, for
if we say 'The North Sea is 10~OOO square miles in
extent' th~n neither by ~North Sea' nor by
~10,OOO' do we refer to any state of or process in
our minds: on the contrary, we assert something
quite objective, which is independent of our ideas
and everything of that sort. (FA, p. 34)
24
Gi yen the aSSLlmpt i on that in :- The North Sea i s 1(), ()(H) sqL,at-e
mi 1 es· in e>:tent' the nLtmber term ' 1(), ()()():' refer:. to a nL'm-
ber, Frege=' s deni 81 that thi S L\Se of :- 1():- ()(U):' refers to a
psychological state or process simply amounts to a denial
[ 1 J
that numbers are psychological states or processes.
But perhaps there is also an argument here. If nL"llber can
be showr. to have a property, QQjg£.:t.iYi~~, that psychological
states and processes lack, then Frege does have the basis
for a genuine argument that numbers are not psychological
entities, and that the subject of arithmetic is not included
in the subject of psychology.
Now, "what is objective •.. is what is sLlbject to laws~
what can be conceived and judged, what is expressable in
words" (FA, p. 35). Moreover- ~ "what is pL\rel y i ntLli tabl e is
not COmmL\n i cab 1e" (FA, p. 35). Thus what is purely intuita-
ble, what Frege also calls §~n§~ttQD, is not objective.
From this we can generate an argument. Numbers are objec-
tive; they are subject to laws, they can be conceived and
judged about~ and such conceptions and judgements are commu-
nicable. Ideas are purely intuitable, and so are not objec-
tive. Presumably the subject of psychology is composed of
what is purely intuitable, and so the subject of mathematics
is not included in the subject of psychology.
Surely the psychologist has a ready reply. F'erhaps
there i§ something that is' purely intuitable and is not
c:ommLtn i cab 1e; and if there is:, let us call it §~nE2tiQn as
Frege does. But even if there are sensations of this spe-
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cial kind~ most psychologists suppose that there arc other
sorts of mental entities that are objective in the requisite
sense. Associationist psychology~ for example~ supposes that
there are impressions and ideas~ and that these objects are
subject to laws --- to the laws of association. Moreover~
it seems that at least some of our judgements are judgements
ideas, and that such judgements can be communicated
that i s~ expressed in words. Thus the associ"ationist
has grounds for claiming that ideas meet all of Frege's
conditions for- objectivity~ and so can deny that ideas lack
this property that numbers have.
As far as I kMow Frege does not anticipate such an
objection. In a footnote where he distinguishes an
~objective notion' of idea from the ~subjective notion~ he
~Jrites: II an idea in the sL,b ject i ve sense i s what i s govern-
ed by the psychological laws of association; it is of sensi-
ble, pictorial char-acter lt (FA, p. 37). So he would certain-
ly disag.ee with what I proposed as the psychologist~s
reply, that what is subject to the laws of association meets
all of the criteria for objectivity. But this is not e-
nough. For in the face of the associationist~s response~ it
begins to look as though Frege is simply identifying the
non-objecti ve "'Ji th the psychol ogi cal. I "am not goi ng to
argue against Fr-ege~s drawing the objective/non-objective
distinction in this way. But without any further justifica-
tion of this dlstinction the associationist will
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contend
that the assertion that numbers are objectiv~ has only the
force of the assertion that numbers are not psychological
ent i t. i i:~tS and we were look i ng f or an ~!:g!dmgoi to tt"lat
conc 1 Ltsi on.
Of course this issue is not closed. Perhaps it can be
shown that there are other properties that numbers have and
i dea5. lack. BLlt by way of contrast I WOLll d 1 i ke to tLlrn to
som€ very different considerations that Frege raises. These
considerations can be turned into a rather powerful argument
against the possibility of there being any identification of
arithmetic with psychology, not by tackling the ontological
question of whether the subject of arithmetic is included in
the sLlbject of psychology, bLlt by directly tackling the
question of whether some appropriate condition P can be met.
One of the fundamental philosophical problems discussed
what is "the natLlre of
arithmetic~:\l trLtths " ? (FA, p. 3) The burden of the book is
to show that they are analytic and a priori. The truths of
arithmetic are analytic if they can be shown to follow from
general logical laws and definitions~ and they are a priori
if they can be proven without appeal to particular factual
claims (see FA, p. 4). The method of proving the conclusion
is by actually ~gmQn§t~~~!D9 that the truths of arithmetic
follow from the general laws of logic, without any appeal to
particular facts. Although a complete proof does not actu-
ally occur in FA, one must agree that the apparent success
of the project jLlstifies Frege's assertion that it is "a
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very p~obable conclusion that the truths of arithmetic are
analytic and a prior-i II (FA~ p. 11 B) • ThLtS t.he b:lok
itself provides the basis for a master argument against
psychologism, or any other doctrine that implies that the
truths of arithmetic are other than analytic and a priori.
For both sides agree that the truths of psychology are
synthetic and a posteriori; thus no sentence of psychology
has all of the properties of any sentence of arithmetic. In
[2J
other words some condition P cannot be met. Notice
that this argument is conducted independently of the ontolo-
gical question of whether the subject of arithmetic is
[3J
included in the subject of psychology.
The master argL\ment depends on thel~e bei ng a der- i vat ion
of arithmetic from logic, but it also depends on the nature
of the laws of logic themselves. In the EQ~nQ2tiQn§ Frege
does not (explicitly> discuss the nature of the laws of
logic, but the application of the master argument to a
critique of psychologism in mathematics forces the issue.
To see this, consider someone who accepts an identification
of logic with psychology. Such a philosopher could accept
that there is a derivation of arithmetic from logic~ but
contend that logic is a part of psychology. ThLtS he accepts
that the laws of arithmetic are analytic in Frege's sense
indeed it obviously follows that some laws of psychology
(or some of their consequences) are also analytic in this
sense. However this is no prob:em for the psychological
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notion of analyticity is fairly trivial.
logician
Frege's
and mathematician~ For from this point of vi e~J
And per"-
haps more importantly, the laws and statements of psychology
generally will not be analytic, since it will be maintained
that logic is reducible to a proper part of psychology and
that arithmetic is reducible to a proper part of logic.
Thus the fact that the laws of psychology are not in general
analytic in Frege~s sense is no reason for denying either
that arithmetic or logic is reducible to psychology.
So the anti-psychologist about arithmetic who follows
the master argument is forced to raise the questions: what
are the laws of logic~ what are their truth conditions; and~
as Frege sometime~ asks, how are they justified? Our anti-
psychol ogi 51: aboL,t ari thmeti cis dri yen to as~~ these qt.les-
tions about l09iC because he must argue that some condition
p do~s not hold between logic and psychology --- for that is
how the psychologist escaped the master argL,ment. Wt,i Ie
these important questions about logic m~y be motivated by
anti-psychologism in the way I have suggested, they are
rather ind~pendent of the ontolGgical questions about what
truth-bearers are. It seems that at least in principle the
anti-psychologist can raise these additional questions about
the nature of logic and logical truth without thereby rais-
ing the ontological questions about concepts and truth-
bearers.
It is interesting to note that Frege himself cannot
accept such a response to the proponent of psychologism who
turns the master argument around in this way. For Frege
seems to think that we are not entitled to raise questions
about the nature and ultimate justification of the laws of
logic:. And he certainly thinks that there is no legitimate
way of answer i ng SL\c:t, qL\est ions.
that
He writes, for e>: amp 1e ,
The question why and with what right we acknow-
ledge a law of logic to be true, logic can answer
only by reducing it to another law of logic.
Where this is not possible, logic can give no
answer. If we step away from logic, we may saYI
we are compelled to make judgements by our own
nature and by external circumstances; and if we do
so we cannot reject this law --- of Identity, for
example; we must acknowledge it unless we wish to
reduce our thoughts to confusion and finally re-
nounce all judgement whatever. I shall neither
dispute nor support this view; I shall merely
remark that what we have here is not a logical
consequence. What is given is not a reason for
something~5 being true~ but for our taking it to
be trl.~e. (BLA, p. 15)
Frege is not minimizing the strength of such reasons for
taking laws of logic to be true. But such reasons do not
l~§t~f~ the truth of the laws of logic. Perhaps there is no
such justification because there is no deeper level to
[4]
retreat to. There is only the internal justification
for a given law that other laws can sometimes provide.
Since there is no external point of view for justification~
there is no external point of view from which to challenge
or defend the thesis that this particular condition P has
[5]
been met.
Frege does actually try to use these apparent facts to
argue against the psychologistic position by showing that
there is a fundamental incoherence in that position.
pose that when we try to 'step away from logic~ we
SL\P-
do in
fact find that by some kind of psychological necessity we
cannot reject the laws o~ logic. Then we must face the
consequences of this, and proponents of psychologism about
logic are not always willing to do so. This necessity would
not prevent us from imagining beings whose thought is go-
verned by other laws, and who reject the laws of truth.
"Where it hi nders L\S is in SL\pposi ng that these bei ngs are
right in so doing~ it hinders us in having doubts whether we
or they are right" <BLA~ p. 15). For if it is trL\e that we
cannot doubt the laws of logic --- well, then we can't! As
far as we are concerned the other beings are simply wrong.
Frege seems to thi n~:: that thi s shows that there is some
incoherence in the psychologist~s position. The proponent
of psychologism wants to say that other systems of logic are
possible or conceivable --- in some sense just as legitimate
as our system --- but by hypothesis I am not able to reject
(or doubt) the presently accepted laws of logic.
If this is the only argument <and Frege does not fill
in any more details) then it is not very convincing. There
is certainly an underlying problem here, about determining
what it is to ~~£~2~ (or reject) laws of logic. It certain-
ly is not to ~e~ that one accepts them. For whatever it is
to accept laws of logic, we suppose both that most people do
accept them and that most people cannot formulate them. So
if we really want to get a grip on the issues here it would
help immensely if we had a better understanding of what it
is to accept or reject laws of logic. But the real diffi-
culty appears to be independent of this point. For one
wants to reply that our supposed. inability to reject the
present laws of logic does not (also by hypothesis) prevent
us from imagining and describing an alternative system of
logic that is accepted by other beings. And is such a
description not enough to show its possibility even if
we think that such beings would be wrong?
I think that this reply suggests another argument that
may be the real point behind Frege's worry. I thin~~ the
problem is not really about whether or not we are psycholo-
gically capable of rejecting the laws we presently accept,
but rather whether it really is possible to coherently
describe alternative systems of logic. For, on the one
hand, this seems to imply that there are systems of logic
that are tQ£Qm22~i~l~ with our own, but, on the other hand~
that such systems are at least Qg§§t~i~ systems. But this
is incoherent. That is, the description I just gave commits
m~ to an inconsistency. Fer any laws or statements that are
incompatible with the laws of logic I now accept are impos-
sible --- they are not only false, but (from my point of
view) are logically or necessarily false. So the proponent
of psychologism seems to be unable to state his position
consistently. Notice that the point does not turn on the
hypothesis that we cannot reject the laws we presently ac-
3?
cept. It is rather that given the laws we presently accept,
we cannot coherently describe the psychologistic thesis.
I do not think that this is an air-tight argument. But
it is fairly convincing for someone in Frege's poisition who
does not see the legitimacy of ~stepping outside' a system
of logic. For the one major point in the argument that
seems open to question by the proponent of psychologism is
the contention that the proposed description would not be
about a possible situation --- not possible ~~~~y~~ it ~~
To the proponent of psychologism this must be
question-begging. For him the claim that other systems of
logic are possible must imply that possibility is divorced
from consistency --- that is, from our ~parochial~ notion of
consistency. In order to make his position coherent, the
proponent of psychologism must come up with an answer the
question of what it is to accept, or follow, a system of
logic. This is not a project that Frege is prepared to take
[6]
seriously.
The upshot of Frege's position is that his only re-
course against the proponent of psychologism who tries to
force an identification of logic with psychology is to argue
against psychologism about concepts and truth-bearers. The
question of whether or not condition P is met is not open
for discussion, as far as Frege is concerned, because he
thinks that there is no position from which we c~n legiti-
mately question or judge the truth and ultimate justifica-
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tion of the laws of logic. (On the other hand this stanc~
does justify his claim that the psychological logican cannot
state his position coherently.) But he can discuss condi-
ticn S. As Frege concludes~
Surveying the whole question, it seems to me that
the source of the dispute lies in a difference in
our conception of what is true. For me~ what is
trLle is something objective and independent of tt,e
judging subject; for psychological logicians it is
not. (BLA, p. 15)
Thus in Frege's own case there is a special motivation for
his narrowing the dispute with psychologism about logic to
the ontological question; he has argued that it is the only
questicn open for debate.
1. Of course he is right that there is no ~~ellslt refer-
ence to psychological states or processes, but that
cannot be the point at issue.
2. Frege sets out these considerations fairly clearly on
p. 5 of FA.
3. It is also appears to be independent of the question of
whether or not condition T can be met. Certainly no
par-ticLtlar identification is being proposed and e)~a­
-mined. The question is whether or not two sentences
can have the same truth conditions, but one is synthe-
tic and a posteriori~ while the other is analytic and a
priori --- and that issue simply has not been raised.
4. Some will object to my supposition that Frege thinks of
justication as working in this untenable way. I would
sympathise if I could see what other argument he might
have in mind.
5. Perhaps it would be possible to rework this result into
an arument at another level. For since laws of psycho-
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19oy apparently ~C~ justifiable in a way that logical
laws are not, then there is a prima facie case for
denying the identification thesis. However the
psychological logician will not be impressed with this
argument.
6. I will not be pursuing this issue here,
speak to it indirectly at several points.
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but I will
Before I return to arguments that are specifically
directed against psychologism about concepts and truth-
bearers, I want to take one more looh at t,he stronger i den-
tification thesis. Of course~ as we have seen, a refutation
of the weaker thesis amounts to a refutation of the 5trong~r
thesis~ si nee the wea~~er thesi s jLlst is c:ondi ti on S. BL,t I
think that most philosophers would find an identification
thesis implausible over and above any problems with c:ondi-
tion S. For most philosophers are convinced that some
condition P is obviously not satisfiable --- that is, that
the laws of logic have some properties that laws of psycho-
logy do not have, or vice versa. However, we will find that
it is rather difficult to flesh out the apparently obvious
implausibility of any identification thesis, in ways that go
beyond the (as yet unexamined) problems associated with the
satisfaction of condition S.
These commonly accepted intuitions are often supported
by the kind of argument that is given by Chisholm. He
suggests that a logical truth such as
(L) for any propositions p and q, if P is true~
and p implies q, then q is true,
might be given the following psychologistic interpretation:
everyone is so constituted psychologically that if
he believes that p is true, and if he believes
that p implies q, he cannot but help believe that
q is trL,e. [1]
Chisholm argues against such interpretations of logical laws
in the following way:
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(a) Since lithe psychological sentences are empi-
rical generalizations about the way in which
people think •.• they can be supported only
by e>:tensi ve psychol ogi cal research".
(b) BLlt IIbeing empiric:al generalizations, the
psychological sentences are probable at best
and are at the mercy of contrary instances".
(c) Moreover the existence (or even the possibi-
lity?) of contrary instances to psychological
general i z at ions .. has no bear i ng on the trLtths
expressed by (sentences ~uch as) ~neces­
sarily, for any propositions p and q, if P is
trL&e and if P i mpl i es q then q is trL&e'."
(All quotations are from Chisholm~ p. 51.)
We are to conclude, presL\mab 1 y, that since the sentence
mentioned in (c) does express a typical truth of logic, no
sentence of psychology expresses a truth of logic.
I think that the argument can be taken in two different
ways:
tion T,
it could be understood as an argument against condi-
or else as an argument against some condition P.
First~ if we understand (b) as asserting that there actually
are falsifying instances, then there must be an explicit
reference to some particular psychologistic interpretation
of logic, which might include a generalization such as
Chisholm's interpretation of (L). Of course the suggested
interpretation is false. But all that follows from this~
since the laws of logic are true, is that any proposed
identification that employs Chisholm~s suggestion as a
translation for some law of logic must be rejected.
not follow that laws of logic are not empirical
It does
gener-
alizations. A proponent of an identification or reduction
thesis is committed to the claim that there are true
37
(and
e): c:ept i on 1ess)
[2J
empirical generalizations that are iden-
tifiable with laws of logic. But it is surely no test of
this claim to point out that a false psychological generali-
zation is false!
Very li~;:ely this is not Chisholm:'s argL,ment. So c:onsi-
de. a second way of understanding (b) that is not directed
at any partic:ular psychologistic proposal. Emphasizing the
distinction between 'empirical~ and ~nece5sary' laws is the
key here. Perhap~ the argument is simply this. First,
psychological generalizations are empirical gen-
eral i z at ions.
When Chisholm goes on to say that empirical generalizations
are 'probable at best' (see (b» he s~ems to mean that
empirical generalizations are (at best) ~QQfi~m~Q
to some high degree of probability. [3]
logical laws are necessary,
and so no logical law is a psychological law.
Let me just mention two problems with this argument.
First, even those who (with Chisholm) claim to have a clear
understanding of necessity, and of the distinction between
necessary and non-necessary truths, should demand a reformu-
lation of the argument. Whether or not a truth is necessary
is quite independent of whether or not we know it to be
trLte, or have confirmed it to a high degree. That is, it is
not inconsistent to assert of a proposition both that ~t is
only confirmed to some degree, or indeed that we doubt its
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trLtth :r but also that it is (if true) necessary. So change
the argL\ment. The most obvious thing to do is to replace
references to the epistemological status of the truths in
question with references to their necessity or non-necessi-
ty. Then Chi5holm~s argument turns out to be:
laws of psychology are non-necessary;
laws of logic are necessary;
thL\S
no law of logic is a law of psychology.
Although this is certainly a valid argument there is
now a second problem. For when the argument is presented
this star~::ly, the proponent of psychologism has several
possible lines of response. Hi 5 most 1 i kel y strategi es· are
to argue either that the second premise is false or else
that the argument begs the question. Here necessity and
possibility must be divorced from logical truth, since the
psychologist must try to argue that logical
[4J
b~~~ ~~~Q other than they are. A more cautious approach
(not incompatible with the preceeding ~,ind of argument)
might be something like this. The proponent of psychologism
about logic accepts a certain set of data: we §e.~ that the
laws of logic are necessary, that they appear to us to be
necessary, and so on. What he wants to do is to explain that
set of data. One e>,planation is that the laws of logic are
necessary, and that we correctly see this. BL\t there co\..\l d
be other explanations. Perhaps necessity is not properly
applied to truth-bearers at all.
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For example, the apparent
necessity of a proposition could be analyzed as a kind of
attitude that a thinker has towards the proposition, or
perhaps as a function of the relations between the attitude
[SJ
and other psychological states, and so on. So we can
imagine that the proponent of psychologism could maintain
that the premises are not f31se~ but are either senseless or
else elliptical for some very complicated psychological
claim. In either case it could be claimed that the argument
begs the question on this issue.
I do not think that the psychologistic position that
has been presented is easy to follow and defend, but it is
clear that Chisholm~s argument does not refute the ~Q§§!~!=
!i~~ of an identification thesis. If you like, it poses a
challenge to a philosopher who proposes to identify logic
with some part of psychology. Chisholm has pointed out that
it seems to be a consequence of an identification thesis
that logical laws are non-necessary, and this needs to be
justified. But I expect that the proponent of psychologism
is quite willing to accept that challenge.
It is for this reason that I doubt that Chisholm has
gotten to the heart of the problem with identification
theses. Surely the main problem with such a thesis is not
the consequence that logical laws are not necessary truths.
To put it baldly, what philosophers find problematic is that
logical predicates and logical properties and relations
would turn out to be characterizable in terms of psycho-
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logical predicates and psychological properties and rela-
tions. That is, predicates such as ~is valid'~ :- is trLte' ,
'logically implies', and 'is deducible from~ may occur in
the formulation of logical laws. And it is certainly a goal
of logic to characterize validity, logical implication, and
dedLtc:ibility (if not trLtth). I thin~~ that what is~ in the
end, the most implausible aspect of an identification thesis
(besides its commitment to condition S) is not that laws of
logic seem to have different modal properties, and so C\
condition P is not met. It is rather our intuition that
psychological laws or sentences do not, and could not have,
the same truth-conditions as laws that employ these logical
predicates; so that condition T cannot be met in principle~
Or, to put this in another way, what is implausible is that
log i cal reI at ions and propert i es are even co-e>: tensi ve wi th
psychological relations. So far this is not to give any
argument, but perhaps we can say a little bit more.
I think that Frege is considering this kind of problem
when he warns us, as he often does, against what is called
the genetic fallacy: IInever let LtS take a description of
the origin of an idea for a definition, or an account of the
mental and physical conditions ort which we become conscioL'S
of C\ proposition for a proof of it. (FA, p. v.) Frege is
concentrating on a special case of the problem I want to
elaborate. He denies that ~~lD9 ~ e~QQf Qf is a psychologi-
cal relation, and in one passage he does attempt to defend
his view. Frege is willing to agree that there may be a
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psychological explanation of assertion --- a description of
the mental processes that lead to~
But he asks:
and cause~ an assertion.
Would not logical laws also have played a part in
this mental process? I do not want to dispute
this, but when it is a question of truth possibi-
lity is not enough. For it is also possible that
something not logical played a part in the process
and deflected it from the truth. We can only
decide this after we have discerned the laws of
truth; but then we will probably be able to do
without the derivation and explanation of the
mental process if it is important to us to decide
whether the assertion in wrich the process termi-
nates is justified. (T~ pp. 17-18)
Frege is acknowledging the possibility that in the mental
process that leads to assertion, logical laws, and perhaps
all the steps of a proof or justification of the asserted
proposition, may ~play a part~. But what Frege seems to be
reacting against is the idea that the proof or justification
of a proposition could turn out to be ~merely~ a psychologi-
cal process.
example.
I will try to make some headway by way of an
To begin, let me give a brief sketch of what a descrip-
ticn of a psychological process might be like. A physicist~
for example, might describe a physical process by referring
to the occurrence of a sequence of states that cause some
final state. So it is reasonable to suppose that the psy-
chological description of the cause of an event such as an
assertion (say, my assertion that I~ll go to the movie>
makes reference to the occurrence of a sequence of states
81, S2~ ..., and Sn, where Sn is the psychologi~al state
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that corresponds to the assertion~ and the occurrence of the
sequence of states 81, 82, and 8n-1 causes the occur-
renee of Sn. Thet the occurrence of states 81, 82, ..• , and
5n-1 £~~E~ the occurrence of Sn might follow from more
gene~al psychological laws.
Now, hi.)W are logical laws and propositions SL\pposed to
~play a part~ in such a m~ntal process? There is a certain
general pictL,re that we can make use of here. At least some
of the mental states that might cause an assertion are
belief states and other so called propositional attitude
states. I will introduce a little terminology here, and say
that a belief (or other attitude) state ~~E~~E~ol§ the
proposition that it is ~about'. We can i magi ne tha'~ among
the states 81, 82, ..., and 8n-1 that cause my assertion
that I ~ 11 go to the movi e, are bel i efs SL\ch as my bel. i ef
that if I find my wallet then I~ll go to the movie, and my
belief that I~ve found my wallet. Thus in such a circwm-
stance there will be two states that are referred to in th~
explanation of Sn that represent the two propositions that
if I find my wallet then 1 1 11 go to the movie~ and that I've
found my wallet. Sn is to represent the proposition that
1"11 go to the movie. In fact to simplify the e>:ample I
will suppose (what is unlikely for any human subject on any
psychological theory) that there are only two states 81 and
82 that are referred to in the description of the cause of
Sn, and thut those states are the beliefs in question. So
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in the example the conjunction of what is represented by 81
and what is represented by 82 implies what is represented by
Sn. I do not know for sure what a sophisticated proponent of
psychologism might say about this example. Certainly most
of us would agree that it is not very plausible to thin~~
that this psychological description of the occurrence of 81
and 82 causing the occurrence of Sn is a description of the
conjunction of two propositions implying or proving the
third. But let us suppose that the psychologist does say
this; how would we argue against him?
I would like to enter several caveats before I procede
any farther. First, whatever arguments we come up with
should not play on the fact that the psychology in the
example I gave is wrong, as the first interpretation of
Chisholm~s argument did. That is, this example is merely
supposed to provide an illustration to help us think about
the problem, and we are looking for an argument that does
not appeal to the incorrect details of ~ example. Second,
I want to reject a certain way of reading Frege~s argument
in the long passage I just cited. When Frege says that it
is "possible that something not logical played a part in the
process and deflected it from the truth" he can be taken to
be implying that it is QQt possible to ~deflect~ an implica-
tion from truth. That is, a logIcal implication is necessa-
ry, but a psychological law is not. On this reading we
simply have a version of the second interpretation of Chis-
holm 1 s argument allover again, and it is not the kind of
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[6J
argument we are looking for. Third~ I have not yet said
what logical laws are, and I have not tried to represent
logical laws explicitly in this example. I suspect that all
Frege means by 'logical laws' in this quotation is what I
have called laws of truth --- generalizations about truth
relations between propositions. An instance of a generaliza-
tion that is obviouly relevant to the example is this: if
the propositions that I~ve found my wallet and that if I've
found my wallet then I'll go to the m~vie are both true,
then the proposition that I'll go to the movie is true. We
could suppose that this instance of the generalization about
propositions, or that generalization itself, is repr~sented
by a state (say 53) that occurs in the psychological process
that causes the occurrence of Sn. But to add such addition-
al propositions doe not help --- the implication holds with-
out them. So I have kept the example simple.
These caveats aside, what ~~inds of arguments are there
to back up the intuition that logical relations such as
implication and proof cannot be psychological (causal) rela-
tions? When I say that the causal relation between 81 and
82, on the one hand, and Sn on the other, is not a case of
implication or proof, I am implicitly pinning a certain
thesis on the proponent of the identification of logic and
psychology, that logical relations hold between beliefs.
One way of putting this thesis is that what is represented
(the representation, in one sense) is to be identified with
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what does the representing (the representation, in another
sense) • It seems that it is is only under such an identifi-
cation that the causal relation under consideration could
even be a candidate for being a case of
[7J
proof.
implication or
I agree that this is an implausible thesis. For- e>:am-
ple~ it has as a consequence that a belief state is identi-
fied with what is believed.
a version of condition S,
But notice that this is simply
psychologism about concepts and
trLtth-bearers. Moreover the proponent of an identification
thesis could argue that his position has been grossly misre-
presented, and that he is not really committed to this way
of putting things. Let me point to an analogy, QLtine='5
doctrine that truth-bearers are sentences. It is not that
Quine agrees that there are propositions under some tradi-
tional characterization of what a proposition is say~
that a proposition is what is expressed by a sentence
and then discovers that propositions are just sentences
after all. Such a description first presupposes that there
is a special relation between sentences and propositions,
the relation of ~~e~~a~LQg, and then suggests that the
relation is part of the identity relation. From this cha-
racterization it would follow that a sentence expresses
itself
view.
surely an unsatisfactory description of Quine's
It is rather that Quine argues that there are no
propositions, but that sentences (or perhaps events of the
uttering of sentences) can perform the central
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fLtnc:ti ens
that propositions were invented to perform-
I th i n ~~ that the proponent of an i dent i f i cat ion thesi s
can respond in much the same way. When I said that a psy-
chological state such as Sn represents a proposition such as
the proposi ti on that 1 ~ 11 go to the movi e, it is r1atL,ral to
think that there are two ~bjects, the state and the proposi-
tion, related by the relation of ~§~~~~~O~~Og. But the
psychologist need not suppose that the notion of representa-
ti on i. 5 reI ati onal • Indeed most phi losophers WOLl} d agree
that the notion of representation cannot be relational in
all cases, and several philosophers such as Goodman (and
possibly Bradley) have tried to give non-relational accounts
of representation.
So let us suppose, at least f or the sa~~e of argLlment!l
that the proponent of psychologism is committed to a non-
relational account of representation. On that assumption
the implausibility of condition S does not arise in this
crLlde form. Moreover we were looking for arguments against
the identification thesis that did not depend on the implau-
sibility of satisfying condition S. So I want to a5~( my
question once again: is there any basis for our intuitions
against this identification thesis that goes beyond the pro-
blems with condition 87
Unfortunately I cannot really answer this question
here. The identification thesis seems to be developing into
the suggestion that laws or principles of proof and justifi-
47
cation are psychological principles --- that principles of
inference are psychological laws. This amounts to an elabo-
ration of the original psychologistic argument form that
occurred in the Introduction. The laws of logic are (or
provide) principles of justification or inference; justifi-
cation and inference are mental or psychological processes;
and so laws of logic are (or provide) laws of psychological
processes. In the previously quoted passage (p. 32)~ Frege
seems to contend that proof and justification are not~ and
do not depend on~ psychological processes or other phenome-
na. But the issues are extremely complex because the no-
tions of proof, justification, and inference are very diffi-
cult notions. In Part II I will argue that the issues have
to be resolved in a rather different way than Frege sug-
gests. I will agree with the proponent of psychologism that
it is at least very plausible that rules of proof or justi-
fication are (in some sense) psychological principles. But
I will argue against the view that principles of proof or
justification are, or are provided by, principles of deduc-
tive logic. So I will argue against any identification of
the laws of (deductive) logic with psychological laws. The
important considerations that do not dir'ectly involve the
rejection of psychologism about concepts and truth'-bearers
(the satisfaction of condition S) depend on a close e>:amina-
tion of the notions of justification and correct inference
(section 6 of Part II).
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1 • Chisholm, R., In~Qc~
Englewood Cliffs~ N.J.,
Qi t;QQ~!.~Qg§~
1966, p. 51.
F1rentice-Hall,
2. Some theorists, such as Fodor, have suggested that
psychological laws <and laws of the ~special sciences'
genera.lly> will DQ~ be e>;ceptionless. A redL\ctionist
who agreed with this, and also agreed that laws of
log i care e>; cept ion 1ess, WOL\l d have to accept a wea~,er
reduction --- a reduction of laws of logic not to laws
of psychology but to sentences of psychology that are
not laws. But this is a wrinkle that Chisholm has not
considered.
3. I am sure that Chisholm does not mean by this that all
empirical generalizations are Q~QQsQi!i§~i~ al-
though, as I pointed out (previous footnote) it has
been suggested that psychological laws are probabilis-
tic and are not exceptionless generalizations.
4. So we might look for arguments to the conclusion that
the laws of logic are 'revisable', although not
everyone who would support this ~~ind of claim would use
such an a,gumen~ to support some form of psychologism.
5. Frege, for example, suggests that the apparent necessi-
ty might be 'psychological'. See page 15 of BLA,
quoted on page 22 Section 3.
6. That is, I object to the immediate jump to necessity.
Maybe Frege has this in mind, but of course I will give
another intepretation in the next few pages. If anyone
does insist that Frege is giving some kind of a priori
argument here, then I might find it more tempting to
try and construct a different argument. Remember that
Frege says that the laws of logic 'explain~ the meaning
of the word ~true~. So we may not need to suppose that
Frege is committed to the necessity of logical laws~
but only to the incomprehensibility of logical laws
being false.
7. A reasonably sophisticated and motivated version of
this kind of position is discussed in section 2 of Part
II. But I will not go into any further details here.
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We have now seen ample justification for the importance
that B~adley~ Frege, and Moore give to psychologism about
concepts and truth-bearers. It stands as a psychologistic
thesis in its own right~ yielding an interpretation of what
I called the psychologistic conclusion (Introduction, p. 3),
and it is a component of any identification thesis. More-
over we have seen that there are genuine difficulties with
arguments against an identification thesis that attempt to
sidestep psychologism about concepts and truth bearers by
arguing against the satisfiability of condition T or of some
other condition P. So it is to this thesis that I now turn.
In Section 1 we saw that Bradley~ Frege~ and Moore all
reject the thesis that truth bearers could be ~actual pheno-
and especially psychological particulars. All three
suggest that this thesis leads to a problem with truth. For
example, Bradley says·that particulars (particular things)
cannot represent truth and falsehood, and all would agree
that ~~tEt~Qg or £QQ£~~t§ particulars cannot represent truth
and falsehood. Frege presents a most straightforward and
convincing set of considerations in support of this first
[1]
point~ and so I will use his arguments to illustrate the
position.
Frege sets out a number of common sense and (almost)
univ~rsally acceptable constraints upon what a truth-bearer
is. Actually Frege~s perspective is slightly different, for
he chooses to call truth-bearers taQ~gQt~:
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WithOLtt wishi"g to give a definition, I call a
thought something for which the question of truth
arises. So I ascribe what is false to a thought
just as much as what is true. (T~ p. 20)
And so a first partial characterization of thoughts is that
they are truth-bearers. A second important characterization
of thoughts is that they are the objects of assertion or
jLldgement (or, we can add, bel i ef) • For the question of
truth arises when one believes or judges~ asks a qLlest ion,
or e>~presses a bel i ef or jLldgement by maki ng an asser-
[2]
tion. And of course given that the subject matter of
both conditions is the same thing, the class of thoughts~ it
is also to be understood that
a thing can be believed, judged, asserted, or
asked if and only if it is something that is true
or false.
For the sake of campi eteness I ShOLl} d ment i on that
there is a third aspect of Frege~s characterization of
thoughts that does not concern me here, although from his
point of view it is perhaps the most important one. That is
the thesis that thoughts are the senses of sentences. The
relevant aspect of that thesis is that the sense of a sen-
tence :- determi nes' its trL,th vall..,e in the way that the sense
of a name determines its reference. Frege is clear that
this is a substantive thesis that needs defence on several
[3]
groLtnds.
Given this characterization of what a thought is, Frege
is concerned to show that thoughts are not ideas or other
psychological entities. The strategy is very simple.
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Frege
proceeds to characterize ideas in a way that even the ~un-
philosophical=' can readily agree with. Then, given the
preceding conditions on what thoughts can be, he argues that
ideas and thoughts do not have common characteristics, and
[4]
so cannot be the same things.
Frege ta~(es the obvi OLIS starti ng poi nt to be that ideas
compose lI an inner world distirlct from the oLlter world ll
lI a world of sense impressions, or creations of (the) imagi-
nation, of sensation, of feelings and moods, a world of in-
clinations, wishes and dec:isions ll • (T !I p. 26) Once this
rough characterization of ideas is accepted then the follow-
ing description of ideas can be motivated. First, ideas are
immaterial, for they are not sensed, touched, smelled, or
seen the way physical objects are. We say that we bEY~
ideas, not that we sense them. Second~ ideas have bearers.
This is part of the force of saying that ideas are had and
are not sensed. For there to be an idea it follows (Frege
would argue) that the idea must be had or borne by someone.
But almost no one would think that it follows from the fact
that some physical object exists that there must be someone
who senses it. Third, ideas have just one bearer. Again
almost everyone would agree that what is in one person's
consciousness cannot be in another consciousness. Of COLtrSe
different people can perceive the same things, bLlt the i m-
pressions or ideas that are a necessary condition for each
person~s perceiving the thing are distinct.
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Gi ven the f L\r-
ther plausible assumption that the bearer relation is irre-
flexive~ the force of the second and third claims is that
ideas are g~e~nQ~nt ~~c~i£~~~~§ --- the e>;istence of any
idea entails the existence of a unique distinct particular,
.
its bearer. Physical things~ for example, are not dependent
[5J
in this sense.
But are thoughts ideas? Like ideas, thoughts are not
material things, for they are not sensed or perceived in the
way that physical objects are perceived. But Frege also
suggests that thoughts are not ideas because they are not
dependent particulars --- and indeed that neither of the
second or third claims about ideas hold for thoughts. I
take it that what is most in need of justification~ when one
is faced with a proponent of an identity thesis, is that the
second claim about ideas does not hold for thoughts. I do
not think that Frege has any hard and fast argument here.
It is rather that these claims about the nature of thoughts
are motivated by the general claim that they are both truth
bearers and also what is asserted, judged, and believed~
just as the particular claims about the nature of ideas are
motivated by the general characterization of ideas as the
elements that compose the 'inner world~ of sensations.
The motivation or justification goes roughly like
[6J
this. First, remember the premise that thoughts are what
is believed, judged, and asserted. If thoughts are also
ideas, which can be had by only one bearer~ then it seems
that what I believe or judge or assert cannot be the same
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thing that anyone else believes, j L\dges ~ or- asserts. And,
with reference to the pythagorean theorem,
that
Frege poi nts OLtt
if it is not the same thought at all which is
taken to be the content of the Pythagorean Theorem
by me and by another person, one should not really
say ~the Pythagorean Theorem' by ~my Pythagorean
Theorem'~ 'his Pythagorean Theorem', and these
WOLlld be different •••• (T, p. 28)
Second,
false.
remember that thoughts are also what is true or
Then on the supposition that thoughts are ideas it
seems to be possible, for e>:mapl e, that my pythagorean
theorem could be true but someone else's false, since they
are completely distinct things. An analogy is that my
sensation of a particular strawberry may be red, whi 1 e it
seems to be possible that someone else's sensation of the
very same strawberry is not red (perhaps his sensations of
red are just like his and my sensations of green). Of
course Frege could ag~ee that there is also a sense of 'red~
[7]
that applies to things outside of consciousness, and
there COLlI d be a si mi 1 ar sense of IItrLle ll and "fal se". BL,t
that is not relevant since we are considering the plausibi-
lity of identifying truth-bearers with ideas.
Both of these consequences fly in the face of several
common sense intuitions. One such intuition is that we can
all believe, assert, and judge about a common subject.
Another related intuition is that we can disagree with each
other about the truth or falsity of particular judgements.
But if what I judge cannot be what you judge,
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then it does
not seem that we can be either agreeing or disagreeing about
anything at all. Let me introduce Frege~s terminology~ and
say that we ~2Q~~Q§UQ thoughts, as opposed to having or
bearing ideas. Then in so far as we accept these intui-
tions~ we have justification for denying that Lnly one
person can apprehend a thought, while we accept that only
one person can have or bear any particular idea. These
considerations are directed against the hypothesis that the
third claim about ideas holds for thoughts, but there are
considerations against the hypthesis that the second claim
about ideas holds as well. For we have the strong intuition
that, for example~ the pythagorean theorem was true prior to
anyone~s apprehending it or its truth. This is the intution
that not all thoughts need be apprehended,
ideas must be had or born.
although all
It is plausible to conclude from this that thoughts are
not ideas. For while ideas are dependent particulars since
they presuppose a unique bearer, thoughts are not dependent
particulars since they do not presuppose any apprehender at
all, let alone a unique one. So Frege says that
A third realm must be recognized. What belongs to
this corresponds with ideas, in that it cannot be
perceived by the senses, but with things, in that
it needs no bearer to the contents of whose con-
sciousness to belong. (T. p. 29)
Now perhaps, strictly spea~~ing, the argument does not really
show this much. For even if we accept all of the foregoing
intuitions, all that has actually been proven so far is that
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the apprehension relation is not the bearer relation! It is
at least possible, given all that has been assumed, that the
bearer and apprehension relations hold between the same
kinds of objects. While this point is correct, I think that
all it really shows is that a little more needs to be as-
sL\med i n order to olake the Fregean (and common sense) case.
For i nstarlce one r.:r:,J\.;,l d poi nt OL\t that there are PL\Z z·l i ng
assymetr i es c:",yendered by the more tentat i ve cone: 1Ltsi on II
One e~·: amp} e i 5 that some part i eL,l ar idea WOLl} d tL,rn OLlt to
be the pythagorean theorem, and so be apprehendable by
anyone of moderate intelligence; but that idea is born by
one and only one person. This assymetry will be prob-
lematic if further assumptions are made about the nature of
ideas, for example that the bearer must be aware of any
ideas that he has. This last aSsLtmption lacks a certain
generality, since there may be psychological particulars
that are not ideas in thi s tradi ti onal sen'se (and indeed
there may be no ideas at all in this traditional sense) •
Still, it seems that any psychological particulars would be
dependent particulars in the appropriate sense. A str-onger
and more general argument that could be raised at this point
would be to a~peal directly to the intuition that thoughts
are'true or false independently of, arid prior to, the e>:is-
tence of any human being. That this is one of the most
central and important anti-psychologistit intuitions will
come to light in section 7, where I will discuss the major
[8J
argument that explicitly makes use of it.
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I want to emphasize that my hesitations on this matter
are not intended to undermine Frege~s conclusion, at least
in the simple form that thoughts are not ideas or other
psychological particulars. There is no doubt that it is an
extremely plausible conclusion. But I do want to underscore
the fact that the justification that has so far been given
for it is just based on the Fregian (and I think common
sense) intuitions about truth-bearers. Few philosophers
would be prepared to ~hallenge these intuitions unless they
were in the grip of a special psychological theory~ and with
that case as an exception, I think that these rather mundane
considerations really do suffice to show that truth-bearers
[9]
are not psychological particulars. But does admitting
all of this refute psychologism about concepts and truth-
bearers? And if so, what was all the fuss about?
Although I agree that these considerations do refute,
or at least strongly undermine, the thesis that thoughts are
psychological particulars, I do not think that they refute
psychologism abolJt concepts and truth-bearers. The reason
is that these considerations still leave the door open for a
thesis that, from the point of view of a proponent of psy-
chologism, is just as good as, or amounts to a version of,
an identification thesis. For these considerations leave
open the possibility that truth-bearers and concepts are
t~2~~ of psychological particulars.
For the moment I am not going to question why anyone
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would possibly want to believe such a view. I will j l.tst
show that it really is compatible with the foregoing consi-
deratins. To summarize, thoughts do not <in general, at
least) presuppose the existence of a thinker --- in particu-
lar they do not have to be apprehended --- and they can be
apprehended by more than one person. Psychological particLC-
lars certainly do preSLtppOse the e>:istence of a thin~~er or
bearer ~ and it seen,s Llnl i kel y that the apprehensi on reI ati on
COLlI d be i:\ reI at i 01' between thi nkers and (some person:'s)
particular ideas, But surely anyone with a mildly robust
realism about univet·sals would not think that psychological
types presupposed the existence of any exemplars --- types
are timeless and exist independently of their exemplars (and
the bearers of those exemplars). And there is no problem
about devising symmetrical relations to types that different
thinkers can share --- for example being in a psychological
state that exemplifies the type in question. So the fore-
going considerations do not rulF out the possibility that
truth-bearers are psychological types. For the suggested
interpretation shows how it can be that one person ca~
apprehend the same thought at different times, and different
people can apprehend the same thought at the same or differ-
ent times.
Noti c:e that it does not i mmedi atel y follow tl,at psyc:ho-
logical particulars would have to be true or false after
all. For types or universals can certainly have lets of
properties that tokens do not (and vice versa), and it could
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be maintained that being true or false is one such case.
Indeed it would seem that whatever advantages or benefits
are reaped by holding a strict identification thesis would
also be reaped by adopting this suggestion that truth-
bearers are psychological types.
1. Most of Frege" s c:orlsi derati ens are presented in liThe
Thought", found in EbllQ2Q2Qt£el bQgi~, ed. P.F. Straw-
son, Oxford University Pre5s~ 1967, pp. 17 - 38. I
will refer to this work as :'IT='.
2. These considerations occur on pp_ 20 - 22 of T.
3. See for e>;ample in "On Sense and Reference". Ir:.e!:!a12=
ti9Q§ f~gm ~b~ Ebi!QEgebl~91 ~~i~iD9§ gf §gttlQ~ E~~g~,
Ed. by Beach and Blac~::, Basil Blac~~well, O>:ford, 197C1,
p. 62, as well as parts of 'The Thought~. Some nega-
tive considerations come from the fact that not all
i ndi cat i ve sentences have ·trLtth-vall.tes apart from some
context of utterance and intention of the speaker. So
it is at least arguable that what might appropriately
be called the sense of such sentences does not deter-
mine any truth-value, and so is not a candidate to be a
trL\th-bearer.
4. Frege does at least ID@QtiQQ several other kinds of
arguments to an apparently similar conclusion in 'The
Thought~. For example, he takes exception to the sug-
gestion that the truth of ideas might lie in the fact
that they correspond with things or states of affairs,
and argues that this leads to a harmful regress. And
he also suggests that while there may be a sense in
whi ch ideas are trLle, . thi 5 t'-Llth of ideas redLtc:es to,
or amounts to, the truth of some sentence or other.
These arguments occur on pp. 18 and 19 of T. I do not
find either of them very clear, and I will not discuss
them directly. But some of what Frege says about the
correspondence problem is at least reminiscent of some
considerations that Bradley raises, that are discussed
in section 6.
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5. Frege presents these considerations on pp. 26-8 of ~The
Thought'.
6. Most of these considerations are to be found in
Thought~~ pp. 28-29.
'The
7. And apparently does suppose this --- T, p. 27.
8. I will save the argument until that time~ since I thinh
that the interesting form of the argument covers a
wider ground than the considerations in this section
do.
9. Further arguments are discussed in Part II sections 2-
5, in which a more detailed psychologistic proposal is
discussed. One reason that this justification here is
so sketchy and programmatic is that we have character-
ized ideas themselves in such a fleeting way.
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Bradley raises objections to the suggestion that con-
cepts and truth-bearers are psychological particulars that
ar-e rather si mi 1 ar to Frege' S!I bt',," he shows more ~wareness
of the alternative positions that a proponent of psycholo-
gism might defend. Bradley wants to escape the trap of the
~psychological attitude' about logic (see the quotation on
page 6 of the Introduction). He readily admits that psycho-
logical states or ideas playa role in the mental
jLtdgement. BLlt
act of
we never assert the fact [ie. a particular idea Or
psychological state] in OL,r 'heads, bLtt something
else which that fact stands for. And if an idea
~g~g treated as a psychical reality, if it were
taken by itself as an actual phenomenon, then it
would not represent either truth or falsehood.
When we use it in judgement it must be referred
away from itself. (PL, p. 2)
So what Bradley wants to show is that psychological states
or ideas are, from the point of view of logic, symbols that
represent what is judged or asserted. What is judged or
asserted~ and what is represented by psychological phenomena
or ideas, are what Bradley calls ~univer5al meanings~
the ideas of logic.
Bradley~s argument against the strict identification
thesis, that the ideas of logic (concepts and truth-bearers)
are psychological phenomena or ideas, consists of a
philosophical joke •
(bad)
••• it is clear that the idea, which we use as the
predicate of a judgement, is' not my mental state
as SL\ch • "The whal e is a mammal" does not qL\al if Y
real whales by my mammal-image. For that belongs
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to me~ and is an event in my history~ and, unless
I am Jonah~ it can not enter into an actual whale.
(F'L, p. 8)
The point of the joke is pretty mLtch in line with the Fre-
gian considerations of the last section: the image is a
part i eLtl ar phenomenon, i t OCCLtrS at some time, and i t e>: i sts
only in m~ consciousness. What I judged (ie. what I predi-
cated of whales) is what you might or do judge, now or at
another time,
[lJ
and so cannot be an event in my conscious-
ness. As Bradley says with reference to the question as
to whether or not there is a sea serpent,
II the enqL,i ry i 5 not made aboLIt my psych i cal f ac:t
tie. my idea of the sea serpentJ. No one wishes
to know if tb~t exists outside of my head; and
still less to know if it really e>:ists inside.
For the latter is assumed, and we can not doubt
it." (PL, P • 8)
Bradley~s enquiry does not stop here, because he sees a
further possibility for psychologism.
Is it possible, secondly, that the idea [ie. logi-
cal idea or predicateJ should be the image, not
indeed as my private psychical event, but still as
regards the whole content of that image? We have
a mental fact, the idea of mammal. Admit first
that, as it exists and inhabits my world, we do
not predicate it. Is there another possibility?
The idea perhaps might be used apart from its own
existence, and in abstraction from its relations
to my psych i cal phenomena, and yet i t mi ght ~~eep,
without any deduc:tion, its own internal content.
(PL, p. 8)
One point needs to be made explicit about the significance
of this question. The term ~content' is a technical term
for Bradley. He says that for anything that is we can
IIIn other
words we perceive both :tb.et !:t .!.§ and ~b9j; !:t is ll
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(PL, p.
3) . Th i s content that any f act or e>: i stent must have i 5 the
"character which is different or distingLlishable from that
of other facts" (PL!' p. 3) --- in other words it is the set
of properties and relations that hold of it.
mammal image (at a given time) has a content!'
My part i C:Lll ar
a c:ompleH of
properties and relations, that distinguishes it from all
other phenomena,
at other times.
including other mammal images that I have
The content of my particular mammal image
distinguishes it even from other mammal images that I might
have because part of its content is that it is related to
the other mental phenomena that co-exist with it,
I
and that
come before and after it in my mind. What Bradley suggests
in this passage is that what is predicatpd may be the mammal
image "in abstraction from its relations to my psychical
phenomena", bL,t st i 11 ~~:eeping .. its own internal content II
that part of the content that makes it a mammal image as
opposed to an image of something else. But this abstrac:ted
idea is pretty clearly what we might call the image or idea
t~Q§, the universal that is repeatable in different psycho-
logical contexts. In other words~ Bradley has broached the
question that I raised at the end of the previous section:
could concepts and truth-bearers be psychological types?
Bradley~s answer is that logical ideas are not 2a~£QQ=
!Qgi~~! types or universals. Since the ~~inds of psychologi-
cal particulars (and thus the kinds of psychological univer-
sals) that Bradley is explicitly considering are the ideas
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and sensations of the empiricist ~theory of ideas~~ there is
a danger that the considerations he brings to bear will not
really justify the strong conclusion that logical ideas,
which compose judgements, are not ~D.~ ~~i nd of psychol ogi cal
type. But perhaps the best way of evaluating the force of
Bradley~s claim is to see how successful his argument is,
and what theses it refutes.
Bradley~s main contention is that the universals in
question are still too rich,
As he says,
too specific, or too detailed.
The 'mammal~ in my head is, we know, not bare
mammal, but is clothed with particulars and quali-
fied by characters other than mammality; And
we may ask, Is the ~bQ!g image used in judgement?
Is tbia the meaning? But the answer must be
negative. (PL. pp.8-9)
We can begin to formulate an argument here when we look at
the best cases for the thesis that types of ideas are what
is predicated. These would be cases in which the predicate
is related to a sensation (§m~l!§ QsQ to a smell~ ia ~~~£g~E
to a noise) or can be pictorially represented
ag~EC~~ ia E bQ~Eg to appropriate images). Now, SLtppOse
that both the paper and the horse are white. When I assert
this I predicate the same thing --- being white --- of two
different objects. Yet the ideas in my mind (supposing that
when I thin~( of these things I have a an image of the paper,
and an image of the horse) might have qualitatively dif-
ferent shades of white. Moreover the truth of my judgement
does not seem to depend on the qualitative nature of my idea
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matching that of the subject of p~edication. For e)~ample,
the truth or falsity of my judgement that the horse is white
does not seem to depend upon whether the whiteness that (we
are supposing) I actually experience or have present in an
idea is qualitatively the same white that the horse is.
Bradley's (somewhat misleading) way of putting this is that
predicates need not always be Q~~g~m10E~~ in the way that
images or ideas are. As he says,
I may surely judge that a berry is poisonous,
though in what way I know not, and though ~poison­
ous' implies some traits which I do not attribute
to this poison. I surely may believe that AB is
bad, though I do not know his vices, and have
images which are probably quite inapplicable. (PL,
p.9)
Someone might give the following reply. When YOL\ are
judging that something is white, what you need is an image
of white. That is the ~iQQ of image in question, and images
of white horses and white paper,
white and stark fluorescent white,
images that are creamy
are all white images.
The problem with the previous argument is that it just chose
the wrong images, or better, the wrong way to charact~rize
the images. For the images in question were images of
white~ and that~s all that matters. This response is unsa-
tisfactory, and points the way for another argu~ent, or
another version of the same argument. For· orle way of pLtt-
ting the problem with images or other states is that they
are instances of tQQ m~Q~ types of ideas. Does my imag~ of
white paper represent being"white, being star~~ white, being
paper, being white paper, being rectangular, being a white
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rectangle~ or what? For the image is an instance of corres-
pondingly many idea types. So there is no one thing or
concept that an image or idea naturally represents
images or ideas have to be ~Qt~~~~~~~Q as representing some
[2J
concept or proposition.
Bradley does not doubt that there must be an idea or
other mental phenomenon that OCCLlrs when I make a jLldgement
about something. But he does deny, and has gone some way
towards justifying his denial, that either particular ideas
or the types that they token c:ompose what is jLldged. It
might be complained that he has only shown this in the case
that the ideas or mental parti eLl} ars are ta~~en to be pi cto-
ri a1 images.
[3J
Certainly Bradley does not intend this to be
the case, and I thi n~, that the argument is stronger than
that comment might suggest. For I would contend that the
very best case in support of the view that judgements are
composed of either particular ideas or types of ideas is the
case in which the idea is an image, and its content is
composed of pictorial properties. Bradley can simply chal-
lenge the proponent of an identification thesis to find some
more appropriate particular or type, for certainly the his-
tory of the subject had not supplied him with any.
Although logical ideas are not e~~£bQiQgt£~l types or
Llni versal s, they are still ~D!~~~§s!~ (PL, p. 6). For what
is predicated, and what does compose the jUdgement, is, in
Bradley's opinion, something that he calls ~the universal
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meaning='. Some f acts or- par-t i CLtl ars have, besi des eH i stence
and content~ a ~third side~.
They have a meaning; and by a sign we understand
any sort of fact which is used with a meaning.
The meaning may be part of the original content~
or it may have been discovered and even added by a
fL,r-ther- e>:tension. Still this makes no differ-
ence. Take anything which can stand for anything
else, and you have a sign. Besides its own pri-
vate existence and content, it has this third
aspect. Thus every flower exists and has its own
qualities, but not all have a meaning_ Some sig-
nify nothing, while others stand generally for the
kind which they represent, while others again go
on to remind us of hope or love. But the flower-
can never itself ~~ what it m~~Q§. (PL, p. 3)
Perhaps a better example that Bradley points to (PL, p. 4)
is the written sentence. Some occurrences of ink on paper
have or represent a meaning. Tha~ meaning is like a univer-
sal at least in that it is not a particular concrete thing
that e>~ists in a particLllar time or place. The meaning i:.
al so 1 i ke a Lln i versal i n that i t can be had ~ represented ~ or
even (one might say) tokened by all manner of concrete
particular things. Bradley certainly takes no pains to dis-
tinguish the way in which meanings are universals (we could
also call them ~QE~~9£~ objects) from the way in which kinds
or types are universals. But we can ferret out this dis-
tinction from what Bradley says, and at any rate we have
already seen that Bradley denies that meanings are types of
psychological entities.
The point of this is that Bradley maintains that among
the particular things that can have meaning are particular
ideas; indeed he briefly suggests the view (although he does
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not actually go on to defend it) that at some ultimate level
of analysis the only signs a~e ideas (PL~ p. 5). So jLtst as
some truth <such as the truth that the horse is white) may
be represented by some patch of ink on a paper, it may also
be represented by some part i CLtl ar idea in my mi nd.
idea certainly has
particular traits of its own~ which may be diffi-
cult to seize, but which, we are bound to suppose,
are present. It is doubtless unique, the same
with no other •.•. But, for logic, and in a matter
of truth and falsehood, the case is quite changed.
The 'idea' has become an universal, since every-
thing else is sL,bordinate to the meaning. (F'L, pp.
5-6)
That
So far:- then:- it seems that Bradley ~as managed to
steer clear of psychologism with respect to logic, at least
in the form of an identification thesis between truth-
bearers and concepts, on the one hand, and psychological
types or tokens, on the other.
[4J
BLIt in hi 5 paper ·'The NatLlre
of Judgment.. G. E. Moore still tries to convict Bradley
[5]
of holding a version of psychologism. Moore says that he
agrees with Bradley that the ideas of logic, the ideas that
compose judgements, are ~universal ffieanings~. BLlt what he
objects to is Bradley~s suggestion that thi5 meaning .. con-~
si sts of a part of the contellt <ori gi nal or ac:qLli red) CL,t
off, f i)~ ed by the mi nd, and consi dered apart f rom the e)~ i s-
tenc:e of the sign" (PL, p. 4, and qLloted in NJ, p. 177».
What Moore wants to show is,
on the contrary, that the 'idea used in judgement'
is not a part of the content of our ideas, nor
produced by any action of our minds, and that
hence truth and falsehood are not dependent on the
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relation of Q~!: ideas to reality. (NJ, p. 177)
Moore makes a LtsefLtl termi nol ogi cal i nnovati on by L\si ng
the term ~concept~ for the ideas of logic, and reserving
[6]
:- idea=' for psychol og i cal part i CL\l cu-5. The first argL\me-nt
that Moore raises is against the contention that the ideas
used in judgement (that is~ £Qn£~~t2) are part of the con-
tent of our psychological ideas~
mental activity.
and are produced by any
(M)y question is, whether we can thus cut off a
part of the character of OLtr ideas, and attribtJte
that part to something else~ unless we already
know, in part at least, what is the character of
the idea from which we are to cut off the part in
question. If not, then we have already made a
judgement with regard to the character of our
idea. But this judgement again, requi~es, on Mr.
Bradley='s theory, that I should have had an idea
of my idea, and should have already cut off a part
of the content of that secondary idea, in order
that I may make a judgement with regard to the
character of the primary idea that is in question.
And similarly it is impossible that I shoL,ld know
what the content of my secondary idea is, until I
have made it in its turn the object of a third
idea, b)' tal~ i ng part of th i s terti ary content.
And so on ~~ !D!!nit~ID. The theory would there-
fore seem to demand the completion of an infinite
number of psychological judgements before any
~udgement can be made at all. But such a comple-
tion is impossible; and therefore all judgement is
impossible. It follows, therefore, if we are to
avoid this absurdity, that the 'idea used in
judgement~ must be something other than a part of
the content of any idea of mi ne. (NJ, p. 178
I certainly think that Moore has found a crucial issue
in Bradley='s theory that needs to be elabo~ated and e "-
"
plored. For Bradley to say that the meaning of an idea~ a
concept, is a part of its content that has been £~t Qtf from
the rest of the content does make it sound as though he
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takes the e>; i stence of a concept to presL'ppose sOlne mental
activity. Perhaps this presupposition is problematic~
my first point is that Moo~e has not shown it to be prob-
lematic. I~ fact at the beginning of the argument Moore~s
assumption is not just that on Bradley~s view the existence
of a concept presupposes this special mental lactivity~ the
process of ~cutting it off~ from the content of some psycho-
logical idea!l but rather that the existence of the concept
presupposes that I tnQ~ the content of that psychological
idea. But my knowledge of the idea must presuppose that I
have judged about it; and my judgement about it must presup-
pose the existence of another concept~ which in turn has
been cut off from another psychological idea; and that
process presupposes that I know the content of the second
psychological idea --- and the regress commences. BL,t even
if Bradley really does think that the existence of a concept
in a judgement presupposes this psychological process of
being cut off from the content of a psychological idea~ I do
not see that this commits him to supposing that one has to
idea..
and so jygg§ ~QQ~£ the content of the psychological
And I find no grounds for independently attributing
this view to Bradley, a1 thOLlgh he often tal ks as thOL,gh we
sometimes are, or can be~
[7J
chological idea.
aware of the content of the psy-
Moore continues from the previous quotation with a
second argument, or possibly an elaboration of or supplement
to the first argument. He writes:
7(l
Mr. Bradley~s theory presupposes that I may have
two ideas, that have a part of their content in
common; but he would at the same time compel us to
describe this common part of content as part of
the content of some third idea. But what is
gained by such a description? If the part of
content of this third idea is a part only in the
same sense, as the common part of the other two is
a part of each~ then I am offering an e>:planation
whi ch presLlpposes that whi c:h was to be e>:pl ai ned.
Whereas if the part, whic:h is Llsed in e):planation~
is ~ part in the only sense which will make my
explanation significant, i.e., an existent p~rt~
then it is difficult to see how that which belongs
to one idea can also come to belong to the other
ideas and yet remain one and the same. In short,
the idea used in judgement is indeed a ~universal
meaning~; but it cannot, for that very reason, be
described as part of the content of any psycholo-
gical idea whatever. (NJ, p. 178>
There is a difficulty in the very first sentence. Moore
claims that on Bradley~s theory~ when two ideas have a
common content,
some third idea.
this must also be part of the content of
I do not see that Bradley is committed to
this at all. What he seems to be committed to is this~ that
for me to j~ggg or ~nQ~ that two ideas have a common con-
tent, then I must have some third (psychological) idea which
has, as part of its content, that common content as well.
The terminology I would prefer to use is that this third
idea C§QC§§~n~a the common content of the other two ideas~
and then we can say that what it represents is part of the
content of the judgement that the first two ideas have a
t.:o'nmon c:ontent. But of course if I do not happen to judge
or know about the common content,
third idea with that content!
then I need not have any
Still I thinJ( there may be a. legitimate worry behind
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Moore~s arguments here. The question is whether Bradley
really propounds a kind of abstractionism about the Q~i9!D
of meanings or concepts, and from this perspective I think
that Moore~s considerations do have some point. Bradley
says that the concept, the idea of logic, is ~cut off from'
the ~original or acquired' content of a psychological idea.
Thi S sOLlnds as thOLtgh it is part of an e>:pl an,-,ti on of the
origin of the ideas of logic, or at least of the way in
which those concepts are related to mental states.
think that Moore~s considerations can be turned into a kind
of challenge for Bradley,
an explanation of this.
about whether he has really given
For if Bradley does think that
meanings or concepts are somehow abstracted or otherwise
derived from psychological states, then by Moore~s first
argument this process cannot involve any conscious judging
about the qualities or properties of the psychological
states on pain of regress or circularity. So the challenge
for Bradley is to come up with some other explanation of the
process in question; but until he does his turn of phrase is
only an empty metaphor.
I am sympathetic with this response to Bradley, e>;cept
that I think that it gets the emphasis wrong. For I thi n~(
that Bradley is not really concerned about giving any psy-
chological explanation of (the origin of) the relation be-
[8J
tween psycholegical ideas and their meanings. A better
way of looking at it, I thin~~,
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is that Bradley has done
nothing more than to apply the more general sign-meaning
relation, a relation which is at least commonly recognized,
and to that extent understood~ although it has not been
explained or further analyzed by anyone. In other words
Bradley should embrace the fact that he has not explained
how it is that some meanings or concepts get ~hooked up~
with, or related to, particular psychological ideas or kinds
of ideas. He has given the outline of a theory~ but not the
details. No more has Frege shown how senses of sentences
and their parts have become related to sentences and their
parts. So~ in summary, Bradley~s thesis is that concepts
or meanings, the ideas of logic, are represented by psycho-
logical states or ideas. This is an interesting hypothesis
that deserves serious consideration, and I do not think
that this hypothesis is made illegitimate by its appeal to
an unanalyzed relation.
1. The major difference with Frege being that Bradley is
explicitly raising these questions about predication
and predicates rather than about truth-bearers. I am
not planning to e>,plore in any detail the consequences
of this difference for Bradley~s theory of judgement.
But it is fairly clear that the powerful systematic
treatment of ~judgement' in Frege's system does depend
on taking truth-bearers and not predicates as the fun-
damental entity.
2. This point is reminiscent of the kinds of arguments
that Frege gives, to show that images or ideas cannot
be properly spea~~ing true or false (T, pp. 18-19). To
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be sure his main point there is that truth is not the
correspondence of an idea or picture to reality. But
he plays on the same features of images. Since it is
obvious that the picture cannot have all of the proper-
ties of what is pictured (it is after all distinct from
what is pictured) then the question always arises: in
what respects ffiLlst the pi c:tLlre be 1 i he the pi ctLlred in
order for it to be correct or true.
3. In varioLls places Bradley makes it qLlite clear that t,e
does not accept the myth that psychological particulars
ale images, although he does sometimes fall into that
trap. The most appropri ate e>: ampl e is ina footnote
appended to part of the exposition of his positive
theory <discussed in the next paragraphs). He writes:
J
I was wrong to speak, here and elsewhere, as if
with every idea you have what may be called an
'image~. How far and in what sense the psychical
e>:istence is always capable of being verified in
observation is a difficult point .•• Still every
idea, l must assume, has an aspect of psychical
event, and so is qualified as a particular exis-
tent. (This is appended as note 8 to p. 6 of PL,
and occurs on p. 38.)
The tt,eory in the foIl owi ng paragraphs wi 11 make cl ear-
er how Bradley can maintain that the actual content of
the psychicial phenomenon is, if not irrelevant, at
least arbitrary when the judgement is concerned.
4. G. E. Moor-e,
1899 , P • 179 •
"On the NatL,re of JLldgment .. , in tl!.D.Q 3() ~
I will refer to this work as "NJ II •
5. I find the unexamined fame of this paper a little
disturbing. I intend to show that the major criticism
of Bradley~s view is successful only against an unge-
nerous reading of his position. I do not want to
minimize the difficulties with Bradley's position, but
in what follows I hope to show that its difficulties
are no more serious than those that face the opposi-
tion. Of course this criticism of Moore does not
impugn his work. But it is very clear that Moore has
no sympathy for Bradley, and what disturbs me is that
he has so little interest in getting him right. The
very first paragraphs of his article provide a case in
point. He illustrates, with a number of quotations,
that Bradley accepts the thesis that as far as logic is
conc:errted ideas are si gns. Then in the ne>:t paragraph
he convicts Bradley of inconsistency because of his
view that the ideas of logic: are meanings. 1 find it
difficult to see how any honest reading of Bradley
cOLlld lead Moore to ma~~e this criticism!, since the
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quotations that are supposed to illustrate the contra-
dictory positions come from very closely related pas-
sages. The e}:planation (which I gave in my eHposition
of Bradley's view) is quite simple --- Bradley has
sL\ggested that there ar-e reall y two noti or. " of iQ~~.
There are the ideas of psychology, mental particulars,
that are mere signs as far as logic is concerned. And
there are the ideas of logic which are what is meant or
r-epresented by the ideas of psychology. Another e)~ am-
ple of this kind of cavalier treatment of Bradley's
position occurs in the second of Moore~s arguments
against Bradley that I consider in a little more de-
tail.
6. A~ innovation which~ if used by Bradley, might have
forstalled Moore~s misreading that I mention in note 5.
7. In the passage quoted in note 3~ Bradley is pretty
clearly denying the assumption that Moore makes. Un-
fortunately this clear denial does not occur in the
first edition that Moore would have read. Btlll, I do
no~ see that Bradley commits himself to the assumption
that Moore has foisted on him.
8. As I think Bradley pretty clearly shows in the passages
that I have quoted in note 2. Indeed one of Bradley's
arguments against empiricist psychology is i~§ attempt
to derive psychological concepts from ideas. One ac-
cessible SOL\rCe of for this is PL, Boo~~ II, Flart II~
Chapter 1~ However the issues are a little difficult
to untangle in a brief discussion.
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The question still remains: is Bradley~s position~ or
at least the position that I am attributing to him, in any
sense a version of psychologism? Frege would say that we
apprehend or grasp thoughts, and someone who agrees with
this could ~12Q maintain that what it is for someone to
grasp a thought~ or what occurs when someone grasps a
thOLlght, is that he bears a parti CLll ar idea (or compI e>: of
ideas) that ~~~C~§~Qt§ what is true or false the
[ 1 ]
thOLtght. In fact I take this to be the point of the
Bradleyan theory. But since Frege holds that thoughts or
truth-bearers are objective~ independent entities, his posi-
tion is clearly non-psychologistic. And the consequence is
surely that the supplementary position, that truth-bearers
are represented by psychological states or ideas, would also
be non-psychologistic or else it would be a perfectly
innocuous and uninteresting form of psychologism. For what
is represented is in no sense a mental entity, and the fact
that mental states can represent such entities is only to be
hoped for.
Certainly these considerations are enough to show that
the Bradleyan theory is not, in and of itself, psychologis-
tic:. Indeed once it is realized that the Bradleyan view is
compatible with the Fregian position, and more pal-ti eLll arl y
when all of the constraints that Frege has placed on truth-
bearers (and so on what is represented) are remembered, then
the question really becomes whether there is any way in
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which the Bradleyan theory can be construed as psychologis-
tic. What I will do in this section is to consider a pas-
sage in which Frege does seem to be arguing in defence of
ti1is position that truth-bearers are completely independent
of human minds. It is one argument that is suggested by
Frege that at least appears to go beyond the previous con-
straints on what a thought or truth-bearer must be.
try· to show that the argument is not insurmountable~
I will
and at
least a certain amount of room is left for the person who
does not want to accept Frege~s ontological commitments. On
the other hand I do not think that the alternatives are
either plausible or attractive.
Frege writes that
A proposition may be thought, and again it may be
true; let us never confuse these two thingsR We
must remind ourselves, it seems, that a proposi-
tion no more ceases to be true when I cease to
think of it than the sun ceases to exist when I
shut my eyes. Otherwise, in proving Pythagoras'
theorem we s~lould be reduced to allowing for the
phosphorous content of the human brain; and astro-
nomers would hesitate to draw any conclusions
about the distant past, for fear of being charged
with anachronism, -- with reckoning twice two as
four regardless of the fact that our idea of
number is a product of evolution and has a history
behind it. It might be doubted whether by that
time it had progressed so far. (FA, p. vi)
There may be more than one argument that is suggested by
this passage. The first one is based on the observation
that there is truth or falsehood independently of our think-
ing about what is true or false. For example, that the moon
ci,cles the ea~th is true (0, false) whether or not anyone
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now, O~ at any other time, thinks of this. That two pILlS
two is four has always been t~ue~
had there been no human beings to apprehend it. That in any
possible situation there are stars and there are no stars is
false, whether or not there are human or other minds, and no
matter what those minds are like. Perhaps these are ~just
intL,itions~ ,
L'nassai 1 abl e.
but they are intuitions that are pretty much
But one thing that a Fregian wants to con-
that exist independentlY of human or other minds,
the sun exists whether or not anyone sees it.
jL\st as
Now, it is not absolutely clear how one is supposed to
get the conclusion from the premises. But the most plausi-
ble reading is along these lines. That the moon circles the
earth is true independently of anyone~s thinking or appre-
hending it;
thinks of it;
thinks of it.
so something is true whether O~ not anyone
so some tQi~g is true whethe~ or not anyone
We know of nL\merOLlS ways in whi ch thi s ~~i nd
of argument can .be attacked. Some such as McTaggart, have
attacked the first premise, denyi ng that str i c:t 1 y spea~~ i ng
there is truth independently of human beliefs or thoughts.
Take the case of a man who was selfish without his
selfishness being suspected or contemplated either
by himself or by any other person. Then there
would be no real truth~ 'X is selfish', but there
would be the real fact of X's selfishess. (NE, p.
16)[2J
While Mc:Taggart would claim that only beliefs are t~uth-
bearers, so that .. there i 5 no trL,th independent of the
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beliefs~ the~e is something else which is independent of the
beliefs --- the facts to which the beliefs cor,espond ll • (NE~
p. 16) Alternatively the premises can be accepted but the
conci L\si on deni ed. The best known a~gL\ment here WOLt1 d make
[3]
use of Ramsey's redundancy theory of truth, which ex-
plains the truth ascriptions in the premises in a way that
blocks the conclusion: they do not involve the ascription
of a property (possibly a relational property) to some
object, the truth-bearer.
I am not going to explore any farther these or other
alternative views that undermine the first argument. They
are indeed beset with problems. My point is rather that if
this is all the first argument comes to, and I do not see
anything else in it, then there is still at least some
conceptLtal room ,for the phi losopher who deni es that tr-Ltth-
beal~ers are non-mental enti ti es. I am not inter-ested in
defendi ng the non-real i st vi ew, and I thi nk that it WOL\l d be
hard to do so. But there is at least an issue here, and
someone who accepts the view that I have attributed to
Bradley is not thereby committed to realism or platonism
about truth-bearers.
However, there is a second kind of argument that is at
least suggested by the passage I last quoted from Frege.
This is an argLtment abOLtt the laws of logic and matt.ematics,
as opposed to the previous argument that was directly about
Just as laws of physics would hold whether
or not there are human beings,
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and so are not just about
human beings, so laws of mathematics and logic would hold.
Indeed the case of logic and mathematics is even stronger~
for Llnl i ke the 1 aws of physi c:s they seem to hoI d C:OL,n-
terfactually. In ~~~~~ QQ§§iQ!g §i~~~~iQO, even those in
which there are no human or other intelligent beings, two
plus two would be four;
even those in which there are no human or other intelligent
beings, it is not the case that both a proposition and its
negation are true. Since the laws of logic and mathematics
hold independently of the existence of human beings and the
laws of psychology, then they can not be about, or dependent
on, human beings or elements of human psychology. In parti-
cular, since laws of logic are about truth-bearers, then
truth-bearers can not in any way be dependent on human
beings or their psychology.
The question is whether this second argument goes be-
yond the first one in any way. That two plus two is four,
or that it is not the case both that there are stars and
that there are not stars are, or follow from, laws of mathe-
matics and logic. Not only are they in fact true, but, runs
the special claim in this second argument, they are true in
every possible situation or state of affairs. Surely the
c 1ai ms that these t,L\tI1s hoI din every possi b 1 e si tLlat i on
are simply an expression of our intuitions that laws of
logic are necessarily true.mathematics and
everyone shares that i ntL,i t i on,
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bL,t those
Perl,aps not
who do WOL\l d
likely be willing to accept these claims as a way of e '··-,\
pressing their intuitions about necessity. So gi ven thi~.
intLtition, do we have a way of bolstering the first argu-
ment? Of course the intuition that logical laws are neces-
sary supports the premise that laws of logic are independent
of human beings and human psychology. In the jargon of an
earlier section, laws of logic meet some condition P that
laws of psychology do not meet. But this is not yet the
conclusion that truth-bearers exist independently of human
beings, and it seems to me that to reach that conclusion a
move similar to that in the first argument must be made.
For, the argument continues, since laws of logic are about
the truth and falsity of propositions,
e>: i st independent 1 y of hL,man bei ngs.
propositions must
It is easiest to see
this is the same kind of move that is made in the first
argument by looking at the following example. The i rltLli t i on
is that in every possible circumstance, that it is not the
case both that there are stars and that there are no stars
is true. So, we could argue, there is something that is true
in every possible situation --- that is, some tb.~o.g, a
particular proposition,
tL,at i on.
that is true in every possible si-
So the upshot is that this second argument does not
take matters substantially farther than the first argument.
But surely that is far enough. Indeed it is not that one has
to accept these particular arguments. We might put it this
way: whether or not the Fregian theory is accepted~
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the
whole point of the representation theory is that mental
states can represent §QIDgtbio9 §!§§ --- something non-
mental. It WOLtld only be from the point of view of metaptlY-
sical idealism that the representation view would collapse
[4]
into anything like a psychologism --- but from that point
of view all scientific theories would be psychologistic in
the same sense.
1. This is not much of an advance in theory~ since we have
made no progress in saying what the relation of repre-
sentation is (and it is here assumed to be a relation).
But this just brings out the parallel with Frege~ who
has not been able to fill in any more details about
what the relation of apprehension or grasping is.
2. McTaggart,
Cambridge
II NE II •
J.M.E., Ibg ~E~~~~ gf slli§~~D~g, Vol
U.P., 1921. I will refer to this work
I . ,
as
3. Ramsey, F.F'.!I IIFacts and Pr-opositions"~ E:r:.Q£~~g!.Qg§: Qf
tOg e!:!.§:tQ:tglisD §Q£!J~~:t~, SLlpp. 'Vol. 7, 1927 •
4. And in just this way Bradley may in the end be commit-
ted to psychologism.
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This search for an identification of logic with psycho-
logy, or for an identification of truth-bearers with psycho-
logical entities, has ended pretty mL,ch as e>:pected.
haps neither thesis has been shown to be impossible, but
their tremendous implausiblity has surely been demonstrated.
In Part II I will look at another possible route to psycho-
logism with respect to logic, a rOLlte that I thi nk is mLlch
more plausible, and much more in need of clear refutationR
However before I tLlr-n to that project I want to sketch
some consider-ations which, I contend, would remove all pos-
siblity of either metaphysical thesis about psychologism~ at
least if they were fully defended. Al thOL\gh I take these
considerations to be the beginnings of a conclusive theory,
I have left them to the end, and will discuss them only
briefly; for they are supported by other- considerations that
go far beyond the scope of this thesis. So I will jL,st
state them in outline form, and illustrate their relation to
the present concerns.
One of the first things I was taught by Richard Cart-
[lJ
wright was that there ar-e too many demands on the notion
of a proposition. No one kind of entity can perform all of
the functions that propositions are supposed to: being
truth-bearers, being the objects of knowledge and belief,
[2]
and being the senses of sentences. It is the realization
that it is impossible for one entity to meet these demands
that is behi nd a great deal of recen't 1 i teratLlre whi ch
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argues that meanings are not psychological entities:, and
that the objects of belief are nat (or are not the primary)
and arguments about demonstratives by Perry and
Of course I have in mind Putnam~s twin earthtrL\th-bearers.
1:3]
argLlment,
1:4:.1
t:~ap 1 an. And I have fOLtnd an e>~pl icit acknowledgement of
[5]
this point in a recent article by Dennett.
It can be plausibly argued both that there are circum-
stances where there are twa things believed (two objects of
belief) but one truth-bearer~ and that there are circum-
stances where there is only one thing believed but two
trL\th-bearers. The first half of the claim can be argued
with considerable generality (this way of putting the argu-
ment i. s~ as far as I can recall, Cartwright:'s). An impor-
tant assumption is that the~e are connotationless singula~
terms, although if that assumption is not accepted; a ver-
sian of the argument can be reconst~ucted using demon-
strativeSr The following two principles are justifiable and
are fai~ly commonly accepted:
I If band care connotati'onless and co-
referential singular terms, and Sand Tare
sentences such that T is like S save for
having a referential occurrence of c where S
has a referential occurrence of b, then the
proposition e>:pressed by S is the proposition
e>:pressed by T.
and
II If Sand T are sentences, and there is a
person x such that ~x knows (or believes)
that 5' is true but 'x knows (or believes)
that T' is not true, then the proposition
e>:pressed by S is not the proposition e>:-
pressed by Til
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But it also seems that
I I I There are connotat i oni ess and co-referent i. 131
singular terms band c and sentences Sand T
SLlCh that (i) T is like S save for having a
r~ferential occurrence of c where S has a
referential occurrence of b, and (ii) there
i 5 a person >: SLlc:h that 1 >: knows (or be-
l i eves) that 5 ~ i 5 trL,e bLIt ~ >: .~nows (or
believes) that T~ is net true.
There are hosts of traditional e>:amples that argL,ably satis-
fy III. Given that ~Cicero~ and ~Tully~ are c:onnotationless
then the sentences ~Cic:ero is Cicero~ and
~Cicero is Tully~ satisfy condition (i) of III. And condi-
tion (i i) i s al so sat i sf i ed, for surely there are lots of
people who believe that Cicero is Cicero, but do not believe
that Cicero is Tully. But now it is apparent that I, I I ,
and III are jointly inconsistent. For by I, the two sen-
tences express the same proposition,
[6J
different prnp~sitions.
and by I I they a>:press
This certainly shows that given condition III, I and II
cannot be true Qf tQ~ 2~m~ Q~i~£t~.
sions can be drawn are debatable.
What f L,rther c ~.JI'C 1LI-
But assuming that I and
11 do (at least partially) characterize different notions of
proposition, I will call the propositions that are deter-
and I will call the propositions that are determined via II
We are certainly
licensed to conclude that linguistic propositions are not
objects of belief; their ~arithmetic~ is different~ since in
this example there are two objects of belief but only one
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linguistic proposition.
This first argument does not provide grounds for saying
that one or the other notion of proposition is more appro-
priately the truth-bearer.
second argument that does.
BL\t I thi nk that there is a
For it aims to show that there
are cases where there is just one object of belief but two
linguistic propositions~ one of which is true and one is
false. The most straightforward argument for this point has
been made by Perry and Kaplan, using facts about demonstra-
tives. For e>:ample, it seems that I can believe that today
is Memorial Day over a continuous span of time~ from May 30~
1982 (Memorial Day itself) through the wee hours of May 31,
1982 and not realize that it is past midnight. It is
plausible (though I will not defend this in detail here)
that the not i on of ali ngLli st i c proposi t i on ShOLlI d be e>:-
tended so that the sentence :- Today i 5 Memor i al Day" e>: pres-
ses a true proposition at one minute before midnight~ May
30, 1982, but a false one at any time on May 31, 1982.
Roughly, the Q££eELQQ of the use of the sentence determines
a referent for- the demonstrati ve (i ndependentl y of the ~,now­
ledge and beliefs of the user), and so determines a truth-
value. Thus if I expressed my continuing belief by utter-
ing the sentence first before midnight, and then after
midnight, the sentence would express first a true (linguis-
tic) proposition and then a false one. From that point of
view one might say that what I believe has changed. Yet it
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seems that from another poi nt of' vi ew my bel i ef!, what I be-
lieve, has continued unchanged throughout --- but the truth
of that belief has changed.
There is little dOLtbt that in this e>;ample what I
believe in the first sense is just a linguistic proposition.
I also contend that what I believe in the second sense is
the kind of thing I called an object of belief in the first
argument. If this contention is right, then we have the de-
si red resL,l t: one object of belief but two truth-bearers.
The object of belief does not determine a truth-value
and so cannot be a truth-bearer. And of course even if you
do not accept these identifications, there is still a moral
for psychologism. Forget the whole first argument, and
concentrate on the second. What is believed in the first
sense is a truth-bearer, and what is believed in the second
is not. But only what is believed in the second sense is
plausibly a psychological entity or state. The trLlth-bearer
can not be a psychological entity, since it is not a func-
tion only of my mental states but also of the time. And by
changing the e>;ample one can ma~~e it a fL,nc:tion of physical
objects as well. So this kind of argument further supports
the previous conclusion that logic cannot be about psy-
chological entities, and that- condition S c:annot be met.
And these considerations stand at the beginning of a system-
atic explanation of the relation between mental states, what
is believed <known or judged), and wh~t is true and false.
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1 • His courses on the Theory of Reference~
Sp '''" i n 9 1977 •
Fall 1976,
2. The demands that Frege placed on them,
OLtt on pp. 42-3.
which I point
3. Hilary F'Lttnam~ "The Meaning of Meaning ll ,
EE!gg!:.§.. Vol. I I •
4 • John Perry, "The F'r-ob 1 em of the Essent i al I nde>: i calli ~
NOL\S 13, 1979. David ,"<apIan, "Demonstratives", L\npL\b-
lished draft.
5. Daniel Dennett~
script.
"Beyond Belief", unpublished manu-
6. It is likely that a version of this argument can be
made using demon~tratives, although the principles must
be rather different to accomodate the very different
function of demonstratives. But let me just give an
e~·:ample, withoLtt attempting to formL\late the principles
--- which would be a very difficult task. In line with
the lingLlistic notion of proposition (e>:plained in the
next paragraph of text), we would agree that on May 30,
1982 the sentence 1 Today is Memmori al Day' (or an
utterance of it) expresses the same proposition as the
sentence ~Yesterday was Memmorial Day' (or ~n utterance
of it) on May 31, 1982. That proposition is a true
proposition. But we can well imagine that on May 30,
1982 at one minute before midnight, the sentence 'Tim
Appelt believes that today is Memmorial Day' is true~
but one minute later, 0- May 31, 1982, the sentence
~Tim Appelt believes that yesterday was Memmorial Day'
is not true. (Or perhaps the argument should go in
another way: at one minute before midnight I would
agree to the truth of ~Today is Memorial Day~, but at
one minute after midnight I might not agree to the
truth of 'Yesterday was Memorial Day'.)
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DEDuc-rIVE LOGIC AND PRINCIPLES OF REASONING
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In F'art I I I want to e>: ami ne some aspects of the con-
nection between deductive logic and our practice of reason-
ing and inference. My guess is that the fundamental source
for traditional psychologistic claims about logic is puz-
Llement about this connection. For e>: ampl e, a tr-adi t i onal
answer to the question of what logic is~ is that logic
encodes or describes principles of reasoning IIgeneral
principles in accordance with which we think about things~
[lJ
whatever things they may be". But principles that des-
cribe or ~odify our practice of reasoning may well be psy-
chologistic that i 5, they may be principles about what
beliefs we do or should accept depending on what other
beliefs we have. Thus if laws of deductive logic are (or
provide) such principles of reasoning, then they will be
about what beliefs we do or should have and this is
certainly an interpretation of the psychologistic slogan.
F'hilosophers who ac:cept this kind of sL,ggestion~ tnat
logic encodes or provides principles about how we thin~~ or
reason about things, put their views in different ways~
They may say such things as: logic encodes~ or provides,
principle~ of correct reasoning; logic provides p.inciples
that we ought to follow when we reason; logic provides
principles that describe how we reason when we reason cor-
rectly; or perhaps principles of logic are principles of
[2J
rationality. There m2~ be perfectly acceptable and
straight forward construals of such remarks that avoid cam-
mi tmerlt to incorrect ver-si ons of psychol ogi sm. And I will
certainly make no attempt to try to show that all psycholo-
gism is based on some fairly gross mistake associated with
these kinds of claims. But some philosophers have taken
these suggestions in ways that immediately generate problem-
1:3J
atic psychologistic implications, and it is pretty clear
that they can lead to ways of jnterpreting the psychologis-
[4J
tic slogan, as illustrated above. In the course of exa-
mining the relation between logic and reasoning we will find
some ways in which these suggestions can a~d do tempt philo-
sophers to ma~~e psychologistic claims. And certainly if any
coherent psychologistic claims were to be made~ the role of
deductive logic in our practice of reasoning and inference
would have to be made clear.
Let me give just one example of how philosophers can
get tangled on these is~ues. Dennett suggests that princi-
pIes of logic are constitutive of what he calls int~Qt~QQ~l
the assumption that something is an intentional
system is the assumption that it is rational; that
is, one gets rl0where wi th the assL,mpti on that
entity x has beliefs p,q,r,.R. unless one also
supposes that x believes what follows from
p,G,r, •.• ; otherwise there is no way of ruling out
the predi cti on that); wi 11 , in the face of its
beliefs p,q,r, ••• do something utterly stupid,
and, if we cannot rule out that prediction, we
will have acquired no predictive power at all. [5J
Dennett has it in mind that we might predict or explain the
fact that a mouse runs to the right, and not to the left,
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for we ae·cribed to it the beliefs: (a) there i:. a
cat to the left, and (b) if there is a cat to the
left I had better not go left~ and our prediction
relied on the mouse~s ability to get to the con-
clL,sion. (Dennett, p. 11)
Th i 5 kind of e>: amp 1 e i s SL\pposed to show that the II mOLlse
fo110"'15 or believes in mOdLtS ponens" (p. 11 ) !' or at least
that our i~tentional ascription of these beliefs carries
with it such a supposition. If we call the principles or
I""'L\les that describe or encode "the mOL,se's ability to get to
then Dennett seems
to be suggesting that the mouse ~follows~ (at least in the
sense of ~conforms to') a rule or principle something like
this:
if >: believes p, and also believes a conditional
wi th p as antecedent and q as conseqL\ent, then >:
also believes q. [6J
Of course such a rule is true of neither mice nor men, and
Dennett is quite aware of this. But his comment would be
that in so far as mice or men are rational they follow such
a rL\le; only an 'ideally rational~ mouse or men could
always follow this rule. This suggests that there is
another principle that Dennett would endorse~ that
if x believes p, and also believe a conditional
with p as antecedent and q as conseque~t~ then if
>: is rational he also believes q.
I shall return to Dennett~s mouse later, bLlt f or now I
want to raise several questions. First, is it at all clear
that even the ~ideally rational~ mouse or man should follow
0, conform to the first stated rule? This amOLtnts to mt.,ch
the same thing as askir:g whether the second stated principle
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is true. Later I shall argue (section 10) that there is
good reason to doubt the correctness of this rule as a
standard of rationality or that if it is maintained, it
can be maintained only within a fairly elaborate framework
for characterizing rationality. Second, forgetting the
previous worry~
modus ponens?
in what sense is either of these principles
Modus ponens might be phrased as a ~rule of
truth': if the proposition p and a proposition with p as
antecedent and q as consequent are both true, then the
proposition q is true. Or it might be phrased as a claim
about the validity of a certain argument form: any argument
with premises p and a conditional with p as antecedent and q
as consequent, and conclusion q, is valid. The classical
notion of validity guarantees the equivalence of the two
statements of modus ponens. But evidently neither statement
of modus ponens is equivalent to either of the stated rules.
Perhaps there is some obvious and close relation between
them many people suggest, or seem to suggest, that there
is. But again I will argue to the contrary later (sections
8 and 10).
I shall discuss these specific questions after I have
spent some time on the ~riginal and more general question of
the relation between logic and reasoning. I shall approach
this problem by looking at Mill's work on logic~ and 1 do
this for a number of reasons. First, Mill is often cited as
a philosopher who holds psychologistic views about logic,
9~~ "
and I
Second,
want to e~·~plore the e>:tent to whi ch thi 5 is
and more importantly, Mill deals with this
tr-Lle.
i SSLte
qLtite e>:plicitly. He was not the first to try to do sO:w bL,t
he is one of the first to have any tolerable success in
making headway on the question. Moreover, I think that few
commentators on Mill have seen the point of his discussion
of logic and I will show that a great deal of sense can
be made of Mill~s wor~~ when one sees the correct point of
it.
To be specific~ I will show that Mill has the outlines
of an objective and non-psychological account of deductive
val idity, and reacts against what he ta~{es to be sL,bjecti-
vistic or psychologistic accounts of validity given by ear-
lier philosophers. The heart of this exposition is section
6, in which I show that Mill distinguishes principles of
deductive validity from principles of correct reasoning. He
concludes that principles of validity are not, and do not
provide, principles of reasoning. This is the point of his
claim that any syllogistic argument is a petitio principii.
And while I do not agree with all of his arguments for this
point, I accept and defend his general conclusion. This
conclusion is important in understanding the rest of Mill~s
views on logic, and I show that there is no important sense
in which Mill holds psychologistic views about logic (sec-
tions 7, 8~ and 9).
During the course of this discussion I examine a number
of ways in which one might try to relate principles of
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validity to principles about our practice of reasoning. But
there are no results that undermine Mill~s general cone I LI-
sian. I suggest that the proper conclusion of all of this
be put in the following way: principles of deductive logic
are not, and do not provide, principles of reasoning or
j L' S t i f i c: at i on ; but facts about deductive logic~ facts about
the deductive relations between propositions, are among the
facts that we use in our practice of reasoning and justi-
fication.
1 • Joseph, H. W. B., eO In:t.!:.QQY£~i..Qo. :t.Q bQ9!.£, 0>: f or d ~ 19()6 ~
p.3.
2. For example~ Brian Ellis in B~tiQQ~i ~~il~f §~§t~m§,
Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J.~ 1979; Dan Dennett
(at least by implfcation) in "Intentional Systems",
~!:2i.!::l§:tQ!:m.2~ Bradford Books, Montgomery, Vermont; and
many more.
3. So Brian Ellis, in B~tiQQ~l ~~lt~f §~~t§m§, argues that
1 aws of 1 ogi c ar-e "l aws governi ng the strLtctLtre of
ideally rational belief systems on idealized languages
which model, always less than perfectly, ordinary human
bel i ef systems on natL\ral 1 angL\ages ... (Ell is, p. v) I
am not sure that this needs to be taken in a psycholo-
gistic way, but Ellis wants to, and does.
A psychologistic interpretation of these matters
that I do find attractive in some ways but that still
ia, I thin~~. problematic, is given (or at least
sketched) by Elliott Sober in his article "F'sycho-
logism". There he argl_\es that laws of logic are "laws
of cognition ll (p. 167) and have psychological ~eality.
Laws of logic are said to be part of an ~informatiDn
processing model' of psychological processe~. Rather
similar- sL\ggestions seem to arise fr-om some remarks
that Dennett makes, and I will challenge sever~l of the
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implications of this view that I take to be L,naccepta-
ble. (Still!l sLlrely this is the way to work oLlt a
version of psychologism~ if any serious attempt is to
be made. See ~Further Issues~, p. 226.)
4. Several e>; amp 1 es wi 11 OC:CL,r in the foIl owi ng sect ions,
but see especially sections 2, 6~ 7, and 9.
5a Dennett!l Daniel~ IIIntentional Systems", pp. lCl-l1.
6. Dennett does not ~~~li£~tl~ state this rule~ but it is
hard to see what else he has in mind~ given the pre-
vious quotations.
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In the opening pages of e §~§t~m Qi b99L£ Mill presents
some general remarks about the nature and purpose of logic.
Logic is concerned with the "operation of the hLtman Ltnder-
[ 1 J
standi ng in the pLtrSLti t of trLlth". In particular Mill
th inks that log i c concerns the ac:qLti si t i on of trLtth ~ or- of
knowledge, through reasoning and inference --- as opposed to
the direct acquisition of knowledge through intuition, sense
perception, and so on. This latter, the study of the non-
inferential acquisition of knowledge~ is the subject of
human psycholcgy. ThLtS
the province of logic must be restricted to that
portion of our knDwledge which consists of infer-
ences from truths previously known; ••.. Logic is
not the science of Belief, but the science of
Proof, or Evidence. In so far as belief professes
to be founded on proof, the office of logic is to
supply a test for ascertaining whether or not the
belief is well groL\nded. (SL, Intro.:- sec. 4)
So logic provides principles for correct or valid inference~
rules by which inferences can be tested or evaluated.
To begin, we need at least a rough characterization of
what reasoning or inferring is. Unfortunately Mill does not
make much attempt to characterize what it is to infer some-
thing~ or to reason to some conclusion; and these notions
are by no means straight forward. In the first place Mill
seems to talk pretty much interchangeably about both inf~~=
as though the two notions are equiva-
lent. In the second place, he often tal ks abOLtt inference
as a ' process', " a progress from the known to the Ltnknown:; a
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means of comi ng to R knowl edge of scmeth i ng wh i ch we d i <..1 not
know before l • ( I I , I I I , 1 ) • This makes inference a kind of
activity (thOL,gh, he might want tc add, a paradigmatic
mgQt~l activity>: it is something we do~ starting at some
time, and lasting over a period of tim~. In the third
place, if inference or reasoning is a mental process, then
it is a process that involves mental ~tates. The :'mentdl:'
states involved in this mental process~ the 'progress f,om
the ~::nown to the Lln known' , are states of knowledge or be-
lief. It is tempting to summarize all of this in a loose
formula that seems to have been accepted by many philoso-
phers:
i nferenc:e ~r r~easoning is the proce:.s of comi ng to
have new beliefs QD to§ ~E§!§ Qf old beliefs.
But, at least on the face of things, all three of these
[2]
poi nts are qLlest i onab I e. There are 1-,L'merOL~S e>: amp 1es of
both reasoning to and inferring the same conclusion from the
same ~premises~ which at least E~gg~Et that ( C\ > , cases of
inferring are distinct from cases of reasoning; 'that (b) ,
cases of inferring are apparently not examples of a process
or activity, and that (c), inferences need not be ~based
upon' beliefs, or any other mental state.
Consider the following examples:
(1) YOLlr coat was hanging ,Jp, so I inferred that VOL'
had retLlrned,
and
(2) I infe~red from the way he said it that he
didn~t believe it.
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Does either the fact that I inferred that you were there~ or
the fact that I inferred that he didn~t believe it~ indicate
that I performed some activity or went through some process?
At least when I give such descriptions about my situation I
need not be ~~~C§ that I had undergone any particular pro-
ce~.s, or had par-taken in any parti CLll ar· acti vi tV. Thi 5 i s
(1) and (2) are contrasted with two addi-
tional e>~amples:
(1~) Your coat was hanging up,
you had returned,
and
so I reasoned that
(2~) I reasoned from the way he said it that he
didn't believe it.
To be sure both (1~) and (2~) are a little peculiar~
but that is at least in part because one wonders ~u~t C~2=
§Qoing ! ~Q~!g bEY~ g90§ tbLQ~gb in these cases.
peculiarity is absent in the following ~xample:
(3) Since it was raining, and I had neither an
umbrella nor a rain coat, I reasoned that if I
st i 11 ~Janted to go I WOLll d have to call a ta>: i or
get you to drive me.
That
Here tf"H.:?rt:? is mor-e clear 1 y some ,. proc:ess of reason i ng:; ~ and
in this c~\se, the substitution of "inferred' for ~reasoned~
is a least a little less natural.
to the following:
And compare (1) and (1~)
(1"') Your coat was hanging up, so I re~soned that
you b~~D:~ returned; for since you never hang it
up when you come in you couldn"t have worn it, and
yet if you~d l~ft without it you'd have returned
by the bus, which hadn~t yet come by.
Of COL,rse there are nL,merOL'S other e>:amples In which
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the choice between ~infer,ed~ and ~,easoned~ is, as fa. as I
can tell, quite neutral~ as in
(4) When I saw it was raining, I reasoned
red) that if we were still going to get
we wouldn~t be picnicing.
But even granted that I am right about (4),
(1 infer--
together
and that ~,e do
tal k aboLlt peop 1 e ma~~ i ng i nferences incases where i tis
plausible that there is a ~process of reasoning~~ the e:·: i 5-
tence of the other cases ShOLll d ma~~e L'S wary both aboL,t
ignoring the possibility that there is an important distinc-
tion between reasoning and inferring~ and also about suppos-
ing, without any further justification, that there is a
infer-ence. It might be contended that there
really is such a process perhaps a ~subconscious~ pro-
cess in any inference --- but that claim certainly needs to
be defended,
tion.
Final1y~
and should not just be assumed without ques-
note that in most of the examples the reason-
ings or inferences are not explicitly ~based upon~ beliefs
or other mental states. The inferences in (1) and (2) are
reapecti vel y based LtpOn yOL,ro coat:' s hangi ng L'p and the way
he said it. The reasoning in (3) was based on its raining,
and my having neither an umbrella nor a raincoat. Onl yin
(4) is the reasoning explicitly based an what might be a
mental state, my seeing that .it was raining. So apparently
the third of Mill~s assumptions is also called into question
by thesE examples.
I will not pretend to handle all of these difficulties
1(let
by theorizing further about whether or not there really is a
distinction between reasoning and inferring. I propose to
bypass the problems with the first two assumptions by only
talking about cases of reasoning, where reasoning is possib-
ly to be distinguished from inferring. Most philosophers
have ignored the apparent fact that in lots of cases which
are naturally described as inferences <and not as cases of
reasoning) there is no obvious process or activity~ and I
will try to sidestep that problem by loo~~ing only at cases
where it is natural and plausible to say that there is some
process or activity a process of ~§22QQtQg.
I should add here that Mill is extremely interested in
the question of what 'the real process of inference' really
is, and we shall find that he is quite prepared to say that
the ~eal process may be quite different from what it ap~ears
to be on the surface. So if this problem were brought to
his attention it would be ~Q§~i~l~ for Mill to argue that in
all cases where there really is an inference, there is a
(mental) ~process of inference~.
suggestion any further.
But I will not pursue this
We could handle the problem with the third assumption
by taking a similar sidestep. Notice that for any case of
reasoning which does not appear to be based only upon be-
liefs or other mental states, we can generate ca&es that
are. For example, we can easily make a parallel to (3):
Since I believed (or saw) it was raining, and I
believed (or knew) that I had neithel- an umbreela
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nor a ~ain coat, then I reasoned that if I still
wanted to go I would have to either call a taxi or
get you to drive me;
and new cases· can be generated flt'om the other e>:amples in a
similar way. So even if it is agr~ed that not all cases of
reasoning are based upon beliefs or other mental states~ we
could limit the scope of Mill's discussion to that subset of
all the cases of reasoning that are.
In fact I suggest that the argument against assumption
(c) is not very plausible. For surely when I say that my
inferences and reasonings are based upon some facts or
states of affairs~ such 'as (in (1» that your coat was
hanging L'P~ what goes without saying is that I am aware of
those facts --- I know or believe them to obtain.
would be incomprehensible for me to describe my situation by
LlSi ng (1) or (1:-), but then to go on to add:
aware:- and certainly neither knew nor believed~ that it was
raining. I am not supposing that there is anything wrong
with descriptions SL\ch as (1), (2)~ (3), and so on; nor am I
suggesting that they ~mean:- something other than they appear
to mean. But since any sensible application of those claims
seems to presuppose an awareness of, or a belief in, the
facts or circumstances that the inference or reasoning is
based on, then I think this shows that assumption (c) is
qL\i te harml ess,
generality.
and can be accepted without any loss of
All of this is by way of defending, or at least delim-
iting a plausible range for, Mill~s assumptions about rea-
soning. To repeat once agai n, tt,e model that resL\l ts is:
reasoni ng is the process of comi ng to ha\/e new
beliefs QO ~b§ ~~§i§ gf one~5 old beliefs
Al thOLtgh th i s way of sLtmmi ng Ltp i 5 i nadeql.tat.e f Oi- a nLtmbe,.-
of reasons~ many e>: amp I es of r-eason i ng do f aJ. 1 Ltnder th i s
characterization. For e:·: amp 1 e ~ my coming to believe that
Erdmann is a psychological logican beCc3LtSe elf (on the basis
of) my belief that Frege thought that Er-dmann was a psycho-
logical logic:an, is sLtrel y a case of reasor,i r1g --- thOLtgh
perh~ps not a case of sophisticated reasoning.
that conform to th i 5 character i z at i or\ aboL,nd.
E>: ampl es
model
I will mention just two blatant inadequacies of this
of reasoning that are not removed by my previous
comments about Mill~s assumptions. First, even if all cases
of coming to believe one thing on the basis of believing
other things are cases of r-easoning, there are lots of other
kinds of reasoning. For e>:ample, c:omi ng to tlope for- (or
fear, or e>:pec:t) somethi ng on the basi 5 of ottler hopes and
beliefs (fears~ e>:pec'tations, and so on) seem tCJ be cases of
reasoning. Indeed we can reason hypothetically~ from as-
SL,mpt ions, and then come to cone 1 Ltsi ons that ar'e not tb.~c.~~~
believed, hoped for, feared~ and so on (although it might be
argued that in such cases we come to believe conditionals).
Second,
anyway,
the characterization is not really very helpful
because the notion of believing something QQ ib~
b~§i§ Q£ other beliefs is an extremely difficult notion.
One might say that this notion of believing ~on the basis
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of' something else is the central notion of reasoning or
inference,
planation.
and is the notion that pa,,-ticLllarly demands e>:-
It is what distingL\ishes ac:qL'.ir-ing C\ belief by
i nf erence as opposed to acqLli ring i t by ~)er·cepti on ~ b)1 bf?i ng
hit on the head, or by taking a pill. (Some indication of
just how difficult this notion is will arise at several
points --- see especially sections 6 and 7.)
Still, I have no better cha~ac~erization of reasoning
(o~!, as Mill would say, inferring), and this one will do for
my pLlrposes. I do not th ink that anyC'ne has a good e>: p 1 i:\na-
tion of the :'on the basis of' relatior\ and a solLltion for
this second additional problem. It is definitely a short-
coming of this crude model, and t.he i S~tL,e wi 11 be spoker. to
briefly. I will tlandle the first addi'tional diffic:L\lty by
once again sidestepping the issue, arld narrowi ng the f OeLtS
of the discussion to that part of reasoning which j,: f~om
and to what is known or believed. This sidestep really does
conform to what Mill says about the nature of i nf 4=rence.
For e>~ample, at one point he says that he intends his notion
of inference to be quite general~ to be understood in what
he calls the 'wide sense~. He writes that
to infer a proposition from a previous proposition
or propositions; to give credence to it~ or claim
credence for it, as a conclusion from something
else; is to ~~~§QO~ in the most extensive sense of
the term. (SL, Bk. II~ Ch. 1:w sec:. 1)
Presumably to give or claim credence for some proposition is
to accept or claim that the proposition is true --- it is to
believe it. And it WOLIl (1 make sense to gi ve or cl ai m cre-
dence for something as a conclusion from something else,
only if that something else is also something believed or
otherwise entertained. So Mi 11 seems to be agr-eei ng that to
reason or to infer is to come to believe (gi~e credence to)
one thi ng on the basi 5 of other thi ngs we bel i. E~ve.
If to infer (or, as I will say, to reason) is to be-
lieve something on the basis of other beliefs~ what i:. a
correct inference or case of reasoning? Although Mill does
say that the goal of logic is th~ attainment of truth, he is
quite aware that the worth of an inference is not judged
solely on the basis of the truth of its conclusion or
even on the truth of its conclusion at all. vJhat he says i n
the opening quotation is that logic, in providing principles
for evaluating inferences~ ascertains "whether or not the
belief (i e. the conclusion) is well groLlnded II ~ that i =.~
whether the ~~§i§ for the conclusion grounds, is good evi-
denc:e for, or jLlstj,fies the COnClL\siorl. And of course there
are lots of cases in which an inferred belief is well
grounded but false. Since inferring (or rather, once again~
,easoning) is clearly a mental activity~ and Mill claims
logic provides rules for correct or valid inference,that
Mill seems to be endorsing, and in no way opposing~ the
kinds of suggestions about the nature of logic that I raised
in the Introduction to Part II.
But Mill~s position is more complicated than this.
There is a suggestion in the previous quotation that Mill
sees a contrast between th i, 5 wi de 0"- e>; tensi ve not i on of
reasoning and some othe~, narrower notion. He is referring
to what he ta~~es to be the traditional Llsage lIin which. the
name reasoning is confined to the fo~m of inference which is
termed ratiocination, and of which the syllogism is the
genel""al typell(SL, Bk.II~ Ch.l~ sec.!). BL\t. in a certain way
Mill is being disingenuous in his apparent support of this
distinction --- and to see this is the crucial
understanding Mill's views on logic.
point to
What I mean is this. It looks as though Mill is simply
suggesting that ~logic~ should be applied in a broader way
than was traditional. That i s, Mill suggests that tradi-
tionally the notion of reasoning or inference applied only
to what he (apparently) would be willing to call deductive
inferences~ while he wants to apply the term both to deduc-
tive infe~ences and also to what he calls inductive infer-
ences. But this is far from correct. For Mill goes on to
argue that while inductive inference is, as he would put it,
a .. real process of i nf erence" ~ dedLlc:t i on Dr rat i DC i nat i on i E·
DQi a real process of inference. This is the point of
Mill~s famous but muc:h maligned argument that all syllo-
gistic: inference is a petitio principii. I contend that the
correct interpretation of this argument is that Mill is
trying to prove that ~b§~§ E~§ 09 Q~g~£t!~~ !Df§~~D£§§ (see
Section 6). That is, he wants to show that there are no
inferences or (in my preferred terminology) cases of ~eason-
1(l6
ing in which what we come to believe deductjvely follows
fr-om the beli.efs that ar-e the basis for that new belief.
This strong conclusion is very hard to accept, and mLtst be
wronga But I will show that Mill has the basis for an inde-
pendent and good argLlment f or a ....Ieaker-, and I th ink corr-ect ~
conc 1 Llsi on, that deductive logic does not provide any rules
or principles for evaluating the correctness or validity of
the conclusions of inferences or cases of reasoning.
Let me rephrase what I take the situation to be in more
modern jar-gon. I will take the term ~inference'~ B:· Mi 11
L\SeS it:; to refer to cases of reasoning --- cases of coming
to believe something on the basis of one~s other beliefs.
And I will always use the term ~argument~ to refer to sets
of propositions=- one of which is designated the conclusion,
and the others jointly the premises. So I would say, in
accordance with modern usage~ that deductive logic <and
inductive logic, for that matter) is~ in the first instance~
about the validity (or inductive strength) of arguments.
Indeed I will show that Mill quite agrees with this. But we
can easily e>:tend OL,r notion of a dedL\ctive argL\ment to tal~~
That is~ my coming to believe p
on the basis of my belief that q and my belief that r is a
deductively valid reasoning only if p follows from q and r.
So Mill's strong (and admittedly false) conclusion is that
there are no cases of deductively valid reasoning. What I
want to defend is a weaker claim that Mill cOL,ld have made,
and that he really was committed to (since it is plausible
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that it fallows from the st~onger claim) that deductive
logic does not provide principles for evaluating the cor-
rectness~ validity~ or justification of the conclusions of
inferences or reasonings.
So the problem that Mill sets out to explore in his
discussion of deductive logic and inference is this: is 50-
called deductive inference a real process of inference? And
my interpretation of the problem turns out to be: are any
cases of reasoning cases of deductively valid reasoning?
The important point behind my eHaminatjon of Mill~s views on
this topic is that he is actually trying to sever the appar-
ently obvious link between deductive logic and our practices
of reasoning and inference. Initial appearances to the
contrary, he is quite opposed to the suggestion in the
Introduction to Part II, that the laws of logic (that is, in
the restricted or narrow sense of the laws of deductive
validity) are laws of reasoning. Of course Mill does consi-
der the correctness of iDf~~§n£~ O~ C~2§QO!Og to be within
the domain of logic, and so he will say that some principles
of logic do provide principles of reasoning. But no such
principles of reasoning or inference are (or are based on)
principles of deductive validity. Mill~s arguments here are
well worth exploring, and I think that they take us a long
way towards getting clear about the issues here --- for
example about how to deal with Dennett~s mouse.
This by no means closes the boo~~ (to the negative) on
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whethe~ Mill holds psychologistic views about logic~ and I
do want to e~·:pl ore that qLlest.i on as well. Of COLtrSe no one
who has thought about these matters for a moment would admit
to making the crLlde mistake of identifying the laws of logic
with empirical psychological generalizations about how peo-
pIe actually think. As Mill puts this,
there is nothi ng to prevent L\S from thi nki ng con-
t~ary to the laws of logic: only if we do, we
shall not think rightly, or well, or conformably
to the ends of th ink i ng, bLlt f a1 se1 y ~ or i nconsi 5-
tently, or confusedly. [3]
And Mill~s argument that the laws of deductive logic are not
~principles of reasoning~ should remove any remaining temp-
tation to make this identification. But the possibility
that Mill holds other psychologistic views about logic re-
mains. For in his later work on Sir William Hamilton he
does say abOL\t logic that lIits theoretical grOLtnds are
wholl y borr·Ol.....ed from Psychology, and includes as much of
that science as is required to justify the rules II of
logic (WH p. 359). These later writings of Millon logic and
reasoning bear special scrutiny, for at first glance they
appear to be very different from the earlier work~ and
possibly at odds with it. I wi 11 e>:plore the force of thi s
apparent psychologistic claim in section 9. Thi s tL,rns OLlt
to be especially interesting because this psychologistic
claim is made in the context of a discussion of whether or
not logic is prescriptive --- whether it provides laws about
how we ought to reason. Mill's conclusions here are clearer
than those of his earlier wor~~~
1(l9
and I will show that he is
pretty much in line with Frege~s later discussion of these
matters.
1. Mill~ J.S.~ a §~§t§m Qf bggi£, Ha~per a~ Brothers, New
York, 1848, Introduction, Section 3. All further r~­
ferences to this work will cited by the abbreviation
··SL··, followed by the book, chapter, and section.
There are some crucial additions in the eigth eddition
of 1872. When I make special reference to those parts~
I will cite the fact specifically. All other citations
can be found in all the editions.
2. My awareness of the depth of these problems, and
argument in the following paragraph~ are both due
Professor Cartwright.
the
to
~. Mil1~ J.B., eO ~~~mtD~~tQQ Qf §lc ~ltll~m ~~mLltQQ:§
~bilQ~Q~b~ (Collected Works of J.B. Mill, Vol IX),
Uni versi ty of Toronto F1re:.s, ROLttl edge and ~:::egan FlaLtl,
1979~ p. 359. I will subsequently refer to this work
as II WH II •
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Mill was not the first to question the worth or signi-
ficance of the syllogism (and deductive logic generally) in
reasoning. I want to preface Mi 11:- 5 work by e>:amining a
traditional and fairly influential scepticism about the
usefulness or point of the syllogism --- a line of reasoning
that is antithetical to Mill~s position. The criticism I
have in mind sometimes surfaces as a kind of anti-formalism;
and this~ in turn~ seems to be based in part on a 5ubjecti-
vist or psychologistic interpretation of what a correct or
deductively valid inference is. Consider~ for e>: amp 1e ~
Descartes~ characterization of the ~plecepts of the Dialec-
ticians' as
formulae of argument~ which lead to a conclusion
with such necessity that, if the reason commits
itself to their trust~ even though it slackens its
interest and no longer pays a heedful and due
attention to the very proposition inferred~ it can
nevertheless at the same time come to a sure
conclusion by virtue of the form of the argument
alone. [1]
Even if we agree that forms of deductive algument are some-
times mindlessly ~Qe!!§~, it is natural to suppose that this
is the faLtlt of ·the thinker who applies the argLtment and not
the fault of the argument forms themselves. Yet Descartes:'
conclusion from this is to reject the propriety of any
appeal to formal arguments when we reason. As he engagingly
pL,ts it, when we want lito be parti CL\l arl y c:arefL\l 1est OL\r
reason should go on holiday while we are examining the truth
of any matter, we reject those formulae as being opposed to
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[2]
OLlr project". (RL\les, p. 32)
I do not think that it is absolutely certain what
prompts Descartes to this conclusion~ but a strikingly simi-
lar conclusion seems to be drawn by Locke, whose discussion
[3]
of the prob 1 ems i 5 somewhat more thoroL,gh. He asks
Itconerning Reason~ whether Syllogism, as is generally
thOL,ght, be the proper instrument of it, and the useful lest
[4J
way of e>~erc:ising this FacL,lty. II Locke clearly distir1-
guishes our actual reasoning from correct or ~right reason-
ing=-. For whenever- I reason or make an inference, which is
II by vi rtL,e of one F'roposi t i on 1 ai d down as trLle, to draw in
another as trLle" (Essay, p. 672), there is always a further
qL\est i on as to whether II the Mi nd has made th i s I nf erence
right or- no" (Essay, p. 672). Loc:ke does not challenge the
idea that II all right reason i ng may be redL,c:ed to his (Aris-
totle='s) Forms of Syllogism" (Essay, p. 671) --- at least
when this 'reduction' is understood in the proper way. But
this is neither an endorsement of the utility of the ~yllo-
gism nor of (as we might say) formal logic in general. The
[5J
main lines of argument can be reconstructed as follows.
In the fir~t place, and perhaps in part by way of
softening the opposition, Locke observes that as a matter of
psyc:hological and behavioural fact, most people (on most
occasions when they are reasoning) do not use syllogisms and
do not, we might add, use any other deductive argument forms
either. Morever many such cases of reasoning are cases of
7clear and right~ reasoning. Now,
,1 ,1,?
one might think that
Locke is merely getting at the fact that there are correct
or reasonable forms of reasoning or inference that are non-
dedLlc:t i ve .. But even if he does intend to point this out, it
can not be all that he intends to do here. For in this
context he is discussing that portion of right or correct
reasoning that is reducible to syllogistic (or more general-
[6]
1 y, deductive) reasoning. I th i n ~~ that what Loe: ~~e i s
really getting at is this. Often when we reason, we do not
explicitly formulate (in speech~ writing, or thought) pre-
mises that deductively imply the ~onclusions we draw, even
thOllgh we may be i n some sense £Q!!H!!!.~~~Q to sL,ch premi ses.
Perhaps it is this implicit commitment to suppressed pre-
mises that underlies Locke~s willingness to agree that all
correct reasoning may be 'reducible~ to syllogistic: (or
deductive) argument forms. That is, reconstructions of such
cases of reasoning may turn out to be instances of syllo-
gisms or other deductively valid argument forms.
In the second place, possibly getting a little closer
to the heart of the mc..tter, Locke makes the additional point
that one~s facility for reasoning correctly apparently has
nothing to do with having any explicit ~~nowledge of syl-
logistic:
it,
(or other deductive) argument forms.
If Syllogisms must be taken for the only proper
i nstrL'ment of Reason and means of t<nowl edge, i t
will follow, that before Aristotle there was not
one Man that did or could know any thing by Rea-
son; and that since the invention of Syllogisms,
there is not one of Ten Thousand that doth. (Es-
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say, p. 671)
For suppose I infer, and so come to believe (or otherwise
ente.-tain) some proposition p on the basis of my believing
some set S of propositions. The previ OLlS pa,"'agraph SL\ggests
first that the argument with all the members of S as pre~
mises and p as conclusion may not be deductively valid~ but
second that it still could be a piece of correct reasoning.
Given Locke's agreement that all correct reasoning can be
reduced to syllogistic (or deductively valid) arguments, W~
might conclude that third, if the inference of p on the
basis of my belief in the members of S is correct, then
either the members of S do imply p or else the members of S
conjoined with some other beliefs that I have (beliefs that
serve as suppressed premises) together imply p. BLtt there
is apparently no need to suppose that I must have any know-
ledge of the forms of valid syllogism in order to reason
correctly. For example~ for me to reason correctly it does
not seem that one of my beliefs must be a conditional with
the conjunction of the members of S as antecedent and p as
conseqLlent.
logic codify,
We can support the suggestion that rules of
characterize, or describe those arguments (or
at least a subset of those arguments) that we accept as
correct, with6ut thereby supposing that we know or in any
way e}·:plicitly follow those rL,les. To e>:plain this in
another way, we c~n say that the rules of logic characterize
or describe our accepted standard for the correctness of
arguments. But in general it is not necessary or even
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plaLlsible to SLlppose that in order to conform to some stan-
dard a person has to know what the standard is. And in this
case it seems to be possible~ at least, that people could by
and large conform to the standard of correct reasoning
without having any knowledge of what that standard i~. This
COLtI d be all tr.at Locke has in mi nd when he says that God
has gi yen man II a Mi nd that c:an reason wi thOLlt bC?i ng i n-
strLlcted in Methods of Syllogizing ll • (Essay, p. 671)
So far the objections are very modest. Few WOLl} d deny ,
that people often do not use, and may not even know, the
forms of deductively valid arguments. BLtt Locke does not
stop here. He has several more serious arguments that are
based on rather more contentious claims about the nature of
reasoning and correct reasoning. He writes that
the Understanding is not taught to reason by these
Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the
Coherence~ or Incoherence of its Ideas~ and can
range them ri ght, wi thOLlt any SL\ch perpl e>: i ng
Repetition. (Essay, pIt 671)
In this passage at least two points come to light. The
first thing, which may not immediately strike one as impor-
tant, is that Locke ta~,es reasoning to be essentially tEl ~~ind
of examination and manipulation of one~s ideas. This way of
thinking pervades Locke's discussion of reasoning. When we
II ••• Man"s Rea,soning and
I·<nowledge is only aboLlt the Ideas e>:isting in his own Mind
.. (Essay, p. 68e}) • This underlying view of what it is to
reason makes it inevitable that argument forms such as the
11 ~
syllogism are interpreted, 8:- Locke indeed does j. nter-pret
them!, as encoding or describing relations between ideas.
For" e;-~ amp Ie, we ar-e t 01 d that a syll og i sm II shew:. that i f the
inter-mediate Idea agrees with those it is on both sides
immediately applied to, then those two remote ones, or as
they are called E}·:tremes do certainly agree II (Essay, p.
674) • Th i s tal k of ideas. agreei ng ~ and i n ottler cases of
ideas being connected, is pretty vague; but the result seems
to be that syllogisms are schemas of roughly this form: if
ideas x and yare connected (or agree) in A certain way, and
ideas y and z are connected (or agree) in a certain way,
then ideas ~.: and z are connnected (or agr-ee) in a ~~rtain
way, where each of these 'certain ways' of being c:onnected
or of agreeing needs to be specified. This suggestion that
we reason about our ideas, and the consequence that syllo-
gi sms encode t-el ati ons between ideas, I shall call Locke:' 5
first subjectivist thesis.
The second poi nt that I want to ma~~e alJoL,t the previ OL\S
qLlotati on is perhaps more readi 1 y a.pparent. Locke appeals
to the e>; i stence of a facLIl ty that perc:ei yes the coherence
and incoherence of ideas~ and hence (by the conseuquences of
the first subjectivist thesis) that perceives the correct-
ness or incorrectness of inferences or cases of reasoning.
Locke is not just suggesting that there is a ~native Facul-
ty~ that £eD perceive the correctness of incorrectness of
inferences (that certain relations hold between ideas), but
that what it is to reason or to infer correctly is to under-
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go some (psychological) process that leads to the ~pe~cep-
tion~ or awareness of certain relations between ideas. For
if the mind makes an inference~ and so comes to believe some
cone 1 Ltsi on,
by finding OLtt the intermediate Ideas, and taking
a view of the connection of them, placed in a due
order, it has proceeded rationally~ and made a
rIght Inference. If it has done it without such a
View, it has not so much made an Inference that
will hold, or an Inference of right Reason, as
shewn a wi 11 i ngness to have it be, or to be taJ~en
for SLtch. (Essay, p. 672)
The second sente"ce is LtneqLli vocal:
the connections between the intermediate ideas (between H
and y, and y and z), is a necessary condition for making a
correct ~Qi§~~n£~ (on the basis of the connections between x
and y, and y and z) that the extremes (x and z) are connect-
ed. Certainly the first sentence is not quite so cle3r, and
actLlall y seems to assert somethi ng rather wea~~er. It seems
to be saying that when the mind infers that x and z are
connected, then if it has a view of the connection between
the intermediate ideas then the inference is correct. This
is weaker because it does not follow that having the ~view
of the connection~ is actually a necessary condition for
making a correct inference. But Locke does often assert the
stronger claim. For the peculiar feature of inference is
that the conclusion is believed gO tb~ QSE!§ gf the pre-
mises, and Locke wants to say that it is somehow because of~
or a reSLtl t of:r the viewing of the connections between the
intermediates that one correctly infers the conclusion:
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it is in vertue of the perceived Agreement of the
i ntermedi ate Ideas wi th the E>:tremes!I that the
E>: tremes are cone 1 L,ded to agree, and theref are
each intermediate Idea must be such~ as in the
whole Chain hath a visable connection with those
two it is placed between, or else, thereby, the
Conclusion cannot be inferred or drawn in
What it is shews the force of the Inference, and
consequently the reasonableness of it, but a view
of the conne>:ion of all the intermediate Ideas
that draw in the Conclusion~ or Proposition In-
ferr=-d. (Essay, p. 673)
Locke is certainly saying that if I infer, and so come
to believe (or otherwise entertain) a conclusion in this
special way (by having a certain perception of the agreememt
or connection between the ideas contained in the premises),
then my inference is in fact correct. Of course it is a
difficLllt p,oblem to say what this special way of coming to
[7J
the conclusion ,eally amounts to. But this 5uggestion!l
that it is a necessary condition of correct reasoning that
that the reasoner has a perception of the agreement or
coherence of appropriate ideas (through a special mental
f BeLlI t y) ,
thesis.
is what I sl,all call Loc~~e:' 5 second sLlbjecti vi st
Notice that there is at least a hint that Loc~~e holds a
stronger version of the second subjectivist thesis. For he
says that having this special perception of the relations
between the intermediate ideas and the extremes actually
ahQ~2 the force and reasonableness of the inference.
when Locke claims that there is a ~native faculty:'
ThLlS
that
perceives the correctness or incorrectness of any inference~
he may be claiming that there is a faculty which~
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if e>:er-
cised (or a procedure which, if followed) guarantees that
one:' 5 i nf erences are known to be correct or j List i f i ed. This
slide from believing the conclusion of an inference that is
(in fact) a correct inference~ to believing with justi-
fication (or knowing) that the inference is correct" is easy
enoLlgh to make gi yen Locke;' 5 termi nol ogy of ideas and the
first subjectivist thesis. For Locke says that believing
something is just to entertain an idea and to assent to it.
And when one has made an inference and believes its conclu-
sion~ it seems that the ideas of the connections between the
intermediate and extreme ideas must actually be :'before the
mi nd ~ • Thus it is hard to see how one could believe the
premises and believe the conclusion thereby having the
ideas of the connection between premises and conclusion
before the mind --- but not assent to (and so believe) the
idea of the connection.
Now we are in a position to state Locke's third and
major c~iticism of the syllogism, which is based on the two
subjectivist theses. It amounts to a denial that syllogisms
(or other deductively valid argument forms) have any useful
~2~it£~~~QD in our practice of reasoning. Locke points to
at least three ways one might think that we can or do use or
apply formal arguments in reasoning: first, that they could
somehow help us to discover new truths; second!, that we do
(or perhaps could choose to) follow syllogisms when we rea-
son-:' and third, that we can use syllogisms to check or
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justify the correctness of our reasoning.
I n react i on to the first sLlggest i on Lac ke poi nts OLtt
that rules of formal logic are not rules for discovering new
trLlths. I am not S'_lre that this possibility was ever tc:.ken
very seri OLlS} y by phi losophers --- bL,t of COLlrse Locke is
correct. The syllogi5m~ for example, does not tell us
anything about how to discover or learn new truths~ for it
does not tell LlS how to QQ anythi ng at all. As Lac ke i nter-
prets it, the syllogism amounts to a conditional which
then some other connection holds
states that if certain connections hold between ideas >: and
y and between y and z~
between >~ and z.
The second and third suggestions are more interesting
and plausible, and Locke responds to them by (implicitly)
appealing to what I have called the two subjectivist theses.
Locke can argue against the second suggestion on the basis
of the first subjectivist thesis. Suppose that at some
point you discover, and so have a view of~ some connections
between ideas x and y and y and z, and suppose further that
the fact that these connections hold corresponds to the
premises of a v~lid syllogism. Locke does not quite bring
himself to say that in this circumstance you would automati-
cally see the further connection between x and z. For he
knows that we do not always see that connection that is~
we do not always believe the conclusions of syllogisms whose
premises we believe. Loc~~e appeal s to what he ta~~es to be
the mechanism of reasoning:
12()
For the natural order of the connecting Ideas must
direct the order of the Syllogisms~ and a Man must
see the conne>~ i on of each i ntermed i ate I dea wi th
those that it connects, before he can with Reason
make Llse of it ina Byll ogi sm. And when all those
Syllogisms are made~ neithe~ those that are~ nor
those that are not Logicians will see the force of
the ArgL,ment at i on!' i . e. the conne>: i on of the E>:-
tremes one jot the better. (Essay~ p. 674)
If we interpret my believing the premises of a syllo-
gism as my being aware of the connection between ideas >: and
y, and y and z that are before my mind, then it is hard to
see how I could be blind to the connection between x and
[8j
z • Certainly there seems to be no room for applying or
employing the syllogism in those cases where I successfL,lly
see the conclusion --- for it seems as though seeing the
conclusion to hold j~2~ i§ to see the connection between the
intermediate and the extremes. But we sometimes do fail to
believe conclusions of syllogisms whose premises we believe,
and might the syllogism be of use here? Again the answer
seems to be no. For suppose that you see the connections
between ideas >; and y and y and z (all :' bef ore yOL,r mi nd:- ) ,
but somehow do not see the connection between x and ,. On
Locke:'s interpretation the syllogism wOL,ld say~
that if the connections in question hold between x and y and
y and z, then a certain connection holds between x and z.
Perhaps it is likely that if you were told this, and L,nder-
stood it, then yOL' WOLI! d see the connecti on between >: and z
but is there any guarantee about this? After all, if
you are somehow blind to the connection between >~ and z when
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VOLt have the ideas of the connect ions between>: and y and y
and z directly before you~ is it not at least possible that
you could see the connections between x and y and y and
§DQ see the truth of the syllogism, but not see the connec-
tion between >: and z? There is no guarantee that applying
the syll og i sm in th is way wi 11 make VOLt .. see the farce of
the a~gumentation,
one jot the better".
i . e. the conne:,: i on between the E>:tremes
Locke can argLte against the third SLtggestion, that the
syllogism can be used in checking or justifying our reason-
ing~ on the basis of the second subjectivist thesis. For
eHample, SLtpposi ng that in some case I do make an i nf erenc:e
based on beliefs that are the premises of some syllogism,
one might wonder why the syllogism would not be useful to
check and justify the result, to determine whether or not
the inference really was correct.
searcher after truth would
Locke replies that a
never use Syllogisms to convince themselves ...
Because~ before they can put them (ie. their i-
deas) into a Syllogism they must see the con-
nexion, that is between the intermediate Idea~ and
the other two Ideas it is set between, and applied
to~ to shew thei~ Agreement, and when they see
that, they see whether this infe~ence be good or
no, and so Syllogism comes to late to settle it.
(Essay:, p. 6'75)
The point seems to be this: if you have already made the
inference, then you see (and believe) the conclusion because
yOLl see (and so know) the connect i on between the e>: tremes.
And what better guarantee could you have that the inference
is correct? Presumably you could compare the inference ,~ith
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a =.yllogism~ but that seems to involve a further and much
mo~e complicated comparison of ideas than was involved in
the original inference. What I have called the subjective
standard of correctness~ Locke's 'native FacLllty:-:- is the
ability to 'see connections' between ideas that lie before
the mind. From Locke='s point of view there is no reason to
think that a further comparison with the complex of ideas
that compose the formal syllogism is any more secure than
the original comparison of ideas. IIA Man knows first, i:\nd
then is able to prove syllogistically. So that Syllogism
comes after Knowledge,
for it. II (Essay~ p. 679)
and then a Man has little Olr- no need
1.. Descartes~ Rene, "RLll es for the Di recti on of the Mi nd",
in Ib~ EbilQ2Q~Qt£~1 ~QC~§ Qf ~§§£~Ct~E~ Vol I~ Cam-
bridge University Press, 1975, p. 32. Other references
to this work will be made using the abbreviation
"RL\! es".
2. I do not mean to imply that this is Descartes~ only
criticism of the syllogism. For e>:ample, he also gives
a version of Mill='s claim that all syllogisms are a
petitio principii when he argL\eS that lithe Dialecti-
cians are unable to devise any syllogism which has a
true conclusion, unless they have already ascertained
the very truth which is deduced in that syllogism.
Whence they can gather nothing that is new ••• ".
(Rules, p. 32) But this claim is not really defended,
and it is a1 so not at all c:l ear from the conte>,t what
the point of the claim really is. It almost seems a~
though the only point is that the syllogism is not a
useful ~rule of di5covery~. I will discuss Mill~s more
substantive remarks on this kind of argument in section
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6.
0_1. In fact i t seems that a great deal of Lac ke =- s d i SCLlS-
sian of ~easoning and infe~ence is a commentary on~ and
elaboration of~ large parts of Descartes=- 8~l~§.
4a Locke, John, eO ~§§~~ ~Qo~~[Ding ~Ym~o ~D~§c§t~D~iD9,
Ed. Nidditch, Clarendon F1ress, O>:ford!, 1975, p. 67().
All future references will be made by using the abbre-
viation IIEssayll~ and citing a page nL,mber.
5. The i nterpl-etati on I am gi vi ng to these passages is in
line with one of the most common readings of Locke, a
reading that makes him into a subjectivist. While this
reading is plausible, I certainly admit that it is very
local and narrow. There may be other explanations of
these passages that undermine this subjectivist read-
ing.
6. This is the charitable interpretation of Locke:'s clai",
that all right reasoning is reducible to the forms of
syllogism --- in th~ face of his (possible) accepatance
of justifiable but merely =-probable' reasoning.
7. That is, to make any headway her-e one WOll} d have to
tackle the problem of interpreting the 'because:' in the
claim that an inference is correct because the conclu-
sion was derived in a certain way. There is at least a
hint that this is supposed to be a causal connection:
one infers correctly (on the basis of such and such
premises) when one's ~1~~§ or ideas of the connections
between the intermediates (the ideas in the premises)
£~~E:~E: one" 5 vi ew of the connecti on between the e>:-
tremes.
B. One problem with this line of argumentation is that it
makes it very hard to see how Locke ·can, in fact, agree
that we do not always believe the consequences of our
beliefs. That is~ one wonders how one could ever be
b 1 i nd to the reI at i on between the e>: tremems >~ and Z !I
given that the lQ§e of that connection, composed of the
ideas of the connections between >: and y, and y and z~
seems to be before the mind. This point occurs again
in section 5.
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~. ~i!!~§ B~j~£~iQO Q£ ~b§ Ei~§t §~~j§£~iYi§t Ib~§i§
I am not very interested in wo~king through the prob-
lems with the Lockean view in great detail. Rather I will
point out what I take to be its major problems in the course
of setting out the central core of Mill's views. This way
of proceeding is particularly interesting because Mill ap-
parently agrees with the conclusion of Locke~s criticism of
the syllogism, that the syllogism has little or no utility
in determining correct reasoning or inference. But Mill~s
grounds far accepting that conclusion are very different.
My strategy will be to highlight four major features of
Mill~s view. In the first place, Mill rejects Locke~s first
subjectivist thesis~ that we reason about our ideas and that
syllogisms describe connections between ideas (this sec-
tion). In the course of this rejection, Mill offers a very
different (though not particularly original) account of
propositions, of the syllogism~ and of the validity of the
syllogism. This is the second feature of Mill~s view that I
want to point out, that he argues for a fairly systematic
and non-subjective account of the validty of formal argu-
ments (section 4). This in turn leads to the third point,
the implausibility of the second subjectivist thesis (that
correct reasoning involves the e~~~g~t!Qn of the agreement
between or coherence of the intermeidate and e>:treme ideas).
Although
directly
Mill does not speak to the second thesis very
it is clear that he does not
accept it, and this is confirmed in a later work
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(section
5) • Fi naIl y ~ I shall tL,rn to what I ta~~e to be f-li 11 's most
important in~ight~ and show that Mill's acceptance of
Locke's conclusion is based on an important distinction
between the validity of syllogisms~ or other d~ductively
valid argL\ment forms, and the correctness of reasoning or
inference (section 6). in the remainder of Part II I will
look at some further points that Mill makes about our no-
tions of reasoning and inference~ and evaluate Mill~s own
tendency to psychologism. L~t us turn to the first point.
Of course thinking and reasoning are mental activities,
and certainly Mill would agree that it follows from this
Lhat when one reasons or infErs, a sequence of mental pheno-
mena or ideas nCCL,r"s. BLtt Mi 11 properl y rejects LocJ(e=' 5
inference from this fact to the first subjectivist thesis~
that IIMan='s Reasoning and I<nowledge is ol11y about the Ideas
e>:isting in his own Mind". Mill clearly distinguishes
judgements or beliefs, which are psychological states or
[lJ
acts, from both propositions and objects of belief.
This distinction is crucial because
Logic, according to the conception here formed of
it, has no concern with the nature of the act of
judging or believing; the consider~tion of the
act, as a phenomenon of the mind, belongs to
another science. Philosophers, however, from
Descartes downwardG, and especially from the era
of Leibniz and Locxe, have by no means observed
this distinction; and would have treated with
great disrespect any attempt to analyze the import
of Propositions, unless founded upon an analysis
of the act of JL,dgment. (SL~ I,V,l)
Judgements and beliefs are the objects of psychological
stL,dy .._-- they are menta.l particL\lars. A theory of judge-
ment would be a description of the psychological processes
that occur in an act of judgement. For e>:ample, when I
jLtdge (and so believe) that gold is yellow, there is a
mental event, or series of events, that does occur.
have the idea of gold, and the idea of yellow, and these two
ideas mL\st be brOL\ght together in OLtr mi nd. II (SL~ I !I V ~ 1 )
Mill realizes that this much is not even an adequate des-
cription of the belief state itself!, since it seems that
these same ideas would occur whether I believed or dis-
[2J
believed that gold is yellow. But even if one did have
a complete account of the mental state or process of judg-
ing, this would not describe the g~j~~~ of belief, what the
belief is about or (to use a more current jargon) what the
content of the belief is.
yellow~
For when I believe that gold is
my belief has not reference to the ideas, it has
reference to the things. What I believe is a fact
relating to the outward thing, gold, and to the
impression made by that outward thing upon the
human orga~cJ not to a fact relating to my concep-
tion of gold, which would be a fact in my mental
h j. story, not a f act of e>:ternal natLtre. (SL, I, I!I
2)
To put this another way, that I have the belief that gold is
yellow is a fact about me, and that gold is yellow is a fact
about gold and yellow. Whatever the consequences for truth,
Mill accepts the distinction between the belief itself and
what is believed: the former is a psychological state and
the latter is a fact and not, in the usual case, a mental
fact. Finally~ Mill accepts a terminology in which a propo-
a verbal e>: pressi on of what
is believed. Thus what is expressed by a proposltion is (or
can be) what is believed.
Whatever can be an object of belief, or even
disbelief, must~ when put into words, assume the
form of a proposition. All truth and error lie in
proposi ti ons. (SL, I, 1,2)
Mill is aware that it is not enough merely to m~~~ the
distinctions between judgements or beliefs, the objects of
judgement or belief, and propositions. He rightly points
out that the logican has to support those distinctions by
advancing a theory of propositions, a theory both of the
structure of propositions and of the functioning of their
elements. In p.art i CL\l ar Mi 11 presents what he call s a
theory of the ~meQct of propositions a theory of what it
is that is e>:pressed by proposi ti ons and thei r el ements, and
a theory of the reI ati on between what does the e>:pressi ng
and what is expressed. If this could really be carried out
it would provide a theory of truth for propositions and an
explanation of the validity of deductive arguments.
One should not ignore that fact that this admirable
attempt at systematization brings a number of problems to
the surface that Mill does not always see and respond to.
For example, since Mill seems to be committed to the view
that what is expressed by a proposition can be believed, he
also seems to be committed to saying that what we believe,
the objects of our beliefs, are fact5~ Now~ Mill has given
himself room to explain how we can say that beliefs can be
trLte or f 131 se wi thOL\t embroi 1 i ng hi msel fin tal k of trL\e and
false facts. For given that what is believed <apparently
facts of one kind or another) are usually expressable by
[3]
propositions, and given that Mill can make good his claim
that there is a systematic relation between the elements of
propositions and facts (his theory of the import of proposi-
ti ons) , then Mill can explain the truth and falsity of
beliefs in terms of the truth and falsity of propo~itions
that express what is believed. But the avoidance of this
one problem leads immediately to another: what is the
object of belief in cases where beliefs are false; and
eqL\all y ~ what is expressed by a false proposition? The
apparent answer, C\ fact, is surely unsatisfactory, and as
far as I know Mill does not speak directly to this crucial
problem.
But the positive aspects of Mill~s view that I want to
emphasize appear as a contrast to part of Locke~s theory.
Mill takes logic to be concerned with propositions and,
through the theory of import, with what is believed. This
means that there will still be a sense in which logic is
concerned with judgements. For the term ~judgement~ can be
taken to be ambiguous as between acts of judgement and what
is j Lldged or· bel i eyed • So logic is concerned with two of
the three elements in the three-fold distinction --- with
judgements in the sense of what is believed, and with propo-
sitions. Thus this distinction removes any temptation to
1,?9
support the first 5ujectivist thesis, that we reason only
about our ideas. And so Mill says that Locke~s notion,
the notion that what is of primary importance to
the logican in a proposition~ is the relation
between two ideas corresponding to the subject and
the predicate (instead of the relation between the
two phenomena which they respectively express),
seems to me to be on of the most fatal errors ever
introdL\Ced into the philosophy of logic. (SL I~ V,
1 )
From this perspec:tive we can say that Loc:~,e implicitly
proposes a psychologistic theory of the import of proposi-
tions (roughly that what is expressed by a proposition is
some relation between ideas) and Mill rejects such a theory
and proposes to offer an alternative non-psychologistic
theory.
1. Mill does not attempt to distinguish acts of Judgement
from states of belief~ as some later writers have. In
general he treats acts and states interchangeably as
~mental phenomena'.
2. We might prefer to change the example from believing or
disbelieving a proposition to believing the proposition
or its negation. So the claim would be that the same
ideas occur whether I am believing that gold is yellow
or believing that gold is not yellow.
3. I qL,alify this claim with IL\sL\ally" bec:aL,se Mill does
seem to leave open the possibility that some belie,=
are not e)~pressab 1 e by proposi t ions. As far as I ~~now
Mill does not discuss this point explicitly~ and there
may be lots of different kinds of considerations that
would lead him to leave this possibility open. One
good reason would be this: given that propositions are
parts of discourse, and that what is believed is a
fact, then there are just too many objects of belief to
map onto the propositins that exist.
13C)
My point here is to give a brief summary of part of
Mill~s theory of import and his discussion of validity, by
way of contrast with his later discussion of correct reason-
ing. In Mill~s words~ the question under consideration is:
What is the immediate object of belief in a Propo-
sition? What is the matter of fact signified by
it? What is it to which, when I assert the propo-
sition, I give my assent, and call upon others to
give theirs? What is that which is expressed by
the form of discourse called a Proposition, and
the conformity of which to fact constitutes the
truth uf the proposition? (SL, I,V,l)
Mill takes the most important competing theory to be
that of Hobbes, who argues that every proposition signifies
lithe bel i ef of '~he spea~~er that the predi c:ate is a name of
the same thing o~ which the sLlbject is a name; and if it
[ 1 J
really is so, the proposition is trL,e ... (SL, I,V,2) It
tLtrnS OLtt that Mill acc:epts most of the aSSLtmpt ions that are
implicit in this statement. He agrees that (1) there is a
systematic syntax and semantics that allows for a subject-
predicate distinction in propositions and yields a taxonomy
[2]
of names; (2) it makes sense to talk of predicates and
general terms as names; and (3) every proposition is essen-
tially a subject-predicate proposition. Indeed Mill~s ob-
jection to this theory is not that it is false, but that it
is incomplete. For he says that "what is stated by Hobbes
as the definition of a true proposition, must be allowed to
be a property whi c:h all trLle proposi ti ons e>:press." (81 ,
I,V,2) In other words Mill agrees that Hobbes has properly
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expressed the truth conditions of propositions: a proposi-
tion is true if and only if its predicate names or denotes
what its subject names or denotes.
Mill contends that this theory of truth conditions~
whic:h Hobbes IIgives as the meaning of propositions, is part
of the meaning of all propositions, and the whole meaning of
some II (SL, I~V~2) • The class of propositions for which
Hobbes;' theory is a sufficient theory of meaning is the
class of what Mill calls verbal propositions. The most
common examples of verbal propositions are what we would
call identities IIthat limited and L,nimportant class in
which both predicate and subject are proper namesll(SL,
[3J
I,V,2). For Mill accepts that the import or significance
of a proposition such as the proposition that Cicero is
Tully is fully expressed by this:
"Cicero" is what is named by IITl\llyli.
that what is named by
This latter is sii
tb~~~ 1~ to the meaning of the proposition that Cicero is
TL,ll Y that i 5, Mill takes it to be the very same propo-
sition. Indeed it is because the proposition that Cicero is
Tully turns out to be (on the accepted analysis) a proposi-
tion about the use of names that Mill calls it a Y~~Qe!
proposition.
It is interest i ng to note that Mi 11 (mi st a~~enly) ta~,es
his celebrated view that there is nothing more to the mean-
ing of a proper name than that it refers to some individual
thing as being compatible with, and support for~ this analy-
sis of identities. The slide seems to be that since there
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i 5 not hi ng more to the mean i ng of II Ci cero" then ttlat i t
names Cicero, then IICi cero" jLlst means "what is named by
:' C i c: er 0 =' II • I will return shortly to the question of whether
the Mill-Hobbes analysis of identities really is adequate.
Given that Mill thinks that this analysis applies to
identities, what does it miss in the case of non-identities,
propositions such as that all men are mortal and that 50-
crates is wise? Mill agrees with Hobbes that these proposi-
t ions are trL,e becaLlse everyth i ng that i s named by .. man II i £.
also named by IImortal", and that what is named by "Socrates
is named by "wise ll • Mill does argue independently for his
well known claim that general terms have connotation as well
as denotation (a distinction which I do not intend to dis-
CL\SS here), and from this point of view it immediately
follows that Hobbes' theory misses "part of the meaning" of
these propositions. But Mill points to a problem that can
be raised about Hobbes~ theory, which is initially inde-
pendent of the c:onnotatiun-denotation distinction~ and which
is indeed a way of motivating that distinction.
qL\esti on of the terms "Socrates" and "wi se":
He asks the
But how came they to be names of the same person?
Surely not because such was the intention of those
who invented the words. When man~~ind f i >:ed the
meaning of the word wise, they were not thinking
of Socrates, nor when his parents gave him the
name Socrates, were they thinking of wisdom. The
names Q2ee~Q to fit the same person because of a
certain fe£t., which fact was not known, nor in
being, when the names were invented. (SL, I,V,2)
The implication seems to be that in the case of proper
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names one £~D suppose this --- that is, one can suppose that
the use of a proper name does depend, at least in the first
instance, on an intentional fixing of its reference~
bapt i sm of some known i nd i vi dL'al thi ng.
argLlment, the reference or denotation of terms such as
II man II , and "wise" cannot be fi~;ed by literally
tagging a number of things with the name. For the group of
people who determined the conventions of language could not
have ~~nown all the thi ng5 that are denoted by the general
terms they created --- at anyone time there are too many
men~ mortals and (one hopes) wise things, and the men!'
mortals, and wise things that exist from one time to the
next may change substantially. That is, these terms apply
to objects that did not e>:ist at the time of the setting of
the conventions.
This first argument can be extended into a second and
more rigorous argument that foreshadows (and perhaps in-
spired) a Fregian point. That all men are mortal, or that
Socrates is wise seem to be truths that we discovered at
some time, and that do not follow just from the conventions
As Mill puts this,
.•• the possibility of a concurrent application of
two names [that is, two non-proper names
T.J.A.J, is a mere consequence of the conjunction
between two attributes, and was, in most
cases~ never thought of when the names were in-
vented and their signific:ance fi>:ed. That the
diamond is combustible~ was a proposition certain-
ly not dreamed of when the words Diamond and
Combustible received their present meaning; and
could not have been discovered by the most ingen-
ious and refined analysis of the signification of
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those wo~ds. (SL, I,V~2)
So propositions such as that Socrates is wiEe or that all
they do not report
facts about the conventions of our language. Not knowing
that diamonds are combustible or the all men are mo~tal is
not, Mill plausibly suggests~ an indication of linguistic
incompetence. On this ground Mill argues that such proposi-
tions must have some additional meaning that is not charac-
terized by Hobbes' theory, and he uses this for another sup-
port of his view that general terms (ie.
have a connotation as well as a denotation.
non-proper names)
The resLll ti ng
theory would actually ~~Ql~!n the success of the Hobbesian
~~eory as a correct theory of the truth conditions of propo-'
si t ions, for
objects are brought under the name by possessing
the attribute connoted by it; but their possession
of the attribute is the real condition on which
the truth of the proposition depends~ not their
being called by the name. (SL~ I!,V,2)
It is not my purpose here to evaluate these arguments,
but there is one curious feature of Mill~s discussion that I
wi IIp 0 i n tOLl t • Mill does accept Hobbes' view as a complete
theory of meaning for the class of identity statements~ As
I mentioned earlier he takes it to follow from this that the
meaning of an identity such as that Cicero is Tully is that
what is call ed "Ci cero" is al so call ed "TLlll y". It is a
proposition ~~Q~t the conventions of language~ and he thinks
that what foIl (JWS from th is i 5 that
since names and their signification are entirely
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arbitrary~ such propositins are not~ strictly
speak i ng ~ SLtSCept i b 1 e of trLtth or f al si t Y!I bLtt
only of conformity or disconformity to usage or
conventi on (51 ~ I, VI ~ 1)
Mill does not realize that Hobbes' theory is no more
successful as a theory of the meaning of identities than as
a theory of meaning for other propositions. E>:actly the
same kinds of arguments can be raised against it in this
conte>:t. Frege eventually saw this parallel, and Ltsed the
epistemological problems with identity claims to set up his
[4J
ar~L,ments that even proper names mL,st have a sense. BLtt
I am not going to rehearse Frege's arguments here. For !I in
the first place, it is not at all clear that they are very
c:onci Ltsi ve. Even if we accept the point that the proposi-
tion that Cicero is Cicero has a different ~cognitive value~
from the proposition that Cicero is Tully~ it is not at all
clear to me why Mill would have to accept this as being
incompatible with Hobbes' theory of the import of proper
names. In particLtlar, I do not see why he would have to
accept Hobbes:' theory as giving a representa~ion of the
objects of knowledge and belief, so that the j~Qg~m§O~ that
Cicero is Tully is necessarily the j~~ggm§Dt that what is
named by .. Ci cero II i 5 what i 5 named by II TLIll Y II • The point is
that since Mill has a framework in which propositions (es-
sentially linguistic entities) are distinguished from judge-
ments or what is believed~ it is at least possible for him
to ta~::e Hobbes' theory as a semanti cs for certai n proposi-
tions without accepting it as giving a representation of
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what is believed.
Moreover~ in the second place~ the inadequacy of the
Hobbes-Mill view as applied to identities can be seen with-
OL,t e~·:ploring these epistemological argL,ments and the qL,es-
tions of whether they work and of what they show. For even
if we agree that the Hobbesian view gives the proper (mater-
i al ) truth conditions for identities, and deny that the
Fregian arguments in any way undermine this, we can see that
the Hobbesian view fails to capture the modal properties of
identities. For e>: ampl e, it is quite possible that Cicero
not be called Tully, but not possible that Cicero not be
TLlll Y (i e. Cicero). This shows that Mill is not really a
Kripkean about proper names (or perhaps I should say that
~:::ripke:'s theory is r10t Mill:'s). For the Hobbes-Mill analy-
sis of identities, whi ch they take to be sL,pported by thei r
treatment of proper names, does not generate the co~rect
modal properties of identities that Kripke properly demands.
These complicated issues aside, the upshot is that in
general propositions are not about the relations between
words and things~ but rather are about the things them-
selves.
t.heory,
We see the beginnings of a systematic semantic
in which the import of a proposition is a function
of the the denotation of proper names and the connotation of
general terms. ThLlS
every proposition asserts, that some given subject
does or does not possess some attribute; or that
some attribute is or is not (either in all or in
some portipn of the subjects in which it is met
with) conjoined with some other attribL,te. (81!,
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II!,I,l) [5J
This framework provides the background for Mill~s ac-
count of deductive validity. Mill contends that every case
of wl1at he calls 'valid ratiocination'!, tlreasoning by which!,
from general propositions previcusly admitted, other propo-
sitions equally or less general are inferred" (~L!, II~II~l)!,
is (or is transformable into) a syllogism. A syllogism is
valid or legitimate on condition that lIif the premises be
trL\e, the concI Ltsi on mLtst nec:essari 1 y be trLte ll (SL,
I I , I I , 1 ) • It turns out that all valid syllogisms can be
converted or reduced to four syllogisms of the first figure
--- major premise being universal and either negative or
affirmative~ minor premise being either unIversal or parti-
cular affirmative, and conclusion having the number of the
minor premise and being affirmative or negative as the major
[6J
premise.
validity
ThLIS the search for a Ltnified e>:plana·tion of the
of ratiocination or deductive arguments can be
satisfied by an e>:planation of the validity of these fOLtr
kinds of syllogism.
The traditional e>:planation of validity that Mill e>~a-
mines and rejects is the gi~t~m Q§ QIDOi gt Dyl!g- Mill='s
rendering of this 7 pr inciple of reasoning=' is IIthat whatever
can be affirmed (or denied) of a class, may be affirmed (or
denied) of everything included in that class" (SL, II,II~2).
I am less interested in the adequacy of this formulation of
the dictum than in Mill:'s attitude towards it. Certainly on
the face of things this is an unhappy formulation. For
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example~ consider that t~ ~ £l~§§ is predicable of the class
of men but not of everything in that class; but perhaps more
[7J
can be said to defend or e:·:plai~ this formLllation.
Mill~s reaction to the dictum parallels his objection to
Hobbes' theory of import: it is not so much that the dictum
is wrong --- lias far as it goes it is a trL,e ac:c:oLlnt" (SL,
11,11,2) --- but that it is incomplete and not very informa-
tive.
Mill does think that the dictum, as he formulates it,
was originally a sLtbstantive principle~ lIa statement of what
was conceived as a fundamental law of the universe ll (SL,
It made sense in the context of a system of
metaphysics in which universals (or for that matter classes)
are IIregarded as as a pecLtl i ar ki nd of sL\bstance,
objective existence distinct from the individual
having an
objects
c:lassed L\nder them ll (SL. I I :' I I" 2) • The idea is that under
SL\ch a system the di ctL\m e>:presses the c:rL\c:i a1 reI ati on that
[8J
hoI ds be'tween L\ni versal sand thei r- e>:empl ars. BL,t Mi 11
rejects the reality of class~s and universals,
asks:
and so he
when it is known that a class~ an universal, a
genus or species, is not an entity per se~ but
neither more nor less than the individual substan-
ces themselves which are placed in the class, and
that there is nothing real in the matter e>:c:ept
those objects, a common name given to them~ and
common attributes indicated by the name; what, I
should be glad to know, do we learn by being told,
that whatever can be affirmed of a class~ may be
affir-med of every object contained in the class?
( SL :r I I , I I , 2)
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Mill would say that a class !§ nothing more than than the
objects contained in it, and so he concludes that the dictum
can be translated into this: that whatever can be affirmed
of objects with such and such common attributes can be
affirmed of the objects with those attributes. As Mill
says~ this is a ~solemn trifling', and it is not at all
c: 1ear how i t COLlI d be the basi 5 of any genLli ne e>: p 1 anat ion
of the validity of the syllogism. On the other hand~ if
there is no further explanation of the val~dity of syllo-
gisms, than syllogisms themselves would seem to be just as
trifling.
Mill's argument her~ parallels his objection to Hobbes'
theory of import. He allows that (this rendering of) the
dictum would be a sufficient explanation of the validity of
the syllogism if Hobbes~ theory of import were true and
complete. Given Hobbes~ theory ~f import, the principle
behind the correctness of a syllogism would be IInothing e>:-
cept that the classification is consistent with itself" (SL,
11,11,3). But there are propositions that convey real in-
formation, for which Hobbes~ theory is not a complete theory
of import, and there are syllogisms that are composed of
such propositions. So it seems that there is more to the
validity of a syllogism then a fact about the way words are
Ltsed.
What Mill proposes, from the point of view of his
theory of import, are the following two principles.
The first, which is the principle of affirmative
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syllogisms!, is~ that things which coe>:ist with the
same thing, coexist with one another. The second
is the principle of negative syllogisms~ and is to
this effect: that a thing whyich coexists with
another thing, with which other a third thing does
not coe>; i st, i 5 not coe>: i stent wi th that th i rd
thing. These a>:ioms manifestly relate to facts~
and not to conventions: and one or other of them
is the ground of the legitimacy of every argument
in which facts and not conventions are the matter
treated of. (SL~ 11,11,3)
Unfortunately Mill does not discuss how these principles are
SL\pposed to work. Given a proper elaboration of lIc:oe>,ists",
no one would question their truth. But it is not very clear
how they can support the apparent Q~£§E§ii~ of the connec-
[9J
tion between the premises and conclusion of a syllogism.
But the main point I want to draw from all of this is Mill's
general position about the nature of validity. Whether or
not these revised principles do improve the earlier formula-
tions of the dictum, they are certainly objective and non-
psychological --- they are pretty trivial truths about all
things that exist. Si nee I~i 11 mai ntai n5 that these two
principles alone explain and legitimizp the deductive valid-
ity of arguments~ it is quite clear that in his system
validity itself is an objective and non-psychological con-
cept.
1. Mill also discusses and rejects a class interprettion
of the import of 'propositions which, he SL\ggests, is
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really the Hobbesian view in another form (sec 3 of Bk
I Chapter 5). One problem that mars that discussin is
that Mill seems to have two different notions of what a
class is. But once this is sorted out~ his arguments
can be seen to parallel those that are raised against
Hobbes.
2. Mill takes some pains to make these distinctions~ but I
wi 11 not e>:plore the detai 1 s of hi 5 attempt.
3. I take it that all verbal propositions turn out to be
i denti ti es L\nder anal ysi s --- bL,t they may not loak
like identities.
4. There is some interest to the question of how Mill's
c:onnotati 0115 reI ate to Frege=' s senses, bL\t jL\st as I am
not prepared to discuss Mill~s theory of connotation I
cannot discuss this further questio~.
5. I want to add one caveat. At several poi nts Mi 11 tal ks
about the import of propositions not only in terms of
conjunctions of attributes in objects, but also in
terms of the sequence and co-existence of ~phenomena'.
In fact the passage just quoted occurs after one such
statement, and is said to be a ~less abstruse~ state-
ment of the theory that, .. thOL,gh stepp i ng E.hort of i n
an earlier stage of the analysis~ is sufficiently sci-
entific for many of the purposes for which such a
general e>:pressi on [of the theory] i s reqL\i red" •
(11,1,1) The full and complete analysis, which I have
not gone through, involves Mill~s grand reduction of
attribL\tes and objects to phenomena. For e>;ample, he
says that
If it is remembered that every attribute is
9CQ~DQ~Q on some fact or phenomenon~ either of
outward sense or of inward consciousness, and that
to possess an attribute is another phrase for
being the cause of, or forming part of~ the fact
or phenomenon upon which the attribute is ground-
ed; we may add one more step to complete the
analysis. The proposition which asserts that one
attribute always accompanies another attribute,
really asserts thereby no other thing than this~
that one phenomenon always accompanies another
phenomenon.... (!,V,4. See other following parts
of part I, and especially discussion of the five
'predicables~. See also the passage at the begin-
ning of 11,1,1, that precedes the ~less abstru5e~
statement of the theory of import.>
My primary reason for pointing this out is to
forestall someone's reading these passages out of con-
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te>:t, and conseqLtently rejecting my analysis of Mill:'5
theory of import and my claim that his theory is not a
sLlbjectivist theory. I do not think that this more
~abstruse' analysis represents any change 'in Mill:'s
views or calls into question my analysis of them.
Indeed I think that it will be arguable as to whether
or not the kind of reduction of things and attributes
to phenomena of sense and consciousness is subjectivis-
tic. But if it is, this is a function of Mill~s reduc-
tion of objects and attributes~ and OQ~, in the first
i nstanc:e at 1east ~ of hi 5 theory of import. (See al so
note 4 of section 9ft There again I mention Mil1~s
grand reduction, and suggest that it does not lead to
any special psychologistic view about logic.)
6. In other words to these four types of syllogism:
All B~s are C~s;
AII/Some/ A~s are B~s;
Therefore
AII/Somel A~s are C's.
No B:'s are C='s;
AII/Somel A~s are B~s;
Therefore
No ~ is/Some A is not/ a C.
Singular minor premises and conclusions such as that
Socrates is a B, are generally treated as universal
propositions, and so syllogisms with such minor pre-
mises <and cnclusions) do not form two additional types
of syllogism.
7. For example, if you took ~all men~ to refer to refer to
the class of men, 'some men=' to refer to a subset of
the class of men, ~Socrates' to refer to a singleton~
and so on, then one could try to explain predication as
the holding or not holding of a sLtbset relation. (Or at
least if this would not capture the complete import of
propositions, one could argue that it would give the
truth conditions of propositions.) Of course this
interpretation runs into problems as soon as we get
past these simple cases of predication --- though I am
not sure that it is worse than Mill~5 alternative. But
it does escape the objection that I raised in the te)~t
(since the the subject of the proposition that the
class of men is a class refers to, on this interpreta-
tion, the singleton whose member is in the class of
men). The dictum de omni thus becomes:
wh~tever is predicated of a class is predicable of
every subset of that class.
Peter Beach, in B~f~~~n~~ Eng §gD~~~!!~~, gives a
much more sophisticated formulation of the dictum de
omni et nLtllo that does wor~~ in the conte>:t of a mLlch
more sophisticated (but still medieval> theory of re-
ference.
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8. But again, this cannot really be the point of the
dictum! As I pointed out in the brief objection I
gave~ not all that is true of universals (or classes)
is true of their exemplars (or their members).
9. But presumably these principles will have whatever
necessity ~O~ laws of logic have. Further questions
about the status of of laws of logic will be briefly
raised and discussed in section 9.
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5: §Qm~ B~m2~t§ 2~Q~~ tb~ §§~QD9 §~~j§£~i~~§~ Ib~§i§
Mill does not formulate and discuss what I have called
the second subjectivist thesis directly in e §~Ei§m Qf
bQg!~~ as he does the first thesis, although it is quite
clear that he would not endorse it. The second subjectivist
thesis really is the claim that it is a necessary condition
for a case of reasoning to be correct that the reasoner has
a certain perception of the agreement between~ or coherence
of, certain ideas --- as Loc~~e would say~ through a special
It is plausible to argue that a rejection of the
first subjectivist thesis already undermines the second
thesis, since Mill is denying that we (generally) reason
~bout our ideas. Certainly this would undermine Locke~s
implicit defence of the thesis (pp. 112-115 of Part II~
Section 2), which does seem to depend on that assumption.
But I would rather step back from Locke~s particular defence
and briefly consider the thesis itself, and at what Mill
might have to say about it.
The first comment that I want to ma~~e is that this
second subjectivist thesis at least suggests that there is
some kind of internal or subjective standard for the cor-
rectness of inferences in particular and beliefs in general.
But Mill tends to reject appeals to various kinds of 5ub-
jective standards or tests for correctness. For example, he
vigorously denies the efficacy of one traditionally accepted
subjective test for the truth of any belief, that the nega-
tion of the proposition believed is inconceivable:
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.•. there is such ample experience to show that our
capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing has
very little to do with the possibility of the
thing itself; but is in truth very much an affair
of accident~ and depends upon the past history and
habits of OL\r own minds. (SL, II!,V~6)
So the fact that a proposition is inconceivable to me is no
guarantee that the negation of that proposition is true. Of
course this is no proof that Mill could not accept a subjec-
tive standard for the correctness of C~~§QQlQg. But it is
strong evidence that Mill would not accept a mere examina-
ticn of the agreement or coherence of ideas as a guarant~e
of the correctness of inferences that lead to conclusions
that are not simply about ideas.
But this consideration leads directly to a second point
that can be worked into an argument against the second
subjectivist thesis; it turns on the e~Q~l~m 91 ~~~QC in our
reasoningp Mill, and for that matter Locke as well, would
agree that we make mistakes when we reason, that we do not
al ways correctl y eval Llate the wortf, of argLtments~ and that
we often hold inconsistent beliefs. Perhaps these apparent
facts are open to VariOL\S interpretations. I BL,t when they
are combined with Mill~s other views, and in particular with
his rejection of the first s~bjectivist thesis and his
theory of import (from which it follows that what is believ-
ed is, in general, i'ndependent of the mind), there is 1 ittle
motivation for supposing that we have any special access to
or knowledge of the correctness or incorrectness of
ences.
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infer-
Thi sis not yet a hard argL\ment agai nst Locke~ bL\t
there is a fairly obvious problem that can be raised for his
view. For it is not easy to see how, on his view, he can
~~Q.!.~tD. the f act that we ma~~e genLli ne mi stakes i n reason i ng
--- that is, how there can be genuine cases of reasoning
that are mistaken
SL\ch mi stakes.
even thOLlgh he agrees that we do make
At one point Descartes actually seems to
accept it as a consequence of his view that if one does
really reason then one can not make mistakes. For Descartes
acknowledges that at least in the case of a'simple deductive
inference IIthOLlgh it may be passed over, if it is not seen
throLlgh, (i t) cannot be erroneous when performed by an
understanding that is in the least degree rational II (Rules~
pp. 4-5) • I take it that ~not seeing through~ and so ~pas-
sing over~ the inference is not really to infer. So cases
of mistaken reasoning are not really cases of reasoning at
all. Locke says ~Qm~ibiQg like this in a passage I have
already used to illustrate a different point.
that if a mind has made an inference
Lee: ~~e wr i tes
by find i ng OLlt the i ntermed i ate Ideas, and tak i ng
a view of the connexion of them, placed in a due
order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a
right Inference. If it has done it without such a
View, it has not so much made an Inference that
will hold, or an Inference of right Reason, as
shewn a wi 11 i ngness to have i t be, or be t a~(en for
such. (Essay, p. 672)
In fact Locke does ~~nt to say that these inferences made
'without a view~ are genuine inferences. He tal ~~S of how
the mind is often livery forward to make Inferenc:es~ and
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therefore often makes too much haste, before it perceives
the conne>~ion of the Ideas that mL,st hold the E>:tremes
together II (Essay!' p. 672). And it seems that a view of the
appropriate connections might also be prevented by the con-
fusion or obscurity of the ideas in question (Essay, p.
682) • BL\t if i tis C.§2!.!.~ II i n vertL,e of the perc:ei ved
Agreement of the intermediate Ideas with the Extremes,
the E>:tremes are conci Ltded to agree ll (Essay, p. 673,
that
and
also see pp 113-115 of section 2 of this part)!' and if in
cases where the mind is hasty or its ideas are confused the
mind does not have such a view of the relations between
intermediate and extremes, then how has an inference been
made at all? I~ these c:ases some ~conclusion~ is believed,
but I am questioning whether,
there has been an inference
en the Locke-Descartes view,
whether the belief in the
:' conel LISi on:' is e~§~g gO or io ~i~t~§ Qf one's beliefs in
the proposed premises.
Th i s internal c:r i tic i sm of the Loe: ~~ean theory sets the
stage for a third and final comment about the second subjec-
tivist thesis. The flip side of the qL\estion of how Loc~(e
can account for the existence of genuine cases of reasoning
that are mistaken is the question of how we can ever reason
to conclusions that were previously unknown or not believed.
Or to put the argument another way, how we can ever fail to
believe the consequences of our beliefs. This point was
really raised in the initial exposition of the Lockean view.
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By hypothesis~ believing the premises of an argument in-
valves being aware of certain ~elations between ideas that
are before the mind. But how can one ever fail to be aware
of the further relations between those same ideas that
embody the conclusion of the reasoning? Since by hypothesis
the ideas in question are not indistinct or incomplete~ it
is hard to understand how any of the relations between the
ideas could be ~forgotten~ or ignored --- and how the con-
elusion of the reasoning could be unknown given one~s belief
[lJ
in the premises. None of these comments are knock-down
arguments against the Lockean view. But they do point out
that the theory as it stands is L'nabl e to e>:pl ai n all
it purports to explain.
that
For all of the differences between Mill and Locke that
I have so far elaborated~
ence is still to come.
one of the most important differ-
For Mill shows that there is a
radi cal probl em wi th the way in whi c:h phi losophers tal ~~
and we will see that he lays the ground for a distinction
between two sen!ses in which phi losophers have confL\sedly
used the terms ~correct inference~ and ~principle of infer-
ence ~ •
1 • In WH, pp. 342-344,
somewhat more detail.
Mi 11 ma~~es si mi 1 ar comments in
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Mill has e>:plained the validity or legi'timacy of cer-
tain forms of the syllogism; he has given principles that
e~·:pl ai n why it is necessary that if the premi ses of a val i d
syllogism are true then the conclusion is true (section 4).
But this is only the background for Mill~s discussion of
what he takes to be" a more important topic~ the relation of
the syllogism (and of deductive logic in general) to reason-
ing. This topic is more important because Mill takes the
primary goal of logic to be the development of a theory of
reasoning or inference. Remember that lito infer a proposi-
tion from a previous proposition or propositions (i s)
to give credence to it, or claim credence for it~ as a
conc:lLIsion" from those propositions (sec:tion 1). So if to
infer is to give credence to or to justify a proposition,
then logic, as a theory of "inference, is a theory of giving
credence or justification. But this con~ention naturally
raises a problem about traditional deductive logic and the
theory of the syllogism.
1 og i cis t his:
Mill~s problem about deductive
(P> Is the theory of the syllogism (and deductive
logic in general) a theory of inference (does
it provide rules of justification or proof)?
I think that it is this question, and the giving of a
negative answer, that is the underlying concern of Chapter
III Book II of e E~Et~m g!. 6gg1£, entitled liOn the FLlrlction,
and Logical ValLte, of the Syllogism ll • And while I disagree
with some of Mill~s arguments for that conclusion~
15()
I will
argue that this conclusion is both correct and justified.
EventL,all y, (sections 9 and 10) I will show the importance
of giving a negative answer to this question for any anti-
psychologistic account of deductive logic --- though a nega-
tive answer does not close the book on psychologism about
dedL,ctive logic. But in this section the issues will remain
narrower. Here I am interested in clarifying Mill~s posi-
tion,
problem
in order to show that Mill is indeed concerned with
(P) and that there is good reason to accept a nega-
tive answer to (P). This result is important in its own
right~ quite apart from the underlying questions about psy~
chologism. For it is a crucial first step in understanding
the role that is played by deductive logic in inference or
jLtstific:ation.
Mill does not state the issue quite as I have fo,mu-
lated it. He writes:
We have now to inquire~ whether the syllogistic
process, that of reasoning from generals to parti-
cLtlars, is, or is not, a process of i nferenc:e; C\
progress from the known to the L,n~~nown; a means of
coming to a knowledge of something which we did
not know bef ore. (I I , I I I , 1 )
Now the force of Mill~s question
(Q) Is the syllogistic process
inference?
a process of
is not immediately clear. JLtst from looking at (Q) it is
tempting to think that Mill~s primary interest must be in a
psychological enquiry. For his reference to inference as a
from the known to the unknown ~eems to indicate
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that he is interested in a kind of activity; and his refer-
ence to inference as a means of coming to knowledge we did
not have before seems to indicate that his interest is in a
rule or principle that governs that activity,
that can be used to obtain new knowledge.
a principle
However we shall see that the primary focus of (Q) is
not psychological, or at least that Mill has legitimate
concerns that are not about psychological matters. It WDL\l d
=ertainly be a mistake to downplay the prominence of psycho-
logical qLtestions in Mill='s work, and in Section 7 I will
disentangle another thread in Mill='s thought that does e~·'­.. ,
plore what the real nature of the psychological process of
inference is. For Mill also wants to show that the syllo-
gism does not describe or correspond to what really goes on
in the mind when we make inferences.
But even when we keep these psychological issues to one
side there is still a certain amount of confusion in the
text. For it turns out that (Q) and related forms of words
express a number of rather different questions that Mill
does not clearly distinguish, and 0111 Y one of them appro>: i-
mates the problem (P). Moreover, Mill invariably answers OQ
to these questions. That is, he claims that deductive infer-
ence, and syllogistic inference in particular~ is not
process of inference'. This is in contrast with inductive
inference~ which is always said to be a process of infer-
enc:e. So it turns out that Mill is defending a number of
negative theses about deductive logic (one of which is an
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answer- to (P) ) , and a corresponding number- of positive
theses about inductive logic --- none of which he clearly
separates.
Of course my intention is to discover what these theses
are. The text of Chapter III of Book II is confusing·~ erid
Mill himself seems to be genuinely confused at times. He
shifts between different arguments, and between different
interpretatioi1$ ·;;.f t.U) =' with frustrating abandon.
we distinguish various arguments, and determine which consi-
derations support which conclusions, then I think it can be
seen that there is a central point that Mill makes aboL,t
inference!! his answer to problem (P), that bears close
e>: ami nat i on.
It is important to introduce some of Mill~s terminology
about inference. Prior to his discussion of the validity of
the syllogism Mill distinguishes C~e~ from ee2e~~nt infer-
ence. "Merely apparent" inferences are those in which lithe
proposition
ED.e!~§!.§ (my
ostensibly inferr~d from another, appears
emphasis) to be merely a repetition of
QO
the
same, or part of the same, assertion which was contained in
the first." (11,1,2) Mill gives four cases of apparent
inference. The first is inference based on the equivallence
or eql.,i poll enc:e of proposi t ions. . Hi 5 i 11 L,strat ion is: II All
men are mortal, for no man is e>:empt from death". The
second is inference from a universal proposition to a propo-
sition "which differs from it only in being partiC:L\lar".
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An illustration is the inference from all men are
mortal to some men are mortal. The third is an inference
IIwhere~
ject,
the antecedent having a predicate of a given 5ub-
the c:onseqL,ent aff i rms of tl,e same sL,bject somethi ng
already connoted by the former predicate ll for
e>:ampl e, all men are animals from all men are mammals. The
fourth is inference based on the conversion of propositions.
Mill gives a number of examples of conversion,
illustration is this: since some men are mortal, some mor-
tals are men. Mill comments that
in all these cases there is not really any infer-
ence; there is in the conclusion no new truth~
nothing but what was already asserted in the pre-
mises~ and obvious to whoever apprehends them.
The fact asserted in the conclusion is either the
very same fact, or part of the fact, asserted in
the original proposition. This follows from our
previous analysis of the Import of Propositions.
(II,I~2)
That two propositions express the same fact, and that
one expresses part of the same fact as another, are notions
that are notoriously difficult. But it is not difficult to
see what these fOLlr cases of apparoent inference have in
common. The second and fourth cases ar~ ones in which
anyone would agree that the premise logically implies the
[lJ
conclusion. The first is likely intended to be such a
case, the only problem being a trivial change in the predi-
cate of the consequent. But if we are allowed, as Mill
sLlggests, to consider the En9!~E!E of propositions through
the doctrine of the Import of Propositions, in whic:h we can
5l\ppOSe that the itnport of comple>: terms is analyzed in some
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canonical way, then it may be that all four case~ are cases
of logical implication. In any event what is certainly
common to all four cases is this: it would be impossible for
the premise to be true but the conclusion false. So we do
not have to decide when two propositions express the same
fact, or when one proposition expresses part of the fact
e>,pressed by another. We can agree that in cases of appa-
rent inference~ if it is a fact that the premises are true
then it must be a fact that the conclusion is true. For
example, if it is a fact that all men are mortal, then it is
certainly a fact that some men are mortal (see note [1]),
and so on. Moreover it does not matter for our purposes
whether or not these are all genuine cases of logical impli-
cation. The important point, as Mill asserts, is that these
cases all have the same status, which is based on, or re-
sults from, an analysis of the propositions through the
doctrine of the Import of Propositions: they are inferences
such that it is impossible that the premises be true but the
conclusion false. As a shorthand, but so as not to beg any
questions about logical implication, I will say that the
premises strictly imply the conclusion, and of course all
logical implications are cases of strict implication. Thus
my suggestion is that where there is only an apparent infer-
ence (that is, where there is OQ ~~sl inference) the pre-
mises strictly imply the conclusion.
The contrast with apparent inference is with "cases cf
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inference in the proper acceptation of the term, those in
which we set out from known truths, to arrive at others
real1)' distinct from them. II (II,I,3) These are ~~~t infer-
en~es. Mill thinks that it has generally been supposed that
the set of real inferences is composed of both inductive
inferences and syllogistic inferences or ~ratiocination~.
Mill agrees that induction, which he characterizes as rea-
soning from particulars to generRls and from particulars to
particulars, is real inference. The conclusion of an induc-
tion "embraces more than is. contained in the premises"; a
general i z at ion i ndLu:ed II covers a mLlch 1 arger e>; tent of
ground than the individual experiments which are said to
form its basis;II(II,I,3) and the conclusion asserts a ~new~
fact~ a fact distinct from what is asserted in the premises.
These notions of 'contains more than~, ~has a greater extent
than ~ , asserts a ~new~ fact, and so on, seem to imply that
there is a real inference (the conclusion contains more than
the premises) if it is not necessary that when the premises
are true the conclusion is true. This confirms my earlier
suggestion that an inference is QQt real (it is only appa-
rent) if and only/if the premises strictly imply the conclu-
sion. We can also say that a conclusion e)(presGes a D.~~
fact (relative to the premises), or is a D~~ truth (relative
to the premises), if and only if it is not strictly implied
by the premises. And this is just to say that it is the
conclusion of a real inference.
Using this newly introduced terminology Mill concludes
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that inductive inference is variously ~real',
cess of inference', and a '~~ocess of real
a ='real pro-
inference=' (eg.
II,II~3). And it is from this perspective that Mill first
raises the question of whether syllogistic inference is a
real process of inference, a question reminiscent of (Q) •
Now I will
defined it,
use the term ='reel inference~ only as I have
(in contrast with anything else that Mill might
mean by ~a real process of inference', or ~a process of real
inference', and so on). So we can already give an answer to
This firsta first interpretation of Mill~s question (Q).
interpretation of the question is:
(Ql) Is syllogistic inference real inference?
It follows from the theory of the import of propositions
that for valid syllogisms, just as for the given examples of
apparent inference, it is necessary that if the premises of
the syllogism are true then the conclusion is true. Indeed
the whole point of the doctrine of the import of proposi-
tionss, and its use in defending the fundamental principles
of the syllogism (section 4), was to explain and justify
this result. For as Mill points out (11,11,1) a syllogism
is legitimate or valid if and only if when lithe premises are
trLte, the cone: 1LlSi on mL\st nec:essar i 1 Y be so". Granted this,
Syllogistic inference is not real inference.
we have an easy (if not very exciting) answer to question
(Q) :
<Ai)
Unfortunately this easily answered question is not the
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question that Mill is really concerned with in his discus-
sion of lithe process of inferencell~ and it is c:ertainly not
(P). For the contrast between real and apparent inference~
the notion of a new truth, and the notion of one truth being
contained in another, are not, as far as we have seen,
epistemological notions at all. And while we have not yet
made much headway in clarifying Mill~s notion of a 1process
of i nf erenc:e:- :- it is apparent that his notion of a progress
from what is known to what is unknown is epistemological.
Consequently (Al) is not really the thesis that he is most
concerned to defend, although it is fair to say that Mill
51 i des between (A 1) and more str i ~~ i n~f these:-!I and t.hat he
trades on the obviousness of (Al) when he enumerates them.
Mill makes the slide from (AI) to an epistemological
claim quite openly. When we agree that syllogistic inference
is not real inference, we are agreeing with what Mill says
is ~universal1y allowed~, "that a syllogism is viciOLtS if
there be anything more in the conclusion than was assumed in
the premi ses". (I I, I I I, 1) In other words the conci Ltsi on of a
syllogism is not 'new~ --- that is, the conclusion is im-
plied by the premises. IIBL,tll~ Mill c:ontinL,es~ ·'this is!¥ in
fact, to say, that nothing ever was, or can be, proved by
syllogism, which was not known, or assumed to be known,
before.II(II,III,!) If this latter really were trLte, then it
would not be surprising to find that the syllogism is not a
process of inference, a progress from the known to the
unknown. But have we been shown that this is true? Does it
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follow from the 'universally.accepted claim~, which is equi-
valent to (Al)~ that no pr-oposition c:an be "proved by syllo-
gi sm ll L,nl ess tt-.e conel LlSi on is previ OllSl y kno~,n? To say
this, that any instance of a syllogism which is a proof of
the conclusion is a case where the conclusion must have been
previ OLlSl Y known, is pretty mLlch to say (as Mill e>:plicitly
does) that any syll ogi sm "<:on5i dered, as an argLlment to prove
the conclusion •.• is a petitio principii ll
begging of the question.
thesis:
So Mill wants to defend this
(A2) Every instance of a syllogistic proof is a
case of begging the question. [2J
The corresponding question
(Q2) is any instance of a syllogism a genuine proof?
is a second, and more important, interpretation of (Q)~ and
is closely related to <P) itself. Certainly if (A2) is a
defensible answer to (Q2) then it is likely that we have an
answer to (P) as well. To show that every purported proof
or justification by syllogism is a case of begging the
question is to show that there are no cases of proof or
justification that are instances of a syllogism. This~ if
would show that the syllogism cannot e@ a rule of
proof or justification, and surely it would also be an
important first step toward showing that the syllogism does
not ~~gy!g~ any such rules either.
If (A2) follows from (Al) it is not obvious that it
follows~ for it is not obvious that (A2) is true.
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there are lots of cases i n ,~h i c:h we have ~bQ~Jgb~ that we
we~e proving a conclusion when we had used a syllogism to
j Ll 5 t i f y it. There is really just one main passage in which
Mill offer something of an argument for (A2) that might be
more than a restatement of (A1). The passage begins:
It must be granted that in every syllogism consi-
dered as an argumerlt to prove the cone! LlSi on,
there is a eg~i~lQ Q~iD~1eii. When we say~
All men are mortal,
Socrates is a man,
therefore
Socrates is mortal;
it is unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the
syllogistic theory that the proposition Socrates
is mort~l, is presupposed in the more general
aSsLtmption, All men are mortal ••• (11,111,2)
Every syllogistic proof of a conclusion is a p2titio princi-
pii because the conclusion is 2C~~U~~Q~~~ ~~ the ~more
general aSSL\mpt i on ~ , in this case the proposition that all
men are mortal. But in what way is the proposition that
Socrates is mortal presupposed by the proposition that all
men are mortal? Let me get one fairly minor point out of
the way. Mill often ignores the minor premise, as he seems
to in this quotation. I say that he is ignoring the minor
premise because there simply does not seem to be any sense
in which the proposition that Socrates is mortal is presup-
posed by the major premise alone. This is so even given
that the proposition that all men are mortal is taken to
imply that there are men. For even with that assumption the
preposition that all men are mortal
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neither ime!1~E nor
semantically presuppDses that §Q£~2t~§ is a man. So I will
al ways be tal ki ng abOLtt:- and will assu~e that Mill is talk-
ing about~ the relation betwen the conjunction of both
[3]
premises and the ~onclusion.
We could take this ~presupposes~ to be a logical or
semantic relation, and then the claim would just amount to a
restatement of (Ai), that the conclusion is not a new truth.
This would not advance my search for a justification of
(A2), since it is not obvious that (A2) follows from (Al).
But I do not think that Mill is simply restating (A 1 ) , for
he goes on to give a series of elaborations of the claim
that the conclusion is presupposed by the major premise,
which are supposed to be arguments in support of (A2)~ the
petitio principii claim. Those who argue that the premises
of a syllogism presuppose the conclusion are claiming
(1) that we cannot be assured of the mortality of
all men~ unless we were previously certain of the
mortality of every individual man: (2) that if it
be still doubtful whether Socrates~ or any other
individual you choose to name, be mo~tal or not,
the same degree of uncertainty must hang over the
assertion~ All men are mortal: (3) that the ge-
neral principle, instead of being given as evi-
dence of the particular case, cannot itself be
taken for true without exception, until every
shadow of doubt which could affect any case com-
prised with it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde;
and then what remains for the syllogism to prove?
that, in short, no reasoning from generals to
particulars can, as such, prove anything: since
from a general principle you cannot infer any
particulars~ but those which the principle itself
aSSLlmes as foreknown. (I I , I I I , 2)
There is a way of reading the first observation ( mLtch
less 60 with the second and third ones)
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that is clearly
wrong and has to be pLtt to one side. It is wlong~ I think~
to take 'aSSL\ranCe' and 'certainty:' (and :'being dOL\btfL,l:' in
the second and third observations) as psychological notions
feelings of assurance and certainty (and feelings of
dOL,bt) • For it is not trL,e~ and Mill has no stake in claim-
ing it to be true~ that one could not feel certain or as-
sured of (or have no feelings of doubt towards) the proposi-
tion that all men are mortal, without feeling certain and
assured (and not doubt) of each individual man~ that he is
mortal. So he must mean something else --- assurance and
certainty (and being doubtful) are epistemic notions.
I will argue that all three observations are really
ways of getting at the same point. Indeed the first two
observati ons are pI BLtsi bl y synonymoLls. For the first says,
roughly, that if we have not already gotten assurance (or
been made certain) of every individual man that he is mor-
tal~ then we have not gotten assurance (or been made cer-
t ai n) that all men are mortal. BL,t II f or i t to
dOLtbtfL\l It that pis jLIst to say that I have
aSSL\ranCe (or been made certain) that p. So
still be
not gotten
the first
observation amounts to the claim that if it is still doubful
for any individual man that he is mortal, then it is still
doubtful that all men are mortal; and surely this is just
the second observation, without the added complication~
which I will not bring into the discussion, of the sugges-
tion that there may be various ~~g~g~§ of doubt or uncer-
tainty (or belief and certainty). I will discuss the third
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observation separately~ beCaLtSe it e>:pl i ci tl y menti ons a
notion of evidence. But I will show that it is also suscep-
tible to the same analysis as the first two points, and
represents the same important ambiguity that undermines
Mi 11 :' S argLtment.
t"ow ~ given that ~assurance' and certainty in (1), and
~being doubtful' in (2) are epistemic notions~ then to be
assured or have assurance~ to be certain~ and for it to not
be doubtful, are to be understood as variants of ~g ~§ tDQ~D
(or to be verified or believed with justification). So in
( 1 ) and (2) Mi 11 can be taken to be mak i ng the ver-y strong
claim
(a) A universal proposition all A's are B~s
cannot be known (verified~ or believed with
jLtstification) L\nless it is indepe~,dently or
antecedently known (verified~ or believed
with justification) of each thing which is an
A~ that it is a B.
There are a number of ways that one might try to use (a) to
argL\e for (A2). Let us suppose I know the premises that all
men are mortal and that Socrates is a man, and that the
conclusion in question is th~t Socrates is mortal. Certain-
ly if my knowledge that all men are mortal depends upon the
fact that I independently know of each man that he is mortal
(principle (a) ) , then in part i CLll ar I have to know Qf 80-
crates that he is a man and is mortal. Th i 5 ~~nowl edge i s
=' presL\pposed:W by my knowledge of the universal proposition.
Notice that this presupposed knowledge is not yet knowledge
of the conclusion of the syllogism, that Socrates is mortal.
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The difficulty is (roughly) that I might know of each man
(and hence of Socrates) that he is both a man and mortal
wi thOL,t knowi ng who, which man, Socrates is, or wi thOLlt
having an adequate £Qmm~QQ of the name ~Socrates'. However
given Mill's treatment of identities (section 4), I rather
doubt that he would have been aware of this distinction;
thus I am fairly certain that Mill would conclude at this
point that I know the conclusion of the syllogism, that
Socrates is mortal. For without being aware of the distinc-
tion between ~knawing of Socrates ... ~ and 'knowing that
Socrates •.• ', then Mi 11 :' S desi red cone 1 L\si on i s e>: tremel y
difficult to avoid.
BLlt even if we do not aSLlme that Mi 11 was maki ng thi s
mistake we may be able to take the argument a little fur-
ther. For remember that I have al so SL\pposed that I ~~now
the minor premise of the syllogism~ that Socrates is a man.
In other words I do have command of the name ~Socrates', and
I do, to some e>;tent, ~know who Socrates is~.
is at least arguable that since I know who Socrates is, it
follows that however I have obtained my knowledge of Socra-
tes that he is both a man and a mortal wOLtl d have gi vel' me
knowledge that Socrates is both a man and mortal.
A difficulty with this last argument is (to put it
rather crudely) that my 'way of knowing~ of Socrates that he
is a man and is mortal might be quite independnet of~ and
unrelated to, my 'way of knowing' that Socrates is a man.
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But then it is hard to see why it should follow that the
sense in whi ch I know who Socrates is gL,arantees that I know
that Socrates is mo~tal.
What Mill apparently wanted to prove on the basis of
(a) was
(b) The premises of a syllogism cannot be known
(verified~ or believed with justification)
L'nless the c:onc:lL\sion is ~~nown (verified~ or
believed with 'justification).
BLI t ( b ) i mp 1 i es ( A2) , given the assumption that an argument
taken as a proof of its conclusion begs the question if one
cannot know the premi ses wi thOLlt knowi ng
believing with justification) the conclusion.
(verifying,
ThLlS if
or
(a)
implies (b) , then he would have a slightly langer argument
for (A2). Certainly (b) is no more obviously an implieand
of (Al ) than (A2) is, and is as much in need of defence.
For it seems eQ§§~Q!~, at least, that someone could know the
premi ses of a syll ogi sm wi thOLlt ~~nowing the cone 1L\si on. For
one thing he might never have though about the conclusion.
Perhaps if such a person were to think about the conclusion~
[4J
and believe it, then we would say that he knew it. But
if he does not believe the conclusion then it does not seem
that he knows it.
false> thesis.
(b) is a substantive (and apparently
If we agree that (b) follows from (a), these considera-
tions are grounds for taking (a) to be false as well. But
(a) is implausible on its own accord, wtlether or not we
accept the shaky argL\ments for (b) on the basis of (a). (a)
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i:. e>:tremely implaLlsible becaLlse it wOLlld make any intere5.t-
ing generalization unknowable. In most case we simply can-
not survey all of the things that are A~s~ and verify that
they are B='s. However, we do have, Ot claim to have!, know-
ledge of some universal propositions. And sLlrel y i f we know
any universal claims at all~ we know that all men are mor-
tal; and even in this simple case we cannot survey all past
[5J
and ft-,tL're men. So (a) is~ on the face of things~ false.
What many philosophers have found plausible~ al thoL,gh I do
OQ~ want to endorse it, is a thesis about evidence:
(E) That alptla, which is an A, is a B is (at
least some) evidence or reason fOt believing
that all A~s are B~s.
(a) does not follow from (E) any mor~ than (A2) or
follows from (A1).
(b)
In contrast to (a), (b) , and (A2), there is anothe~,
and in a sense weaker, kind of thesis that Mill could be
getting at in (1) and (2). For when Mill says that lIif it
still be doubtful whether Socrates, or any individual YOL\
chose to name~ is mortal or not, the same degree of uncer-
tainty must hang over the assertion, All men are mortalll~ he
may be thin~~ing of this perfectly acceptable thesis (again
removing the complication of considering degrees of belief>:
that al pha i 5 an A bL,t not a B i s reason f 0''-
doubting that all A's are 8='5;
or, as I prefer to put it,
(Bl ) that alpha is an A but not a B is reason for
believing (it is evidence) that not all A~~
ate B's.
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That an individual A is not a B is reason for believing that
not all A's are B's because it is impossible both that there
is something which is an A but not a B and that all A~s are
To put this another way~ that alpha is an A but not a
B is reason for believing that not all A~s are B~s~ because
it follows from the theo~y of the import of propositions
that the proposition that alpha is an A but not a B strictly
implies that it is not the case that all A~s are B~s. A
variant of (B1) might be
(B2) That the conclusion of a syllogism is false
is reason for believing (it is evidence) that
the conjunction of its premises is false;
and of course (B2) can be defended exactly as (B1) has been
defended.
What is the nature and significance of these new ~prin-
ciples of evidence' or ~principles of reasoning~. In the
first place, in defending (81) and (B2) I am not defending
any psychological claimsm For example, I am not denying
the possibility that someone could believe that Socrates is
a man who is not mortal, but also believe that all men are
mortal. Nor am I denying the possibility that som~one could
doubt the conclusion of a syllogism, but also strongly
believe both of its premises. What I take these principles
to be asserting is the existence of some objective fact
about the evidential relations between propositions. That
is, we take it that the fact that certain propositions are
true (that such and such facts obtain) is reason for believ-
ing, or is evidence, that some other proposition is true
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(that some other fact obtains). In the case of (Ec 1 ) and
(B2) this is justified by the strict implication relations
between the propositions in question. We ~an get at the
objective nature of these principles in another way. For
e>~ amp 1 e ~ what (81) e>:presses mi ght be PL\t 1 i ~~e thi 5: if
someone ~~~~ to have g~od reason for believing that alpha is
an A but is not a B then he ~g~iQ have reason to beli~ve
that not all A~s are B~s --- whether or not he does in fact
have such good reason. And what (82) e>:presses mi ght be PLIt
in a similar way: if someone ~~~~ to have reason for doubt-
ing the conclusion of a syllogism then he ~Q~~g have reason
for doubting the =onjunction of its premises --- again whe-
ther or not he actually has some reason for doubting the
cone 1 L\si on.
While observation (2) is plausible if interpreted as
(Bl) or (B2), and while I think that (81) captures what is
correct about the second observation, I want to argue that
(B1) does not support any of the strong theses (a), (b)~ or
<A2). Indeed I want to argue that these a-principles are
radically different from the strong theses about knowledge
or justification. But it will be easier to make this case
if we first proceed to a discussion of the third observa-
tion. This observation is that (c) the universal proposi-
tion that all A=' s are B" s "cannot i tsel f be ta~~en for trL,e
without exception" (that is, it cannot be known~ veri fed, or
believed with jL\stification) "l.'ntil every shadow of dOL'.bt
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which could affect any case comprised with it~ is dispelled
by evi dence al i L,nde tl • And on the basis of this Mill fwrther
claims that (d) the universal proposition cannot (properly)
be given as evidence for the particular preposition (the
conclusion of the syllogism). This terminology (in (d» of
being ~given as evidence~ is slippery, bL,t I ta.ke it that
Mill intends (d) to have roughly the force of ( C\2) • The
notion that one proposition is or is not properly gi~~O as
evidence for another, and, we might add, the notion that a
proposition is properly e££~et~e as evidence for another,
should be contrasted with the notion that one proposition ~~
evidence for (or reason for believing) another. To say that
(d) the premises of a syllogism cannot (ever) be
properly given or accepted as evidence for
the conclusion of that syllogism
is roughly equivalent to saying that
(e) the premises of a syllogism cannot (ever) be
a justification or proof of the conclusion of
the syllogism.
Certainly one could argue that it is because (according to
(A2» the premises of a syllogism beg the question if given
as a proof of the conclusion that the premises cannot be
properly given or accepted as evidence for the conclusion.
(A2) explains the trL,th of (d) (and of (e».
(e) has a weaker and a stronger interpretation. When
Mi 11 t al ~~S abOL\t ~ cases c:ompr i sed wi th:' the proposi t i on that
all men are mortal, the intuitive picture is easy enough to
grasp. The cases comprised with the proposition that all
men are mortal compose the class of propositions that alpha
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is Inortal, where al pha is a man. These are proposi ti ons that
are evidence for the universal proposition that all men are
morta.l !I in acco~dance with (E), and whose falsity would
[6J
guarantee the falsity of that universal proposition.
ThL'S a first weak i nterpretati on of (c) is si mpl y that
If there is reason to doubt that alpha, which is
an A, is a B, then there is reason not to accept
or believe the proposition that all A~s are B~s.
This is not exactly (Bl), although it is one of the ways I I
characterized the force of (Bl). And it may be defended by
[7J
(B1), or by the arguments that justify (81).
Here is the second, stronger interpretation of (c:) •
Perhaps Mill is saying that in order for all A~s are B~s to
·be accepted by someone, he must remove the ~Q§§~~titt~ of
doubt from any case comprised with it. That is, he must
remove any possibility of doubting any proposition which~ ~f
~Q~~~~~, would cast doubt on the universal proposition.
Comparing this suggestion with (B1) and (B2) informs us that
this is an extremely strong claim. On this interpretation
we would have to remove the possibility of doubt from~ that
i s~ verify, E~ 1~9§~ every piece of possible evidence for
the universal, which evidence <according to (E» i nc 1L\des
every proposition that predicates ggl09 ~ ~ of every indivi-
dual that is an A. In other words this is to say that
In order for someone to accept the proposition
that all A~s are B~s he has to verify of every
individual that is an A that it is a ~.
Here we have (a) allover again.
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Just as Mill believes that (A2) follows from (a) ~ he
will be persuaded that (d) follows from this strong inter-
pretation of (c). The arguments~ and the difficulties with
[8J
them~ will mirror those discussed previously~ and have no
more plausibility then the previous arguments.
since we have already suggested that (a) and (b)
Moreover
(and so
(A2» are implausible principles, even if we did agree that
(d) follows from this strong interpretation of (c) (which
BmOLlnts to
all.
(a» this would be no recommendation for it at
Th i 5 st i 11 1eaves the wea~~ i nterpretat i on of (c ) ~ as
well as (B1) and its variants. How are we to evaluate these
principles? I said that I would argue that (Bl) and its
variants do not support any of the the strong theses (a),
(b)~ and (A2) (and now (d) as well). The easiest way to see
this is to reflect on the argument for the truth of (Bl) and
(B2) • (B1) and (B2) do not literally follow from the theory
of import (the facts that support (Al», but they are justi-
fied by it. For e}~ample, (82) says that the fact that the
conclusion of a syllogism is false is reason for believing
that the conjunction of its premises is false. Thi sis·
correct because it is impossible that the conclusion is
false and the premises true. And that this last is true
follows from an analysis of the propositions that compose
the syllogism by using the theory of the import of proposi-
tions.
Now, observe that we can justify hosts of principles by
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analogous arguments. For e>:ample!,
(B3) The premises of a syllogism are reasons for
believing (evidence for) its conclusion.
(B3) is justified because it follows from the analysis of
the propositions of the syllogism through the theory of
import~ that it is impossible for the premises to be true
but the conclusion false.
What I want to emphasize is that (83) is quite distinct
fro.n (d), and in no way conflicts with it. I n part i eLl} ar ='
it is not the denial of (d). (1 suppose that it is the
denial of another interpretation of the form of words that I
interpreted as (d)~ and which might be confused with (d).)
To get clear about this~ let us compare (B3) more closely
with (d) itself. (d) says that
the premises of a syllogism cannot (ever) properly
be given as, or accepted as, evidence for its
cone 1 LlSi on.
(B3) says that
the premises of a syllogism are evidence for (~ea­
son for believing) its conclusion.
The first important difference is that (B3) (and of course
its denial) are completely impersonal and context-free. All
of the B-principles ma~~e claims about the evidential rela-
tions between propositions that stem from the (strict) im-
plication relations that hold between them. They make
claims which, if true, are true whether or not people ever
[9J
understand that those evidential relations hold.
BL\t (d), as it tL,rns oL,t, i 5 not impersonal and conte>: t
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free, although this formulation of the principle misleading-
ly obscures that fact. Cd) really is about people, about
what people accept as the proper or correct evidence~ and
about what people give as a justification or proof. (d) is
logically compatible with (83), for while I claim that (B3)
is true and (d) is false~ it seems to be possible that Cd)
be true. For it seems to be possible that we could never be
in a position to know, or to believe with justification, the
premises of a syllogism without thereby knowing its conclu-
sion. Looking at this a little more abstractly, we can
imagine a B-principle that says: propositions of type I are
reasons for believing (evidence for) propositions of type
II; and this is justified because propositions of type I
strictly imply propositions of type II. The analogue of (d)
would be: propositions of type I are never properly given
or accepted as evidence for propositions of type II. These
two claims are logically compatible because, for e>:ample, it
may be that no one could have gOud reasons for believing
propositions of type I; after all, surely there are some
propositions that we can never know, verify, or believe with
justification (for one thing, there are propositions that we
cannot believe). But it still could be true that if we ~gC§
to have reason for believing a proposition of type I, then
we ~Q~iQ have reason for believing a (corresponding) propo-
sition of type II (as the B-principle implies). Or as Mill
tries to argue in the case of the syllogism, it may be that
we can never accept propositions of type I as evidence for
173
propositions of type II because~ while we can know or be-
lieve with justification propositions of type I, any jLtsti-
fication that we might have for believing or accepting
propositions of type I ~presupposes', or otherwise involves,
a prior justification of the corresponding proposition of
type II. In all of this I do not mean to be arguing that
there never is good reason to believe principles analogous
to (d); it is only that if there is, then such principles
[1 ()J
are independent of the B-principles.
Of course Mill would not accept the prima facie refuta-
tion of (a) and (b) (and so I (A2) and (d» that I ha\/e given.
My pLlrported refLttati ons are based on what I take to be
counter examples to the principles. In the first place~
there seem to be cases in wh i eh we know or have j List if i ed
belief in universal propositions, but do not, and could not,
su,vey all possible evidence (contrary to principle (a) ) •
In the second place, there seem to be cases in which the
premises of a syllogism are known but the conclusion is not
[ 11]
known (contrary to principle (b». Moreover in the
parag,aph following his argument in support of the petitio
principii claim~ he illustrates what is apparently a per-
fectly good case of justification (if not proof) which is
given by an instance of a syllogism. Mill writes:
We bel i eve that the DL'ke of Well i ngton is mortal.
We do not, know thi s by di rec:t observati on, 'si nce
he is not yet dead. If we were asked how, this
being the case, we know the duke to be mortal, we
should probably answer, Because all men are so.
Here, therefore:- we arrive at the knowledge of a
174
truth not (as yet) susceptible of observation~ by
a reasoning which admits of being exhibited in the
following syllogism ---
All men are mortal~
The DLtke of Well i ngton i s a man,
therefore
The DLlke of Wellington is mortal. (I I, I I 1,2)
I take this syllogism, in the context that Mill has set up,
to be a counter-example to both (A2) and (d) • In this
context the premises of the syllogism provide an acceptable
justification of the proposition that the Duke of Wellington
is mortal, contrary to (A2). They are properly acceptable
as evidence for the conclusion, contrary to (d). Of COL,r=·e
Mill must treat this case differently, and I will look at
his reaction in the next section. But for me there is no
PL\ZZ 1e: both (A2) and (d) are false.
Still, I think that Mill has shown more than that there
are countless B-principles, although my insistance on the
falsity of principles (a), (b> , (A2> and (d) may obscure
thi s. For I think that there is §Qm§~biog behind Mil1~s
defence of (A2) and (d) (though not behind his defence of
(a)
that
and (b». As we have seen, there is reason to think
and
Some cases of syllogistic proof gC§ cases of
begging the question.
(d*> In some cases the premises of a syllogism
~EDDQ~ be accepted as evidence for its con~
clLtsion.
If in fact, as Mill suggests is the case for nim, the propo-
sition that the man Socrates is mortal is part of h~§ evi-
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dence (the evidence he accepts) that justifies hl§ belief
that all men are mortal, then b§ is not entitled to justify
his belief that Socrates is mortal by the syllogism: all
men are mortal, and Socrates is a man. In this case the
premises are not part of b!~ evidence for the conclusion
«dt> is proven), on pain of begging the question (and (A2*)
is proven). So as a partial answer to (Q2), whether there is
ever any genuine syllogistic proof, I wo~ld support (A2*).
But I would quickly add that there are, surely, at least
some cases of syllogistic proof. That is, there are cases
of proof or justification in which the premises of a valid
syllogism are accepted as a justification or proof of the
conclusion of the syllogism.
Notice again that this is quite compatible (as it must
be) with (B1) and its variants. In thi s e>:ampl e I WB5·
careful to emphasize the personal~ or more generally ~QOtgll=
t~21 ~ature of acceptance, or justification, or proof. A
general diagnosis of the plausibility of the strong theses,
all of wh i ch are f al se, i 5 that the conte>: tLtal natl..tre of
what they really assert is hidden by their formulations.
They are principles about acceptability, or justification,
or knowledge; and they are easily confused with B-principles
which, as generalizations about evidential relations between
propositions, really are context-free.
However I do not think that in showing that Mill has
justified only (A2*> and (d*), I have shown Mill to have
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failed completely~ For (A2*) and (dt) are strong enough to
support the central point that Mill wants to make, which is
to justify a negative answer to the basic question <P>:
(A) The theory of the syllogism <and deductive
logic in general) is not, and does not~ pro-
vide c~i~~ of justification or proof.
There are lots of cases 1 i ke the ones that SLtpport (A2*) and
which undermine any suggestion that the syllogism is
or provides a rule of proof or justification. Some i ns·tan-
ces of a syllogism are instances of a proof of the conclu-
sian based on the premises, and some are not. The syllogism
itself is not, or does not provide, any rule of proof or
r-L,l e of j L' S t i fie at i on • The point of the eHamples which
prove (A2*) is that whether or not a cas~ of a syllogism is
a case of proof depends on all sorts of contextual matters.
These have not been elaborated, but from the examples one
obvious point arises: whether or not the premises of a
syllogism provide a justification or proof of the conclusion
(for a person~ or from some point of view), depends on the
origin of the the knowledge of,
pr-emises.
or justification for, the
Mill ta~~es the goal of 1 ogi c to be the di scovery of
general principles of justification, or acceptance, or in-
ference. Whether or not we accept this as the 'oal of lQgl~
seems to be a ve~bal qwestion. For Mill has argued that
deductive logic does not provide any such rule of accep-
tance or justification, and that is surely t e important
point. Another way of putting this lesson is hat there is
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an often overlooked ambiguity in the terms 'correct infer-
ence' and ~p~inciple of infe~ence~. For philosophers often
talk of syllogisms and other deductively valid argument
forms such as modus ponens as correct inferences,
formulations of those argument forms principles of
and call
infer-
ence. Doing this is perfectly fine if it is also ~ealized
that principles of inference in this sense are not ~real~
principles of inference --- principles of justification.
But wheM Mill argued that every case of proof or justi-
fication by syllogism is a petitio principii~ he was arguing
for the stronger claim that no proof by syllogism (or by
extension, no proof whose premises deductively imply the
conclusion) can ever be acceptable and justify our beliefs
[12]
--- and this seems to me to be clearly wrong. It is
wrong because we sometimes do, without circularity, justify
a belief q by appealing to (justified) beliefs that deduc-
tively imply q. So I summarize matters this way: while
deductive logic does not provide any general principles of
acceptance or justification, we can sometimes appeal to
i2£~a about the deductive relations between propositions as
part of our justification of our beliefs. The possibility
of such appeals to deductive relations as evidence for
(reasons for believing) propositions is encoded by the B-
principles; and these are derived by simple transformations
from statements about the implication relaions between pro-
positions. But as I pointed out at some length~
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these B-
principles do not tell us under what circumstances we are
entitled to appeal to deductive relations as part of a
jLlsti f i cati on. I should add that it is an interesting and
important question whether there are ~Q~ general (and imper-
sanal and context-free) principles of justification or ac-
ceptance --- but this is a question that I cannot pursue in
this thesis.
There are lots of loose ends. More needs to be said
about the status of the B-principles ~nd about the role of
deductive logic in inference and justification, and more
needs to be said about the nature of principles of accep-
[13]
tance or justification. But I take it that what I have
shown is sufficient to establish a negative answer to Mill~s
problem (F'). I will return to these loose ends in my last
section on Mill,
from that work.
and in the discussion which is gene~ated
1. With the caveat, of course~ that the truth of the
universal proposition that all A~s are B~s p~esupposes
the existence of A's --- and so is not translatable as
II()~) (AH --) BX)II. Mill clearly does SL'ppose this. For
e>~ample, he e>:plicitly states at another point "that of
two subalternate propositions~ the truth of the univer-
sal pro\/es the trLlth of the part i eLl} ar ...... ( I I , I ~ 2)
2. Mill as often talks about justification and justified
belief as about proof and knowledge, and he frequently
just interchanges these notions. So I will assume that
Mill is as willing to defend a version of (A2) in which
'proof' is replaced by ~justification': any purported
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justification of the conclusion of a syllogism from
the premises is a case of begging the question •
.~'. Mi 11 :' S e}·:ampl es, and mine as well, are gener-all y cases
of a syllogism with a major premise that is universal
and affirmative, and a minor premise and conlusion that
are singular. There is no loss of generality in this
1 i mi t ted choi ce of e>: amp 1es. Remember that as Mi 11
points out (section 4) all valid syllogistic forms are
reducible to four first figure forms (counting singular
minor premises as universals). In any case where I
argLle from· an e>: amp 1e ~ i tis easy to see that analogol's
arguments can be formulated for syllogisms in the other
valid first figure forms.
4. Unless it is possible to believe the conclusion but
not~ somehow, 2~~ the connection between it and one~s
beliefs in the premises. If this is possible, then
even in these circumstances belief in the conclusion is
not sufficient for knowledge of it.
5. Perhaps it is Mill~s willingness to accept something
like (a) that e>:plains why one commentary on the pas-
sages under consideration (W. Kneale and M. Kneale~ Ib§
Q§yg!Qgmgoi Qf bQgi£~ Oxford, 1962, pp. 375-6.) sug-
gests that Mill IIreverts to the mistaken view that a
universal statement is never more than a summary of the
cases which it covers. II This is a pretty desparate
suggestion, given that Mill has, within the page, reaf-
firmed his own doctrine of the import of propositions~
and given that one of the motivations for Mill~s theo~y
of import was his opposition to this very suggestion
about the significance or import of universal proposi-
tions (section 4). It is trLle that Mill makes an e~·:tra­
vagant claim in (a)~ but it is surely mo~e plausible
that he is maki ng a mi stake aboL,t evi denc:e and know-
ledge~ rather than that tle is (for a moment?) giving L'p
his whole semantic theory, the theory of the import of
propositions.
6. It will sL,ffice to look at only those propositions
e>:pressed by sentences that consi st of al pha~ followed
by .. i s mortal II , where a1 pha is repl aced by a t'1i 11 ean
pr-oper name.
7. It may not be that any time one has a principle analo-
gous to (Bl) of the form Q!§ Cg~§QO fgC ~§!igYiD9
i~Qy~tiD9l tb~~ g, there is a principle analogous to
this weak interpretation of (c) of the form ~~~§QQ§ fee
Q§ligY~D9 Q E~~ ~~~§gDE fQ~ Qg!i~YiD9 199~~~tD9l g.
But in any case that p strictly implies q it is hard to
see how there COL'} d be any ob j ect i on to th is ref orfnL,1 a-
tiona The problem seems to arise fo~ cases where p does
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not st~ictly imply q, and yet p (or p~s being true) is
~eason fa. believing q. Fo~ e>:ample, someone who
thought that (E) was acceptable could not agree that
every reason for believing that some individual A is a
B is a reason for believing that all H~S are B~s. On
the other hand, (E) Rimply is not true --- and maybe
the fact that this reformulation can not be accepted is
just a consequence of the falsity of (E).
8. The a.guments were along these lines. If one really
did have to ve~lfy of each man that he is mortal in
or,~~r to accept the proposition that all men are mor-
tal~ then he would have ve~ified of Socrates that he is
a man and is mortal. One possibility is that Mill
simply stopped at this point, and assumed that one
would thereby have verified that Socrates is mortal.
Anothel~ possibility~ if we not make this assumption~ is
that the argument can be continued by appealing to the
verification of the mino~ premise, that Socrates is a
man. The claim might be that since I have a way of
verifying that Socrates is a man, then however it is
that I ve.ify of Socrates that he is both a man and
mortal would have been a verification that Socrates is
mortal.
Thus the conclusion (for the person who finds
these arguments acceptable) would be that the premises
of a syllogism cannot be part of one~s evidence for
verifying the conclusion on pain of begging the ques-
tion.
9. We can imagine that there are B-principles that will
never be understood and never be recognized as holding,
because they obtain between propositions that are too
complicated for us to comprehend.
10. In other words, B-principles are very weak --- perhaps
not to the point of triviality, but as trivial, o~
nontrivial, as implication relations are. Principles
analogous to (d) are not trivial.
11. Now, refutations of (a) and (b) are not refutations of
(d) and (A2), although (a) and (b) are the only support
for the latter principles that Mill can be understood
to be giving. But from my point of view~ (A2) and (d)
are as susceptible of dir~ct counter examples as (a)
and (b) are --- there appear to be cases of syllogisms
which are cases of acceptable and non-question-begging
proof or justification. Indeed Mill sets out such a
case as a kind of puzzle, which I go on to discuss in
the next paragraphs.
12. I had originally put this point incorrectly (as Profes-
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sor McCann pointed out to me). For I had originally
said that Mill's stronger point is that we can never
use syllogisms, or deductive relations in general~ as
part of our practice of justifying our beliefs. But of
course Mill is aware ~hat we use syllogisms as part of
our ~c~~ti~~ of justifying our beliefs --- it is just
that he qL\est ions the anal ysi 5 of that pr act i ce ·.,.h i ch
would have it that the role of the syllogism is to
~~QY~ the co~clusion. In fact one of the tasks that
Mi 11 sets hi msel f is to actL\all y e~·:pl ai n what the rol e
of the syllogism actually is --- since he cannot deny
that it plays §Qm~ role (eg. see the quotation from
11,111,2 that bCCL\rS on p. 146). I am not going to
look at all that Mill says on this matter~ but some of
the main points do surface in the next section.
13. For e>: amp Ie, I dOLtbt that I have sai d enoL,gh aboL,t
justification to convince the sceptical that it really
is a contextual matter, and I cannot do that cliam full
j L\st i ce here. BLtt at 1 east I want to prevent one kind
of response. I can forsee that someone may think that
I have simply made terrible blLtnder and overlooked an
obvious point; for, it may be claimed, the problem is
si mpl y that the antecedent bel i efs in OLlr e>:ampl es have
to be justified --- whatever it takes for that. But
given that they are justified, it is then really a
trivial matter to derive principles of justification
that are Llni versal and conte>:t-free. For e>:ampl e. we
would have the principle that
if one is jLlstified in believing the pre .... ses of a
syllogism~ then one is justified in one's belief
i,n the c:onc:lLlsion.
And ever so many similar principles immediately come to
mind. Notice that this principle escapes Mill~s suc-
cessful objection~ that one's beliefs in the premises
of a syllogism do not always justify one's belief in
the conciusion. Fer it does not follow from this
principle that ~bs~ i~ !~ that justifies the belief in
the conclusion is the beliefs in the premises --- it
just asserts that the belief in the cnclusion is justi-
fied when beliefs in the premises are~ whether or not
it is the beliefs in the premises that provide the
justification for the belief in the conclusion.
My response to this new kind o~ principle is that
they have exactly the force of a-principles, and, if
yOL' li~~e, are really jLlst B-princ:iples in disgL\ise.
Consider the analogous B-princ:iple:
the premises of a syllogism are <conclusive> evi-
dence for its conclusion.
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Both of these principles wOL,ld be defended and eH-
pI ai ned in e>: act 1 y the same way --- by appeal i ng to the
impossiblity of the premises being true and the conclu-
sion being false. And I have already agreed (pp. 164 8(
168-9) that it follows from this B-principle that if
one ~~~~ to have (conclusive) evidence for the premises
of a syllogism (and such evidence would surely justify
one~s beliefs in those premises) then one ~Q~lg have
(conclusive) evidence for its conclusion (and so one 1 s
belief in the conclusion would be justified). Pointing
this out does not close the book on these issues~ but
at 1 east i t ma~~es it pI aL,si bl e tha.t thi s new ki nd of
~principle of justification~ actually follows from the
appropriate a-principle.
In the concluding section of Part II I
briefly at another ~principle of justification~.
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look
As I mentioned earlier, Mill reacts rather differently
than I do to the DL\~,e of Well i ngton case. We both agree
that it is a ~real process of inference~, that it is a case
where bel i ef in (or knowl edge of) the conel L,si on of the
syllogism has been correctly justified. ! take this to mean
that in the circumstances that Mill describes,
genuine example of a syllogism whose premises,
we have a
which are
believed with justification (or perhaps known), jL,stify
belief in the conclusion~ which was not previously believed
with justification (or known). It is because I interpret
the example in this way that I take it to be a disproof of
(A2), that every case of syllogistic proof or justification
is a case of begging the question.
However Mill thinks that he has defended (A2). So he
thinks that the Duke of Wellington case is not a counter ex-
ampl e to (A2). But how can Mill avoid inconsistency~ when
he admi ts that the DLlke of Well i ngton case is a ' real pro-
cess of inference~, an example of the correct justification
of the belief that the Duke is mortal? The answer is simple
if L\ne>: pec:ted. The case in question is an inference, so it
must have some premises; but Mill denies that it is an
inference or justification bas~d on the premises of the
[lJ
syllogism. He suggests that it is really an inference
based on what he has accepted as the evidence for the major
premise (that all men are mortal) plus the minor premise
that evidence being composed of ~particular facts~ such as
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that Tom is a man who is mortal, Dick is a man who is
mortal~ Harry is too~ and so on, in accordance with (E).
It is not at all clear what the force of Mill~s sugges-
tion is. At one point Mill summarizes his discussion by
asserting that he has established that
(C) All inference is from particulars to particu-
1 ar- 5 (eg • I I , I I I , 4, P • 1 29)
But this is hard to decipher. A first~ and perhaps most
obvious, interpretation might be that
(Cl) Every inference, that is, every proof or
justification of a belief, i5 a~ inference
from a set of singular propositions to some
singular proposition. [2]
But it does not seem that Mill could accept (Cl). For he
allows that there are inferences with general conclusions:
IIGeneralization", by whi eh Mi 11 means someth.i ng 1 i ~~e ~b§
lIis not a process of mere
naming, it is also a proc:ess of inference. II (II,III,3 p. 124)
For e>:ample, the observation of a nL\mber of particL\lar- facts
(in accordance with (E), and under the right circumstances)
may ma~~e L\S IIfeel warrantf::~ in conclL\ding, that what we
found true in those instances, holds in all similar ones~
past, present:- and f L,tL\re ••• ". (I I , I I I ,3 p. 124) So some
warranted conclusions, some justified general beliefs, are
inferences from propositions about particulars.
all inductive arguments have singular conclusions~ and Mill
accepts (contrary to (Cl» that some instances of such
arguments are good arguments.
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What Mill would accept is the proposition that
(C2) Every inference, that is~ every proof Dr
justification of a belief~ is non-syllogistic
(or stronger, is non-deductive).
(C2), at least in the weaker version, follows directly from
(A2) :- that no instance of a syllogism is a non-question-
begging proof or justification of its conclusion. BL\t this
is not a plausible interpretation of (C) for at least two
reasons. In the first place~ it emerged from the previous
paragraph that Mill does not equate either non-syllogistic
or non-deductive argLtment with arguments whose premises and
conclusions are all singular propositions.
odd to use (e) if (C2) were really intended.
So it WOL\ld be
In the second
place I do not find any additional arguments for (C2) other
than the original argLIments for (A2) (in sections I and II
of Chapter III) that ha~~ already been discussed in section
6. So it seems that Mill is trying to make some additional
point that goes beyond (A2) and (C2). I should add that
even if (C2) were the focus of Mill~s interest, then (if I
am right that (A2) is the only defence for (C2» this latter
proposition would be of no special interest to us.
It ~s clear from what I have already said that Mill
would want to defend the view that there are at least some
correct or justified inferences with only singular premises
and a singular conclusion. As Mill sometimes puts this,
We me~
wi thoLIt
125)
reason from particulars to
passing through' generals.
part i CLll ars ~
(11,111,3 p.
And this claim can, I thin~~, be fairly rendered as a weah-
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ened version of (Cl):
(C3) Some inferences (that is~ some warranted
conclusions or justifications of beliefs) are
from singular propositions to singular propo-
si t i. ons.
Mill seems to argue quite explicitly for this point:
If, from our experience of John~ Thomas~ &c, who
once were living, but are now dead, we were enti-
tled to conclude that all human beings are mortal,
we might surely, without any logical inconse-
quence, have concluded at once from these instan-
ces, that the DL,ke of Well i ngton is mortal.
(11,III,3 p. 125)
This is so because
The mortality of John, Thomas, and company is~
after all, the whole evidence we have for the
mer-tal i ty of the DL,~::e of Well i ngton. Not one iota
is added to the proof by interpolating a general
proposition. (II,111,3 PN 125)
I thi nk that there is actLlall y no gg!J~r:~! argL\ment here
in support of (C3). We COL,l d ta~::e Mi 11 to be maki ng an
appeal to the plausible principle that if, in certain cir-
CL,mstances (as yet unspecified), one~s belief in a set of
propositions of the form alpha is an A and alpha is a B~
jointly a justification for believing that all A~s are
are
then in those circumstances one~s belief in that set of
propositions conjoined with one~s belief in the proposition
that ~ is an A justifies one~s believing that ~ is a B.
Indeed the converse is just as plausible~
biconditional
and so we get the
(f) In some circumstances C, believing the truth
of the members of a set G of propositions of
the form alpha is an A and alpha is a B
justifies one's belief in the proposition
that all A's are B's if and only if believing
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the members of
believing that
belief that 2 is
the set G
~ is an A
a B.
in addition to
jL,stifies one=' 5
But this still leaves us short of the desired conclusion
(C3), that there ~[§ any correct or justified inferences
with only singular premises and singular conclusionsw Of
course if Mill has a proof that there are justified infer-
ences with only singular premises and a general conclusion~
then by this plausible principle of justification we would
have a proof of (C3)u But how does he get a proof that
there are correct cases of inference or justification with
particular premises and general conclusions short of giving
e~·: ampl es (as we did in the correct d~fence of and
(A) )? And then he may as well give e>~ amp 1 es that bear
directly on (C3) --- examples of correct inferences with
only singular premises and singular conclusions. And I
suppose that such examples can be given, although it may be
difficult <if not impossible) to characterize such inferen-
[3]
ces in general terms. (Some indication of this difficulty
was given in section 6, wi th the di SCL\ssi on of the conteH-
tLlal nature of correct or justified inference, and some
further issues are raised incidentally in the remainder of
this section.)
I thin~~ that it is possible to fall into a COnfL\sion
here that is similar to the confusion between B-principles
and principles of justification (section 6)~ and perhaps the
temptation to look for a general argument in defence of (C3)
is an indication of the confusion.
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Remember that it does
not follow from the fact that one proposition or set of
propositions is reason for believing another proposition
that anyone is ever jLlstified in believing 01'" inferl~"ing the
latter proposition on the basis of the former propositions.
And some philosophers would endorse principles about non-
deductive evidential reI at ions qLli te anal agoLls to tt,e B-
principles~ which are about evidential relations based on
deductive relations. For- e>; amp 1e:- r-eformulating (E) .from
section 6 e~·:plicitly as a principle aboLlt relations between
pr-opositions we have:
(E 1 ) A set G of propositions of the form alpha is
an A and alpha is a B is reason for believing
(evidence) that all A~s are B~s.
Indeed anyone who accepts (El) will find it to be just as
pIaLl 5 i b 1 e t hat
(E2j A set G of propositions of the form alpha is
an A and alpha is a B, conjoined with the
proposition that 2 is an A~ is reason for
believing (evidence) that S is a B.
And the r-el ati on between (El) and (E2) seems to be e ...:pressed
by
(E3) A set G of propositions of the form alpha is
an A and alpha is a B is reason for believing
(evidence) that all A~s ar-e B~s if and only
if the set G, conjoined with the proposition
that 2 is an A, is reason for believing
<evidence) that ~ is a B.
Those phi Iosophers who find "(E) pI aL\.si bl e wi 11 , preSLlmab 1 y,
accept (E1) and (E2). In fact (E) is false, and so (El) and
(E2) must be false as well but let~s put that aside for
now. The point is that even the philosopher who accepts
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(E 1 ) :' (E2) , and (E3) must distinguish these E-principles
from claims about justification. Fo~ (E3) is different from
(f ) , and (El) and (E2) must be distinguished respectively
from such claims as that
in some circumstances C~ believing the truth of
some propositions of the form alpha is an A and
alpha is a B justifies a belief in the proposition
that all A's are 8'5;
and that
in some circumstances C~ believing the truth of
some propositions of the form alpha is an A and
alpha is a B~ plus believing the proposit~on that
~ is an A, justifies a belief in the proposiion
that e is a B.
If the 'circumstances C' could ever be specified then in-
stances of this latter schema would imply (C3). BLtt the
aSSLtmpt i on that (E2) is true does not guarantee that any
such instance is true --- that there are any circumstances
in which belief in the appropriate premises guarantees that
one~s belief that S is a B is justified. (And perhaps more
to the point, (E2) is in fact false while it is likely that
some instances of this schema are true.) In SLtm, it does
not follow from these E-principles that there are any cases
of justified inference that would support (C3), for the E-
principles:, like the B-principles, are not principles of
proof or justification.
Now, in this section I am primarily interested in
exploring what Mill might have had in mind by thesis C, that
all inference is (really) from particulars to particulars.
Certainly Mill accepts C2, though I have argued that it is
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indefensible, and C3 is r-eall y too weak to be a pI BL\si bl e
interpretation. BLtt before I go on to look at what I take
to be the most important and interesting (th Ltgh LtsL,all y
overlooked) interpretation of C~ I want to pint out an
historically impor-tant thesis that can also e connected
wi th the Dl\ke of l.-Jell i ngton eHsmpl e. This t esis~ which
roughly~ that all evidence is Y!~im~t§!~ evide ce of parti-
[4J
ell} ars or part i CLll ar facts. Mi 11 ' s treatmen of the DLtke
of Wellington case can be seen as a rudimentar but fairly
plausible defence of this thesis. For the ar ument can be
turned in this way: my belief that all men are mortal
j LIst i f i es my bel i ef that the Dllke i 5 mort al nl y i f the
former belief is first known or jLtstified.
in the
is Ltlti-
ce,
whence do we deri ve OLtr knowl edge of that gener-al
truth? No supernatural aid being suppos d~ the
answer must be~ by observation. Now, all which
man can observe are individual cases. Fr m these
all general truths must be drawn (II~III~3)
This is not really an argument about
matel y knowl edge of parti CLtl ar thi ngs or facts.
So all the evidence that we have for our belief
way I have been using the te,m~ that is it is not about
evidential relations between propositions. It 's rather an
argument about what evidence ~§ b~~~ for our bel. efs, or a~·
I have pLtt th i s ~~ i nd of poi nt, i tis abOLtt the .i t2t!.f.i£2"£!.QD.
we have for them. For in my terminology~
really trying to show that all j~§~ifif~l!QOI ultimately
rests on observation, and thLls <given the empir~ci5t thesis
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about observation) on the observation or knowledge of parti-
cular things or facts. So perhaps we should call this
Many philosophers have thought'that the Empiricist
Thesis abOL\t JL\stification is very plaL\sible •.. However:, it
depends on a number of claims that are at least controver-
sial. The most obvious of these claims are~ fir5t~ that all
observat ion i 5 on,l y of part i CL\l ars or part i eLll ar fact s ~ and
second, that all justification of beliefs must resolve (on-
1 y) to observations. BLlt i n th i s conte>: t ~ what I am most
concerned to make clear is that this thesis is not a possi-
ble interpretation of Mill~s claim C, whether or not it is
one of the points he impl icitly wants to argL\e in the DL\ke
of Wellington discussion~ and no matter how important it is
for Mill~s work or his legacy. For one thing it is quite
compatible, as it must be, with Mill~s rejection of Cl, and
his recognition that some inferences are to general conel L\-
si ons. And for another, it is compatible with my rejection
of C2 and A2. That is, one could agree with my claim that
there are some circumstances in which my beliefs that all
men are mortal and that the Duke is a man really do justify
my belief that the Duke is mortal, and §~!l! accept that~
when you resolve the chains of justification for my beliefs~
those chains are always anchored by, or based upon observa-
[5J
tions of, particulars. Thus while this thesis about
justification is pretty clearly in the offing here,
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I claim
that it is not Mill~s concern when he is trying to defend C.
Now!l l'1i 11 does make i tel ear- that he want to c 1 ai fT. more
tr.an j l\st (C3).
(C3) Mill writes:
For after giving his argument in support of
Not only ~~~ we reason from particulars to parti-
culars~ without passing through generals~ but we
perpetually do so reason. From the first dawn of
intelligence we draw inferences, but years elapse
before we learn the use of general language. The
child, who,· having burnt his fingers, avoids to
thrust them again into the fire, has reasoned or
inferred, though he has never thought of the ge-
neral rna>: i m, Fi re bL\rns. He knows from memory
that he has been burnt, and on this evidence
believes, when he sees a candle, that if he puts
his fingers into the flame of it, he will be burnt
again. He believes this in every case which hap-
pens to ari se; bL,t wi thOL,t 1 ooki ng in each i n-
stance, beyond the present case. He is not ge-
neralizing; he is inferring a particular from
parti~ulars. In the same way, also, brutes rea-
son. (I I , I I I ,3 p. 125 )
Th i s sh i f t from .. we may reason f rom part i CL\l ars to part i CLt-
1 ars II , which I take to have the import of (C3), to II we do
reason from particulars to particulars", needs some amplifi-
cation., It could be that Mill is now just trying to give
e~·: ampl es of correct r-easoni ng f.om part i cLll ars to part i Clt-
1ars, the e>: amp 1 es that WOLt} d prove (C3)" BLtt I thi nk that
something else is going on. Mill is now trying to charac-
terize the psychological process of thinking or reasoning,
what he sometimes seems to refer to as tQ~ c~~i ~CQ£~~§ Qf
not all cases of which need be cases of correct
thinking or reasoning. As part of this cha~acterization
Mill proffers the thesis that we seldom, if evet""~ actL\all y
employ unive~sal propositions in reasoning.
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As he Pllts
this~ ··We ar-e constantly reasoning from oLlrselves to other
people~ or from one per-son to another," or, we might add,
from particLllar e~·:periences or particLllar- cases,
giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into
general rna>: i ms of hLlman or e>: ternal natL\re. II (II,III~3 p.
126) So Mill wants to claim that (in the usual case at
least) the £QQ~~Qt of our reasoning is not general~ and that
a correct description of the premises and conclusion of our
reasoning does not posit any general propositions. Indeed
Mi 11 goes on f or several more pages g i vi ng f L\rther e>: amp Ie:·
of what he takes to be reasoning:' from eNperienc:e:' ~ or frc)m
[6]
particular cases, to conclusions about particular cases.
It is after these examples that Mill conel Lldes wi th
what I Rave call ed (C), that II All i nf erenc:e i 5 f r-om par-t i CLl-
1ars to part i eLll ars" :- (II,III:-4 p. 129) and this provides
some support for the suggestion that (C) is really an at-
tempt to describe a psychological phenomenon. BL\t the dif-
ficulties with (C) are not yet solved~ for Mill does allow
that in some cases~ some people (particularly philosophers,
and educated people generally) ~g employ universals in rea-
soning. So if (C) is a ='psyc:hological claim=', a claim abOL\t
the content of our actual reasoning,
no grounds for accepting it.
it seems that Mill has
In fact the only reasonable interpretation of (C) that
I can find is F.H. Bradley~s interpretation. He ta~~:es (C),
and related claims:, to fallout directly from Mill='s psycho-
logical theory. On the associationi~t theory, all psycholo-
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gical ger1er-al i z at ions tLtr-n OLtt to be general i z at ions aboLtt
the assCJciation~ that is the sequential occurrence~ of i-
deas. Moreover ideas are said to be particulars. This
slightly peculiar clalm has at least two different interpre-
tations~ both of which are intended (and perhaps confused)
[7]
on the standard theo~y. In the first place it is a
metaphysical claim: ideas are p~rticular things as opposed
to L'ni versal s. In the second place, it is a claim about the
content of ideas: ideas represent particular things ( i f
considered by analogy with names or descriptions>, and ideas
represent facts or propositions about particular things (if
thought of as truth-bearers).
at this fundamental level,
Generality is not represented
and on a st~ndard account it
might enter as a disposition to use certain kinds of 1 an-
Of COLtrSe th is thLlmbn ai 1 s~~etc:h of assr.Jc i at i on i st psy-
chology does not do justice to the potential complexity and
richness of the theory, but it is enough to Ghow the general
form of explanations given by the theory. As Bradley points
OLtt, in so far as i ,1ferenc~ i 5 ta.~en to be a psychological
process, it will be treated as a case of the association~
the sequential occurrence, of a number of ideas. So the
set of psyc.hol og i Citl general i z at ions at,oL,t i nf erenc.t~· wi 11 be
a sL\bset of the pS~/chologi. cal general i z at ions abc.H)" of- he
asscciation of id~~s. From this point of view, (C) is a
perfec~ly trivial claim that fnllaws directly from the th~o-
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r~;, of ideas. Certai nl y all i nf erence i 5 from part i cL,l ars to
particulars because all inference is ultimattely to be ana-
lyzed in terms of the association~ that is the sequential
OCCL\renCe ~ of particular ideas (in either sense of
tic L\ 1 a r- II ) • In fact the associationist may want to make what
appear-s to be a stronger c: I ai m~ (thOL,gh tl~ may take i t to be
merely a rephr-asing of the claim in different terms): all
inference is from particulars to particulars in the sense
that all inferences are cases of one idea causin~ (the
OCCL\rr-ertc:e of) another. Let me just register this psycholo-
gical interpretatiion of (C) in tt.e following way
(C4) All cases of inference are cases of the asso-
ciation of particular ideas.
On the one hand thi 5 makes (C) into a cl ai m that l"li 11
would likely want to defend. And Mill does say that he is
looking for the 'real process of inferenc:e=', whatever it is
that lies behind the use of language. Moreover <C4) is safe
from the original objection about interpreting (C) as a
psychological clairn. The problem was that Mill
willing to say that we sometimes have general beliefs (be-
liefs whose content is general) and that we sometimes reason
to such general conclusions. For (C4) is part of a psycho-
logical theory which (attempts to) e>:plain away generality
in terms of particular ideas. Of course the theory may not
succeed in doing this, bL,t' the interprf.:'tation of (C) as a
consequence of the associationist theory shows how Mill
could accept (C) in the face of his awareness of the various
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phenomena of generality. On the other hand (C4) limps as an
inte~p~etatiion of (C) simply because Mill gives no details
of the associationist view in these pages. Still, it i:- the
only interpretation of (C) that has some plausiblity from
Mill='s point of view~ and it is the interpretation given to
Mill='s ='theory of inference~ by his idealist critics.
For this last reason alone (C4) would deserve serious
attention .. And in fact there are no alternative interpreta-
tions in plain view. One of the foremost concerns of Brad-·
ley and Green is to undermine the foundations of associa-
tionist psychology~ and Bradley's E~~Q£~~~§§ Qf bgg~£ is a
[8J
pr-ime e:·:ample of this. The associationist theory treat:.
the psychological
case of association.
process of inference as just a special
Thus if it can be shown that associa-
tionist explanations of psychological phenomena are inade-
quate in principle, then the associationist account of in-
f~rence (and so (C4) in particular) would fail. BL,t I will
not here look at this general attack on associationist
psychology. Bradley~s discussion does raise some important
metaphysical and ontological questions~ some of which are
[9J
discussed elsewhere in this thesis. But Bradley does
develop at least one interesting line of thought that can be
abstracted (at least in the first instance) from the debates
about the proper nature of psychology, and which does threa-
ten to undermine not only the psychological claim (C4) but
(C3) as well. Although I am fairly sure that Bradley would
not approve, I will tentatively characterize the argL,ment in
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this way: it is a feature of our conception of what an
inference is that rules out the possibilty of there being
any inferences with only singular premises and a singular
conel L\:·i on., In the remainder of this section I will discuss
this one set of arguments, and the possible ramifications
there may be for any attempt to characterize ~the real
process of inference~.
Let me preface my e>:amination of this argL\ment by
emphasizing that Bradl~y is not about to deny that there
~eQ~~C to be Mlilian inferences from particulars to particu-
1 ars. He would say that there are inferences that are not
only Q.e§§g QO ~!iI2§!:i§D£~ --- what he calls ~eNperience of
part i CL\l ars' --- but that also have as a conclusion some
other singular proposition. But what he debates is the
proper way to characterize this ~~ind of inference. Bradley
loo~::s at a. case that he agrees is an inference from e>;peri-
ence an inference based on particular pieces of evidence
and to a conclusion about a particular fact --- but that is
also clearly QEQ or ~~~QO~Q~§~ "A child has come to know
that, when the dog is pleased~ he wags his tail. On this he
Bradley uses this example to argue
argues that, when the
[ leI]
pI eased ... (E:b~ p. 35(l)
cat wags its tail~ it mL,st be
that in any inference from particulars to particulars~ there
really must be what I shall call a general connecting prin-
c: i pI e or rL\l e. He writes:
Reasoning from a particular to a
obviously an argument from analogyu
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part i CLl} ar i s
It was an
inference by analogy that deceived the child. He
'took f r-om the dog a rel at i on of qLlal i ties and
transferred it to the cat. What he argued from
was this general relation, and it was a false
analogy~ just beca~se it was a bad generalization.
Again~ why do we object to false analogies? Is it
not because in them we treat some fact as another
instance of a rLll e, when there i 5 no comnlon rLll e ~
when there is no common rule and the facts are not
instances? And is this not a hint that in true
analogy we use a principle though we can not state
it? (Eb p. 351)
This passage suggests to me at least two different
kinds of arguments that can be reconstructed. They both
seem to lead to the conclusion that inferences from parti-
culars to particulars require a connecting principle~ which
appar-ently is e>:pressible as a general proposition. To tl.,rn
to the first argument, suppose that someone argues just as
th\'? child does, but is unwilling, even under cross-examina-
tion~ to agree to the truth of a generalization such as that
all mammals wag their tails when pleased, that all little
animals wag their tails when pleased~ that all my pets wag
their tails when pleased, or any other generalization that
would ~connect' the premises with the conclusion. In SLtch a
case we would have a strong tendency to question whether any
ini~~~Q£§ was made at all. To say that the child has made an
inference is to say that it is not a mere accident that the
child has this new belief --~ it is a belief ~~§~~ yeQO,
that is, iDf~(~gQ f~gm a number of other beliefs.
the child refuses to acknowledge any further general belief
that connects the premises and conclusion, then it is hard
to see why his new belief is not just the result of an
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accidental (though opportune) occurence of ideas~ and so no
inference at all. I t h ink t hat t hi:. i 5 "'Jh at i. E· b eh i n d
Bradley's suggestion that inference from particulars to
particulars is really an argument from analogy. The analo-
gy ~ ~Jhatever- i tis taken to be ~ i s e~·~ pressi b I e as a genera-
lization. Wi thOLlt any SLtch connecti ng bel i ef ~ e>:pressed as
a gene"...alization~ it wOL~ld sees to be merely an accid,~nt
that the child believes that the cat is pleased after seeing
it wag its tail.
Turning to the second argument~ we want to say that the
child has made a false~ or bad, or erroneous inference. But
in saying this we are saying something more than that his
belief that the cat is pleased is false. It is the iDf~[=
§o£§ that is erroneous~ not merely the belief in the conclu-
sian of the inference~ or a belief in a premise, that i s
f al se D The suggestion that there must be a connection~ a
gene~alization that links the premises and conclusion~ seems
to give Bradley a way of accounting for the falsity of
inferences, as opposed to the falsity of the conclusion of
an i nf erence. The i nf erence is bad becaLlse the proposi t i on
that connects the premises with the conclusion is false.
These arguments are supposed to undermine Mill~s cha-
racterization of the real process of inference (as essen-
tially from particular propositions or beliefs to particular
propositions or beliefs) by demonstrating the necessity for
a general principle or proposition that connects the pre-
mises with the conclusion. If these arguments are correct
2()()
then they would undermine (C3) as well~ fo~ if there are no
inferences with only singular premises and a singular con-
ell ]
elusion then there are no correct ones either. I am not
supposing that these arguments would have any force against
associationism pe~ se~ and indeed the associationist could
say that h~ has provided a principle that connects the
premises with the conclusion by making it a case of associa-
tion.
a real
For now let me just mention what seems to me to pose
problem for this response by the associationi~t.
Presumably there are occurrences of beliefs that are not
inferred from previously occurring beliefs; and Bradley~s
argument suggests tnat there must be a connecting principle
in any case of of inference or inferred belief, that distin-
guishes it from any belief that is not the result of infer-
ence. The problem stems from the fact that on the associa-
tionist theory, any occurrence of an idea that is not a
Humean impression <and so is not, to put it crudely, a
result of external causes) occurs as a consequence of the
mechanisms of association. Since even non-inferential be-
liefs are the result of association, it is hard to see how
the principles of association could be used to distinguish
cases of inference from non-inferential beliefs in the re-
quisite way. However, if the associationist £~Q find a way
to make this distinction, then he seems td have fallen into
ag~eement with Bradley's argument. For then he seems to be
agreeing that inference involves in some special
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way a
(presumably general) connecting principle~ and this agree-
ment seems to undermine Mil1~s general characterization of
the process of inference as merely being from particular
ideas or p~opositions to other particular ideas o. proposi-
tions. Since I am not going to pursue any special problems
with associationist theories here, I will not try to follow
out this possible argument against associationist psycholo-
gy. In fact this problem~ which here appears to be directed
against associationism~ will arise again at the end of this
section in a slightly different form --- and I will d i SCL\SS
it a little more at that point. For now I wi 11 jL\st worh
through the ramifications of Bradley's arguments that seem
to tell against Mill~s characte~ization of the process of
infet""ence ..
I think that both of these arguments are challengable~
and we shall see that Bradley fails to make his full case,
that every inference f rom part i CLll ars to part i CLll ars invokes
a gener al pr inc i pIe. BL\t I wi 11 try to show that he ma~~:es
an important part of the case, and illustrates an important
feature about inference.
There is a first objection that Bradley anticipates.
It is the observation. that in many cases we simply are not
aware of any general belief that connects the premises with
the cone I LlSi on. Remember Mill~s claim that brutes and chil-
dr-en never employ general propositions~ and that only highly
educated people employ them with any regularity. Bradley~s
reply is that he is not supposing that we do always ~~eit=
2C>2
£it!~ formulate or believe the general principle that must
accompany inferences from particulars to particulars. t'li 1 ],
wants to prove that some <and in the end all) inferences are
(a=. Bradley says) IImade direct from particL\lars, as SL\c:h, to
other par-ticLllars li • <Eb p. 349) BL~t Bradl ey argLteS that lito
prove the t~)esisin di SpL\te it is necessary to aSSLtme that.
§itbgC we go direct from particulars to particulars, 9C ~!§~
advance throLlgh an e>~pl i ci t syll ogi sm No sort of
evi dence is. offered to show that thi 5 al ternati ve e>:haLtst:.
the possibilities •.• It. <Eb pp. 349-5() And Bradley points
out that it does not exhaust the po~sibilities. A third
alternative is that there is a general connecting principle
in any inference althoL\gh it may not be e>:plicitly or con-
sciously formulated. In SL\ch cases "we L~se a principle
thOLtg"h we can not state it" <E:b, p. 351).
Perhaps this works as an immediate reply to the objec-
tion in its original form. BL\t I dOLlbt that it speaks to
the puzzlement that provoked the question. If the connec-
ting principles are not, or at least do not have to be~
conscious beliefs, then what are they, and what can be said
about their role in inference? If it turned out that there
were no other problems with the position that is emerging,
then I think that Bradley has the apparatL\S to give the
beginning of at least one answer. For in one place Bradley
makes a d i st i net i on between oCC:L\rrent or c:onsc i OLlS bel i ef 5,
and beliefs as long term
2()3
states or"" dispositions (possibly dispositions to make jLtdge-
[12J
ment~. L\ndeF" appr-opr-i ate ci r-cLtmstances) .. Wi th t.t-li s di ~.-
tinction in hand one can agree that connecting pr-inciples
need not be conscioLtsly or e>:plicitly believed or enter-
tained when the inference is made~ without thereby denying
that the connecting pr-inciples are still beliefs. That is!,
one can agree that ther-e need be no act of
connecting pr-inciple to be true when an inference is made~
but allow that the person who makes the inference must
believe the connecting principle in the dispositional sense
of =' bel ieve=' • In fact this a~cords nicely with the intui-
tion that the per-son who makes the inference is £Q[Hn~ti~Q to
the connecting pr-inciple, so that even if he is not able to
asser-t it at will, and perhaps has p~oblems formulating it~
it can sometimes be drawn out by car-eful thought~
rogation, and so on.
by inte~-
This clears the way for several more serious objec-
ti ons. The first objection is simply this: accepting for
the moment that there must be such ~connecting principles='
in any genuine case of inference, is it at all clear that
they must be g§n~c~l? Bradley's suggestion that inference
from particular cases to other particular cases is an impli-
cit argument by analogy does tend to support the idea that
the connecting principles are general. For e>: amp 1 e , the
weak claim that there i§ an analogy~ that the cat='s beha-
vi OLlr is anal agoL's to, or i 5 i n some wa y 1 i ~~: e , the dog:'s
behavi OLtr ~ amounts to a general (though vague) claim about
kinds of behaviour. But consider some additional beliefs to
which the chiJd COL~ld be implicitly appealing in the cat i,n-
fer-ence:
if my dog wagged its tail when it was happy then
if my cat now wags its tail then it must be happy
too;
or-
that my dog wagged its tail when it was happy is
~eason for believing that since my cat now wags
its tail it is happy too.
and so an. Surely these would serve as adequate connecting
principles. That is:, if we were in doubt as to whether or
not the child was making an inference, but found that he
def ended his cone], L,si on by appeal i ng to one of these non-
general propositions, we would have a reasonable assurance
that he had ind~ed made an inference --- that he was suppo-
sing there to be some connection between the premises and
the conclusion, and that it was not just an accident that he
first believed the premises and then believed the conclu-
sion. This point is well taken~ and it shows that the
suggestion of both arguments that the connecting principles
must be generalizations is gratuitous.
I want to brush aside a possible misconception of the
argL,ment here. I am not, and as far as I know Bradley was
not~ supposing that all inferences are ~~2li~ Q~Qy£tt~§.
Perhaps it is tempting to think this,
positing the connecting principles is not,
bL,t tt~e poi nt of
as far as I have
argLted, to ma~~e an apparent 1 y non-dedL~c:t i ve argLtment into a
deductive argument by uncovering a suppressed premise. For
one thing:- it is just not true that every possible g~Q§C~i
connecting principle:- taken as a premise~ makes the cat
inference into a deductivly valid argument.
that the eat's behaviour is analogous to,
(For e~·:ample.
or in some res-
peets rather like:- the dog:- s behavi OLtr is 1 i kel ~I to be
understood as a complex generalization, but the conjunction
of it and the =.i ngLll ar p;-emi se do not i mpl y the si ngLll ar-
conclLlsion. ) Similarly, only one of the non-general connec-
ting principles that I mentioned would render the argument
deductive if it were added as a premise. The suggestion was
m~c~l~ that there does need to be a connecting principle,
what seems to be a suppressed premise, as a consequence of
there being an iO£§~§D£§ to the conclLlsion (a case of rea-
soning) as opposed to a mere sequence of (as we would say)
uncon~ected ideas or beliefs.
But this heralds a second objection~ which is mainly
directed at the first of the Bradleyan arguments. Is it
really so clear that there must be connecting principles or
suppressed premises in §y§C~ case of inference? What comes
to mind is the Lewis Carroll puzzle of Achilles and the
Tortoise, or at least an analogue of it.
in this way:
The child reasoned
F'REMISES:
and so
( 1 )
(2)
The dog wagged its tail when it was
pleased;
The cat is wagging its tail;
CONCLUSION: (3) The cat is pleased.
lJ.Je then argLted that for the child to be making a genLtine
infe~ence he must be committed to a further connecting
principle or suppressed premise. Perhaps it need not be
general, contra~y to Bradley, and no ~ttempt was made to
suggest that it must turn the argument into a deductively
val i d ar-gLlment.
premise this way:
So let me just represent the connecting
SUPFIRESSED
PREMISE: (4 ) Premises (1) and (2) are connected
with (3).
But now the question can be raised of the inference, taking
the premises to be (1), (2), and (4)~ and the conclusion to
be (3): what is the connecting principle that p,events this
new inference from being merely a sequence of beliefs or
association of ideas? If we were right in the first case~
that f or the ch i 1 d to be mak i ng a genL\i ne i nference there
must be some connection between the premises and the conclu-
sion, then the a~gLlment seems to apply here again, and so on
~Q iofioi:t!:!m- So, it seems, the i.ntroduction of connecting
principles is of little help. If there is a need for one
then there is a need for infinitely many.
I think that there are several lines of reply to this
attempted regress. In the first place one can just be hard-
headed. Yes, there must be a connecting principle if the
child is really making an inference, and perhaps we can have
good reason for ascribing one and not another connecting
principle to the child. Moreover, if in another case some-
one L,tter-s (1), (2), and perhaps
That my dog wagged its tail when it was happy
is reason for- thinking that the cat is happy
when it wags its tail.
and then utters (3)~ we would expect that person to hold
some f Ltr-ther- bel i ef abOLtt the reI at i on between (1), (2) ~ and
on the one hand~ and (3) on the other. And if we
could find no evidence that the person had some such further
belief we would have reason to doubt~ as odd as it might
seem~ that an inference really had been made. BLtt this is
another- case, and another inference. The hard-head empha-
sizes this point. Adding the connecting principle as a
premise is a perfectly legitimate thing to do;
to make an inference with those premises then~
if one ~~r:.§
by the first
Br-adleyan argument, there ~Q~l~ be a further connecting
pr-inciple. But one need not do this one need not add
the connecting principle as a premise. In the case of the
chi Id=' s ir.ference there is no reason to think that mor-e tr.an
the one additional connecting principle is necessary.
This hard-headed reply has a certain force against the
regress agument, at least as I formulated it. In that
f ormL\l at i on I took the connecting principle to be a sup-
pressed or hidden premise, and took the new set of premises
to require a connection with the conclusion. BLtt what the
hard-head i s real 1 y Be ~~nowledg i ng i s that ib.~ £Qo.o.§£~!.O.g
you do take it in this way, then yOLt end LIp ask i ng a qLteS-
tion about a different inference. So the conclusion seems
to be:
The claim that any infe~ence must involve a con-
necting principle cannot be taken t.o be an argLl-
ment for- the e~·: i stence of a sLlpp~essed premi se.
Let me point out that it does not follow that there will
never be cases in which it is appropriate to cake LtnLlttered
or i ne>: p 1 i cit bel i ef 5 to be sL,ppressed premi ses. BL,t the
har-d-head thi nks he can get OLlt of the regress probl em by
denying that connecting principle5 can ~!~~~~ be represented
as s',.lppr-essed premi s~s.
In fact the second of the Bradleyan arguments can be
construed as supporting the claim that connecting principles
can not be suppressed premise~. In that argument the moti-
vation for- supposing there to be a connecting principle is
that it provides a way for distinguishing a bad or false
inference from an inference with a false premise or conclu-
sion. It was suggested that a'bad inference is one in which
the connecting principle (as opposed to a premise or the
conclusion> is false. But if you suppose after all that the
connecting principle is a premise, then yOLt are right back
wher-e you started from, with no way to distinguish a bad
inference from an inference with a false premise and a false
cone: 1Ltsi on.
I think that there may be §Qm~~blQg in these replies to
the regress argument, but enough has already been given up
to dispell any illusion that Mill~s (C3) has been refuted.
For not only have we backed down from the suggestion that
~f)9
the connecting principles are general~ we have given up the
suggestion that the connecting principles (general or not)
mLtst be among the premi ses of an inference. So it seems
that nothing that Bradley has said undercuts the claim that
there are correct or justified inferences with only singular
premises and a singular conclusion.
Getting quite clear about this may help uncover an
underlying confusion about what the point of the Bradleyan
arguments really is. What Bradley is concerned with is to
cha~acterize ~~iE Qf ~oi§c§n~~ or £~§~§ Qf ~§2§QntDg~ so
that he can distinguish cases of inferring or reasoning from
other kinds of mental acts (such as mere associations of
ideas). ThLtS i tis c:rL'C i al to ma.~e a d i st i net i on between
the project of determining what acts of inference .eally are
(that is, what the proper (psychological) description of
such acts is), on the one hand, and the project of determin-
ing which acts of inference are correct or incorrect~ good
or bad, on the other. And these two projects must be dis-
tinguished from a third project (which we have not been
overly concerned with here), that of characterizing what
2ett~CQ2 Q£ ~Q£~~~Q£~ or iQ~mE Qi eCg~m~at are correct or
incorrect, valid or invalid, strong and wea~, ~ and so on.
Perhaps the distinction between the first two projects is
easy enoLlgt. to see, but I want to underscore the difference
between the second and third projects, a difference which
should be evident from the discussion in section 6. We
might say: in the second case we are studying the worth of
acts of inference~ in the third case we are studying the
worth of forms or patterns of arguments. In the latter case
that worth is couched in terms of deductive validity or
i rldLtct i ve strength. Of COLtrSe we can e>:tend these noti ens
to acts of inference in a trivial way: the premises and
conclusion of an act Qf inierence can compose a deductively
val i d or i ndLtct i vel y strong ar·gLlment. Thi 5 i 5 e>: act 1 y what
I was showing in section 6~ when I argued that some justi-
fied inferences or proofs are syllogistic ~-- their premises
and conclusions compose valid syllogisms. But in that sec-
ticn I also used the appropriate term of commendation or
worth for acts of inference~ and distinguished the question
of the worth of acts of inference from the question of the
worth of argument forms. Here we are interested in whether
inferences are justified or not, and clearly (again given
the results of section 6) that question does not reduce to
the question of whether or not the premises and conclusion
of the inference compose either a deductively valid or
inductively strong argument.
Now, my contention is that Bradley is mainly concerned
with the first project. I hed originally suggested that the
two Bradleyan arguments might have consequences for the
second of the projects as well --- that is, I suggested that
those arguments might undermine (C3). But this has now been
shown to be wrong. The argument was quite simple: if
Bradley were correct that no acts of inference were from
211
only singula~ p~emises to singular conclusions, then of
course no ~Q~C~£t inferences would be either. r\lo reason has
been given to show that there are no inferences with only
and so (C3) has not been undermined.
Moreover it is only when we confuse the first two projects
with the third that we automatically treat the connecting
principles as if they were really suppressed premises (which
might make the inference valid). For when we are concerned
with the third project any proposition has to be categorized
as either a premise or a conclusion --- or as irrelevant to
the argL\ment. There are no other options. BL,t thi s may not
be the case for the first two projects. However, to point
this out immediately return us to an important question that
has already been raised: if the connecting principles are
neither premises nor conclusions of the inference~ then what
are they?
Before I finally return to that question,
make several comments about the second of the Bradleyan
arguments, which is apparently about what constitutes the
correctness or incorrectness of inferences. I n that argL'-
ment we are reminded of our practice of distinguishing the
question of the worth (correctness or strength) of the
inference (or of an inference pattern) from the question of
the trLtth of its conci L\si on. Tt,e qL,esti on of the correct-·
ness of the argument is not a matter of the content, and
hence the trL,th or f al si t y, of the premi ses and the c:or1C 1L'-
sicn. 50:- the argument went on to conclude~
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it mL,st be a
some-matter of the truth or falsehood of something else~
thing not in eithe~ the p~emises or conclusion.
This argument could be taken to be about either acts of
inference (their worth or justification) or about patterns
of inference (their validity or strength)~ and the language
I used to make the argument blurs that distinction. As I
have said before~ I thinl~ that Bradley~s main concern is
wit~ acts of inference, and so it would be better to con-
strue the arguument as directed toward the first question~
if that is possible. But it is important to see that if it
is tal~en to be an argument about what constitutes the worth
or validity of patterns of inference~ then it~s conclusion
is completely unwarranted. Yes, we can agree that the worth
of an argument form has to do with §Qm~~biD9 other than the
(truth and falsity of) the premises of the inference it
is natural to say that the worth of the argument has to do
with the ~~!~~iQD between the premises and the conclusion.
But it is not obvious that this is a question about the
truth of some proposition --- even of the truth of a propo-
sition not contained in the premises. Of course for any
argument, say the argument with premises p and q and conclu-
sion r, there will be propositions such that the argument is
valid if and only if those propositions are (necessarily)
true. Some e>;amples of propositions that 50 correspond to
this argument would be that if p and q are true then r is
true, that if p is true then, if q is true then r is true~
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and so on. The argument would not be valid if those propo-
sitions were not necessarily true, and those propositions
would not be necessarily true if the argument were not
valid.
argLlment
Maybe this gives a sense in which the validity of an
~depends~ on the truth of some propositions not in
the premises of the argument but that dep~ndence is then
a perfectly trivial matter. We might also put it this way:
whatever it is about the relation of the premises to the
conci Ltsi on that makes the argL,ment val i d al so is what makes
those propositions necessarily true.
It may be that this illusion, that the worth of an
argLlment f or". has to do wi th the trL,th of some II connect i ng
proposi t ion" ~
inference~ and
is a consequence of thinking about acts
about what is going on in the mind of
of
the
person making the inference. E§[b2~§ the worth (the warrant
or justification) of a particular act of inference has to do
with the tr-Lltt} or falsity of some connecting principle!, a
further belief that the person making the inference has. At
least nothing that has been said so far in this section
would imply that this is wrong, and remember that one of the
suggestions at the end of section 6 was that the question of
the warrant or justification of acts of inference was a
c:onte>:tL,al matter, and had to do wi th what other bel i efs the
person had. So let us see how the Bradleyan arguments about
the necessity of connecting principles bear on the question
of j~E~if~iOg inferences.
We have provisionally accepted (or at least have not
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rejected) one conclusion from Bradley~s arguments, the claim
that in any case of inference~ say the child's inferring (3)
on the basis of (1) and (2), there must be some further
principle that connects the premises with the conclusion.
This principle cannot be a suppressed premise~ and it need
not be general. And we have not yet settled the important
question about what this principle really is~ although it
has been tentatiively suggested that it could be another
belief. This first conclusion must be distinguished from
the point of Bradley~s second argument. When it is applied
to acts of inference rather than to inference patterns, that
argL\ment seems to characterize the~ worth or jL\stification of
an inference in terms of the truth or faisehoood of the
connecting p~inciple.
At least one point needs to be clarified before this
suggestion can be pursued. If I am asked to justify my
An inference or an inferred belief is
inference to
pleased, I
that belief.
some conclusion, say (3),
am being asked to do more than
that my
simply
cat is
jLlsti fy
9.~~§g
~~QO, or believed Q~~E~§g Qf, some other beliefs --- in this
case my beliefs in (1) and (2). So if I am asked to justify
my i nf erence to some cone 1 LlSi on I am bei ng as~ced to j Llst i f y
m~ ~~~ Qf ~Qmiog ~Q ~§lig~~ that conclusion. In this case I
am being asked to demonstrate the worth of (1) and (2) as
the basis for my belief in (3).
With this in mind I think that we can say a little more
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about the suggestion that emerges from Bradley's second
argument. What I take the suggestion to be is roughly this~
that if I make an inference that is jL\sti f i ed then there
will be some connecting principle or belief that is true~
and it is the existence of this belief that justifies my
inference. This suggestion is quite plausible. If I were
asked to j~§t!f~ my inference of (3) from (1) and (2)~ and
QQi just my belief in \3)~ then there may be some circum-
stances in which by giving (4*> or some comparable alterna-
tive, I would have given reasonable or acceptable justifi-
cation of my inference. Of course after I have given (4*)~
that (1) and (2)
natL\ral enOLtgh
are reasons for believing (3), it might be
for someone to ask whether ~bi§ claim is
jL\sti f i ed. But notice that this is now to ask for a justi-
fication of the truth of (or for my belief in) the proposi-
tion (4*> --- it is not to ask for the justification of any
inference. Moreover!' if someone were to as~~ the odd ~ tor-
toi se-l i ke qLlesti on: II I agree wi th (4*), and I agree that
it is justified~ but how does tb~t help justify your belief
in (3)?1I~ then I thin~:: that one has the option to reply mL\ch
as the hard-head did in another conte>;t. The objec:tor is~
in effect, questioning the worth of a different inference to
(3), an inference based on the beliefs (1), (2)~ and (4*>;
and why should the proponent of the original inference have
any obligation to defend or justify i~?
Certminly one important point that has emerged in the
previous paragraph is that in these circumstances, the con-
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necting principle must not only be true but justified. As I
pointed out there may be questions about whether Dr not the
connecting principle is really justified, but the possibili-
ty of such questioning does not in itself undermine the
suggestion that if (in those circumstances> such a connect-
ing belief were justified, then the inferemce would be
j Llst i f i ed • Of course~ even if we accept all of this, it is
f ai r'l y evi dent that there i 5 more to j L\st i f yi ng an i nf erenc:e
then appealing to a justified belief that connects the
premises and conclusion. For e>:ampl e~ it is reasonable to
demand that the beliefs that the inference is based on
its 'premises~ --- must themselves be justified. So I take
the suggestion that emerges from Bradley's argument to be
this: if any act of inference is ju~tified, then there is a
connecting principle (a further belief) that is true and
jLtstified.
Although there is some core truth to this suggestion~
that
the
is
can
reflects what we frequently ~Q to justify inferences,
question of the worth or justification of an inference
just a much more complicated matter than the suggestion
account for. The main point is that our practice of
giving justifications, and OLlr e>:pectati ons aboLlt recei "i ng
jL\sti f i cati ons, are simply not as systematic as the sugges-
ticn would have us believe. For it is a serious question as
to whether it always reasonable to ask for, or to give, a
justification of an inference --- for example, when the pre-
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mises obviously imply the conclusion. Certainly a person
who i 5 mak i ng an i nf erence whose premi ses and cone 1 Ltsi on
compose a case of modus ponens, or other very si mpl e ar-gLt-
ment form, may legitimately refuse (or in fact be quite
unable) to give any justification for it --- yet this need
not undermine the wo~th of the inference. One way of put-
ting this is that for :·ome cases of infererlc:e there is no
neea for justification, and it would be unreasonable for an
observer to press for one. Here I am supposing that there
is no doubt that an inference has been made; f or e~·: ampl e ~
that someone believes q on the basis of his justified be-
liefs p and if p then q. (We will turn shortly to the
question of what it is for an inference to have been made
--- but of course it is not enough that someone merely have
jL\stif·ied beliefs p and if p then q, and bel i eve r" for-
he may believe r for some unjustified reason~ and not on the
basis of his beliefs p and if p then q.) Once we accept
this point about certain paradigm cases~ any previous con-
viction that a person generally has an obligation to justify
his inferences by citing some independently justified con-
necting principle or belief should at least be shaken. Of
course if we do choose to justify an inference --- that is~
if we choose to gt~~ a justification of it --- then it is
plausible to suppose that the exhibition of an (independent-
ly) justified belief that ~connect5' the premises and the
conclusions of the inference would justify, or be part of
the justification of, the inference.
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But an inference may
be jLt:.tified whether or not a jLtstification has e>~plicj.tly
been 9.iy:~D.~ and we have seen that it is not always reasona-
ble to e>:pect or to be able to give a jLtstification.
In SL,m, the second of the Bradleyan arguments has
failed. It does not apply to the third project of charac-
terizaing the worth of argument-forms. And while we might
agree that it raises questions that are relevant to the
second project~ since it reflects some of our intuitions
about justification, it does not succeed in showing even a
necessary condition for evaluating the worth of acts of
inference. For there is a lot of slack in OLIr notion of
jLIsti f i cati on, and i tis Llnl i kel y that there is an obvi OliS
hard and fast way to characterize our practice of justifying
the correctness of our inferences.
What ~emains is to return to the question of what the
connectng principles could possibly be, and mQre generally
to e>~ ami ne the force of Brad 1ey:' 5 argL,ments when they are
applied to the psychological question, the issue of how we
can properly cha~acte~ize the psychological process of in-
ference. Unfortunately, as soon as we turn to this question
we run into trouble again. The basis of the Bradleyan worry
about the associationist account is the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing acts of inference from cases of merely fortui-
tous associations of ideas. The obvious suggestion is that
there must be some special connection between the premises
and cone: 1 LISi on • Indeed it is pI C\L,si bl e' to SLlppose that tl,e
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person making an inference must §§§~
connection between the p~emises and conclusion of the infer-'
ence. So the point of positing a connecting principle~
which has been cast as a further belief (but not a premise
of the inference)~ is to express this connection between the
premises and conclusion of the inference. BLtt now a new
question can be asked on the basis of which another regress
argument can be formulated: is any such further belief
real1 y SLtf·f i c:i. ent to gL\arantee that a genL\i ne inference has
been made?
Take any pL'.ported i nf e.ence .SLlCh C\:. that of the ch i 1 d
from (1) and (2) to (3). By the first Bradleyan argument it
seems that if there really is an inference then there must
be some further belief, a connecting principle, of which
(4*) is an e>:ample. But consider, does the supposition that
there is this additional belief really settle the qestion of
whether or not the child is making an inference? Is it not
at least gQ§§i~l~ that a person could accept the premises~
and the connecting belief~ but not see the connection be-
tween the premises and the connecting belief, on the one
hand, and the conclusion on the other? After all, the
belief in the connection is just itself another state of
mind. If this is so, then it seems that the child must be
committed to yet another connecting belief~ that the pre-
mises and the first connecting belief are reason to believe
the cone 1Ltsi on. BLlt agai n, is this really sufficient to
guarantee that the child has made an inference?
22()
Is it not
premises and the two connecting principles on
and the conclusion on the other) is not seen?
a.t least
original
one r,and ~
possible that a further connection (between the
the
And
so the argument continues.
Given the original worry about distinguishing cases of
association from genuine cases of inference~ I take this
argument to show that the needed connections between one~s
<belief in the) premises and <belief in the) cone 1L\si on
cannot merely be represented as additional beliefs. BLtt i f
the connection between the premises and conclusion can not
be represented simply by furthe~ beliefs, then how else
could the psychological process of inference be properly
characterized? I think that this second regress argument
shows how hard a problem it is to characterize an inference
--- that is~ to characterize what it is for a person to mE~~
an inference. The psychologist will want to say that there
is a psychological connection, but this is no help unless we
can get a grip on the notion of the e>tistence of psychologi-
cal connections that are not just further psychological
states, like further belief states. And recall a problem
that I posed for the psychologist who says that the connec-
tion is just an ordinary instance of a psychological law
for the associationist~ an instance of association.
The problem then is to distinguish inferences from other
~~ i nds of psycho! ogi c: al connect i OflS and reI at ions. I qLteS-
tioned whether the principles of association were sufficient
221
to make such a distinction~ and certainly we want to distin-
guish inference from beliefs that occur merely as the result
of some association.
To push this question about psychology any farther
WOLll d r-eqLli,..-e an e}·: cLtrsi on into psychology that I cannot
Llndertake. What I have illLlstrated!, I think~ is that m~f
attempt to generate an argument against (C4) r2ally cannot
be separated from a deeper inquiry about the nature of
psychological laws. And while this objection to aSSOCla-
tionism (that principles of association cannot distinguish
cases of inference from other psychological connections) is
rather plausible!, a genuine evaluation depends on a more
serious discussion of associationism --- the kind of discus-
sion that Bradley does provide elsewhere (see footnote [8]
for a brief sketch). But the underlying problem of distin-
guishing inferences from non-inferences~ of characterizing
what it is that makes my belief that q to be ~~§§~ QO my
beliefs p and if p then q~ as opposed to othe~ beliefs I may
have~ must be faced by any psychological theory. Someone
may say: we have dispositions to believe the consequent of
a· conditional if we believe the antecedent and the condi-
tional itself. But this is just another way of stating the
kind of fact that we want explained. Thus Bradley~s first
argument~ when it is shorn of all the likely misinterpreta-
tions --- that the connecting principle is a premise!, that
i tis general, and (most importantly> that it is a belief
raises important questions for the psychologist about
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connec-the nature of psychological laws and 'psychological
t ions =' •
We have come close to an app~opriate stopping point in
our inquiry about ~the real process of i ,",ference' • (C3)
accords with our intuitions~ and it has not been undErmined
by Broadley's argL,ments,
debate about psychology.
and (C4) seems to turn on a genuine
But what worries me is that ques-
tions can be raised from thi~ discussion, particularly from
the last re~ress argument, that tend to question the coher-
ence 0+ our notions of belief and inference. What I have in
rnind is this. The considerations that lead to that regress
argument seem to show, on the one hand, that it is a least
QQ§§i~!~ that someone could believe the premises and conclu-
sion of some simple deductive argument <such as a syllogism~
or a case of modus ponens) but not ~ee the connection be-
tween them!, and 50 not be inferring the conclusion from the
p~emises. Certainly we can not say that it fg!lQ~§ from the
fact that he has such beliefs in the premises that he be-
lieves the conclusion!, or from the fact that he believes
both premises and conclusion that he sees the connection
for people are ~at perfectly rational, they do not see
all the COn~E!CfL,nCes of thei r bel i ef 5, and they do of ten ma.~:e
(logical) mistakes. On the other hand, when we look at such
simple and obvious logical relations and deductively valid
infer~nces, the following reply is at least tempting; some-
one simplY ~ould not have a genuine full-blooded belief in
the premises of a syllogism or a case of modus ponens with-
Dut both believing the conclusion and also understanding the
connection between the premises and conclusion <and so in-
ferring the conclusion). For if the person did not believe
the conclusion~ and did not see the obvious connection
between the premises and conclusion~ then we would have good
grounds for denying that he YD~~C§tQQ~ the premises of the
argument --- and if he does not understand those premises
then he cannot genuinely believe them.
These considerations indicate that there are two facts
here that are at odds with each other~ if not in open con-
flict. First, we are forced to accept the premise of the
regress argument, that even in the simplest deductive argu-
ments it is possible that a person believes the premises but
not the conclusion, or believes the conclusion but does not
see the connection between them. And second, and at the
same time, we think that not believing the conclusion and
not seeing the conn~ction at least weakens the claim that
the person has a genuine understanding (and hence belief) in
the premises. If these two facts are not openly contradic-
tory, then they at least force us to question our under-
standing of our notions of belief and inference, and of our
practice of ascribing beliefs and inferences.
1a Mill w~ites:
The proposi t i on that the DL\ke of Well i ngton i s
",ortal is ev'idently an inference; it is got. as a
conclusion from something else; but do we~ in
reality, conclude it from the proposition~ All men
are mortal? I answer~ no. (11,111,3, p. 124)
2. The term ~particular~ causes a little confusion in the
context of (C). It does not mean ~particular proposi-
tion', for Mill uses this term in its traditional sense
to mean a proposition of the form Some A's are/are not
B~s. I will use the terms ~singular proposition'~
'propositions about particulars~ and ~propositions
about particular facts' to refer to propositions such
as that Socrates is a man --- that is~ propositions of
the form alpha is a man~ where alpha is replaced by a
proper name O~ other referring expression that refers
to an individual. (Mill counts a proposition such as
that the teacher of Plato is a man as a singular propo-
si t ion. )
3. It is worth pointing out that (C3) is quite independent
of (A2). It is quite compatible with (C3) that there
are also some correct inferences whose premises and
conclusion comprise a valid syllogism, or other valid
deductive argument. Nor does (C3) depend on any parti-
C:Lll car anal ysi 5 of the DL,ke of Well i ngton case --- i t
just depends, as I have tried to suggest, on there
being some unequivocal examples of inferences with only
singular premises and a singular conclusion.
4. The importance of distinguishing this additional thesis
about evidence or justification was made clear to me by
Professor McCann.
5. Of COLtrSe this way of thin~~ing abOLtt jLtstification is
already to presw~pose a great deal that is question-
able.
6. One of Mill's examples points to a confusion that he
finds hard to avoid. For one of his examples of rea-
soning from particulars to particulars is a case of
reasoning in geometry, in which lI one instance only is
demonstrated". (II~III,3 p. 128) This ~~ind of eHample
recalls Berkeley's discussion, in the Introduction to
his E:~!.Q~i:..I2.!.~e, of the same J(ind of e>cample with mL\ch
the same point --- that we can (and Berkeley would want
to conclude that we always do) reason to general con-
clusions via particular instances, and without general
terms or ~abstract ideas~. The problem for Mill is
that although we can agree that many such geometrical
or other mathematical cases of reasoning can be under-
stood as reasoning via instances or resoning from par-
ticulars to particulars, such cases are also clear
examples of deductive reasoning. That is~ in the first
place~ that the non-general premises of the particular
example deductively imply the non-general conclusion~
and, in the second place, this process of tnateQt~ei
C§~§gDiD9 itself is part of our deductive practice for
I2CQ~!.D.g general c:onci L\si ons. Ber~,eley can agree wi th
t~is~ but it is a problem for Mill. For remember that
Mill denies that any ~real~ inference can be deductive
(that is~ he defines a real inference as one in which
the premises do not deductively imply the conclusion)~
and wants to maintain <via (A2» that in no case the
premises of a genuine proof deductively imply its con-
clusion. So cases of deductively valid reasoning from
particulars to particulars actually should pose a pro-
blem for Mill~5 overall view. Li~~e Ber~~ely~ and like
thE empiricists generally, Mill wants to defend the
vie~ that at some ultimate level the contents of mind
are particular --- at least in the sense that they are
aboL,t particL,lars (see the ne)ct pragraphs). BLtt Llnlike
Berkeley~ Mill wants to deny that any such cases of
reasoning that provide genuine proofs of their conclu-
sion are cases in which the premises deductively imply
the conclusion and this seems to be a problem.
7. This notion of the "standard theory" is a little vagLle~
but I have in mind the rather austere statement of the
theoretical apparatus of the theory that Hume~ for
example, as well as Mill, will sometimes give (eg. in
the opening pages of Hume's I~~~~!§~).
8. Another is Green's "IntrodL,ction" to HL,me's Ir:gE~!.§~ Qf
~Ym~O ~~!y~~, Vol I of Hume~s gg!!~£1~~ ~Q(t§ edited by
Green and Grose, 1874.
Bradley agrees with the empiricist on several
counts. Bradley defends what he calls phenomenalism in
psychol ogy ~ in wh i eh .. the mere COL,rse of psyr.:- i cal
events, as sL,ch, happening within a single organis,,,~
and the laws of coe)cistence and sequence between these
events, (are) ••• the object of psychology" (IIA Defence
of Phenomenalism in Psychology", in ~Qll~£t~Q ~~§e~2'
p. 367) So in the first place Bradley agrees that
ideas are particulars, particular occurring events (eg.
ECiQ£~~i~a Qf bQg~£, p. 5). And in the second place~
he agrees that there is what he calls a ~psychological
fact of association~ (eg. E~iD~iel~§, p. 299). Where
Bradley begins to differ with the empiricist is in his
treatm~nt of this fact of association. For .. the school
of Empiricism~ in its most consistent development~ has
tLtrned the metaphorical e>:pression of one fact into a
theory which may be said to cover all. It has a doc-
trine as to the ultimate constituents of mind. They
are particular feelings and particular ideas, in either
case repellent units. And they have absolutely no
internal bond of connection. 1I (EctQ£t~i~§ Qi bQ9L~~ p.
3() 1 ) For Bradl ey the f act of assoc i at i on i 5 not the
fOLlndati on of any theory, bLlt rather a fact or probl em
that needs explanation.
Bradley characterizes the empiricist theory by the
following four theses (all of which are hinted at in
the previous quotation): (a) all ideas are particu-
lars; (b) all psych i cal reI at ions are assoc: i at i ve (f rom
which Bradley argues that they are not internal rela-
tions); (c) the Qo.!.~ c:onstitLlents of mind are ideas;
and (d) all ideas decompose into simples or atoms.
Bradley's attack on associationist psychology is lev~l­
led against all of (b) ~ (c), and (d). Only (a) escapes
criticism as part of a theory of psychology. (And in
the end Bradley wants to reject even (a), for he thinks
he has metaphysical proof that there are no particulars
--- that particulars are not real.)
9. In Part I of this thesis~ sections 6 & 7.
1(). .. Eb It st ands for F. H. Br ad 1ey' 5 E:r::.!.o.£!J2!..~a Qi bQg!..£
Vols. I and II, O>;ford U.P., 1967.
11. But notice that these arguments do not tend to under-
mine the Empiricist Thesis about Evidence, that all
justification resolves. into observations of particu-
1 ars.
12. Bradley ma~~es this distinction (or one very like it) on
p. 20 of the E(iD£ig!~§ Qf bgg!£-
,?,,?7
I n Sect ion 6 I i. nterpreted Mi 11. as arQLli ng that the
laws of deductive logic are not~ and do not provide~ laws or
principles of correct reasoning,
weakened versi on of hi s argL,ment.
and I strongly endorsed a
However, I want to tal~e a
second loak at th i s c:one 1 LlSi on. For Mill, in his later
commentary on the philosophy of William Hamilton (and i n
some remarks that occur as additional sections to late
[ 1 J
editions of the E~~a£te~~~ Qf bgQt£) approaches these
questions from a slightly different point of view which~ at
least on the face of things, contradicts the earlier conclu-
sion. In this conte>:t Mill argLles that principles of logic
are prescriptive of thinking --- laws of how one ought to
thinh. But I will show that this later contention is per-
fec:tly atLlned with the earlier work,
mineE. it.
and i~ no way under-
One could argue that 1 am beating a dead horse. For in
the earlier work (Section 6 of Part II) one of my main
points was to distinguish laws of deductive validity from
genuine principles of reasoning or justification --- though
I did not actually give any e>:amples of genuine principles
of correct reasoning in that sense, and I am not really sure
that there are any (see the last p~ges of section 6, and
secti or, 1() • BLlt si nce Mi 11 inc: 1 L\des both ~\ i nds of laws
under the domain of logic, then it is trivially the case
that §Qm~ laws of logic are prescriptive of reasoning
for surely the laws of correct reasoning (assuming there are
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some) are~ or can be transformed into~ prescriptions about
correct reasoning! Fortunately this is not to be my point.
Of course I agree that if there are any Millean principles
of correct reasoning (principles of justification or' war-
rant) then such principles would be prescriptive of reason-
ing. But I will confine my discussion to the case of deduc-
tive logic. For, in the first place~ despite the arguments
of section 6~ many people will still believe that there must
be some way in which laws ~f logic (such as modus ponens or
principles of syllogism) are principles of cor~ect reason-
ing, or principles ~bout how we ought to reason. And, in
the second place, I want to show that there is a very limit-
ted, though perhaps unexciting, sense in which that belief
is trLle.
Mill begins by exploring the sense in which laws of
logic can be considered to be laws of thought. Of C:OLIrse
there will be psychological laws that describe human beha-
vi oLlr, but laws of logic cannot be identified with such
~laws of thought~. For
there is nothi ng to prevent LIS from thi n~~i ng c:on-
trary to the laws of logic: only, if we do~ we
shall not think rightly, or well, or conformably
to the ends of thinking, but falsely, or inconsis-
tently, or c:onfL\sedly. (WH, p. 359) [2]
Mill actually takes this simple observation to a very strong
cone: I LISi on: the laws of logic: are not law-li~ce generaliza-
tions about anything at all.
c~i~§ for correct thinking. The argument seems to be this.
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If the laws of logic were like scientific laws, that is~
contrary' to them would seem to falsify
law-like
='think
generalizations, then the fact that people
them.
can
BL,t
the laws of logic are UQ~ falsified by cases of incorrect
inferr-ing. Hence~ Mill seems to conclude, the laws of logic
are not generalizations at all. In a footnote (WH, p. 358)
Mill suggests that there is an ambiguity in the word
as between a scientific generalization and a precept or
rule. A law of psychology would be a case of the former and
a law of ethics a case of the latter. Since the laws of
logic ~C§ laws, they must be precepts or rules.
Of course this argument, that laws of logic ffiM§t be
precepts, is not very persuasive. The fact that we can
='think contrary;' to the laws of logic, that is!, the fact
that we can make incorrect inferences and evaluate incor-
rectly the validity or non-validity of a purportedly valid
argument, does show that the laws of logic are not true
general i z at ions aboL,t what i nf erences we actL,all y ma~::e or-
approve of. But it does not follow that the laws of logic
are not true universal generalizations. For e>:ample, they
could be universal generalizations about the truth relations
between propositions --- or about anything else, given what
little has been shown by this argument. Of course another
way of looking at this argument is to say that Mill Rccepts
the premise that the laws of logic are laws of thought~ and
so he has to accept one 0< the two interpretations of ='laws:'
in ='laws of thought~A In either case, given the r~sults
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from section 6~ my question becomes: in what 5ense can the
principles of deductive validity really be taken to be
~c~£~et§ of thought?
Mill calls ar-,y body of rLlles or precepts an ~L.:t., as
opposed to a §£i.~o.£~, bLlt sLlggests that any lIart necessari 1 y
preSLlpposes knowl edge If (SL, Intro. , sec 2) or a science.
Thus in so far as logic is an art, a set of r-Lll es or pre-
c:epts, it will also ~pre5uppose~ or be ~justified' by (WH~
p. 359) a body of knowledge or a §~!~D~~. As I will discuss
in the next section,
psychologism arises,
this is the context in which Mill~s
for his psychologism is his commitment
to the view that it is the science of psychology that is
presupposed by and justifies the art of logic.
Mill treats the notions of an art and of a science, and
the relations of presupposition and justification that some-
times hold between an art and a science, as though they are
unproblematic. I doubt that this is so, but I also do not
intend to push this point. We can recognize particular
cases in which some body of knowledge, a set of generaliza-
tions and facts, justifies a set of rules or precepts. For
example, if it were universally agreed that such and such an
act is right (at least in specific circumstances), then
there would be no question that one ought to do· it (at least
in those circumstances).
The first and most obvious result of this discussion is
that in order to discover whether principles of deductive
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1ogi c are or provi de precepts aboLlt thi nki ng or bel i evi ng!l
it may help to look at how we could generate prescriptions
from some science or body of knowledge, such as the laws of
truth or validity. However, it turns out that the main
problem here is not that it is difficult to find candidate
prescriptions!, but that it is too easy. There are so many
initially plausible ways of generating prescriptions from
the laws of logic that the problem is to evaluate them.
This leads to the second point --- initially less obviously
pressing but ultimately more important --- which is to dis-
cover what the force or meaning of an obligation to believe
might be.
Let m~ illustrate why this second issue is so important
and cannot be avoided. Certainly there are lots of ways one
might try to generate prescriptions from deductive logic.
Here are several of the most obvious general
suggest countless specific prescriptions:
methods that
I -A I f one bel i eves the pretni ses of any dedL\C-·-
tively valid argument than one ought to be-
lieve its conclusion;
I-B If one believes the premises of any deduc-
tively valid argument than one ought not
believe the negation of its conclusion;
I I-A One ought to believe every instance of every
logical truth; and
II-B One ought not believe any inconsistent propo-
sitions.
Now, are any or all of the prescriptions that can be gener-
ated in these ways acceptable or correct? For eHample=-
consider the following schema that we can obtain using
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method I-A:
if a person believes p~ and believes a conditional
with p as antecedent and q as consequent~ then he
ought to believe q.
One thing that follows from this prescription is that
in some circumstances I ought to believe false things. For
if I believe p, and the appropriate conditional~ it follows
that I ought to believe q --- but since nothing so far
guarantees the truth of either p or the conditional~ q might
be false.
principle~
tion of
I do not take this to be an objection to the
since it may be that any reasonable interpreta-
II OLtgt-lt to bel i eve p" WOLtl d allow that there are
circumstances in which one ought to believe what is false.
For example~ one very natural interpretation might be that x
ought to believe p if and only if x is justified in believ-
ing p. But then it is no problem that I sometimes ought to
believe what is false, for it is generally accepted that one
can be justified in believing what is false. A . second
natural interpretation might be that >: ought to believe p if
and only if he has reason for believing p. And again I can
have reason for believing something that is false.
Note that if the first interpretation were accepted
there would be grounds for rejecting any principle generated
from I-A or I-B, along the lines discussed in section 6.
Taking the prescription above, it might be that I am not
justified in beliving q because my belief in either p or the
conditional is not justified, or because I have some other
belief that I have already accepted that justifies the nega-
tion of q~ and 50 on. This point ei;tends to any instance of
I-A or- I-B. For e>:ample, her-e is an instance of I-B:
if anyone believes p~ and also believes a condi-
tional with p as antecedent and q as con5equent~
he ought not believe the negation of q.
BL,t gi yen the pr-oposed i nterpretati on of the "OL\ght II ~ this
principle must be wrong.
believing the negation of q,
For I might well be justified in
even though I also believe ---,
but perhaps without justification --- both p and the condi-
tional.
On the other hand note that if the second interpreta-
ticn were chosen, then I-A and 1-B might be defended
certainly from the kinds of c:oLtnter-e>:amples given above.
For I can certainly have reason for believing both p and its
negation.
These considerations highlight the need to understand
or determi ne the force of the "o\.,ght to bel i eve ll as part of
the process of determining whether or not some particular
prescription is acceptable. Unfortunately Mill does not
give a definition or translation of his "OLlght to believe" ~
and he does not formulate specific prescr-iptions based on
dedL,ctive logic. However he does give us some indication of
how he understands the force of prescriptions based on
dedL,ctive logic:.
Mill
trL,th.
says that the goal of logic is the attainment of
BL,t the ~~inds of facts and generalizations that
deductive logic is concerned to describe are the conditions
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under which sets of propositions are consistent or inconsis-
tent. ThL\S
the logic called Formal only aims at ~emoving one
of the obstacles to the attainment of truth, by
prevent i ng SL,ch mi stakes as render OL,r thOLlghts
inconsistent with themselves or with one another:
al1d it is of no i mpor-tance whether we thi n~, con-
sistently or not~ if we think wrongly. It is only
as a means to material truth, that the formal, or
to speak more clearly, the conditional~ validity
of an operation of thought is of any value; and
even that value is only negative: we have not
made the smallest positive advance towards right
thi nki ng, by merel y ~~eepi ng ol;rsel yes consi stent
in what is!, perhaps, systematic: error. (WH, p.
37(» [3]
In so far as formal or deductive logic is prescriptive,
it gLli des LlS not -to .. mater i alII trL,th bL,t to cansi stency
or better, to avoiding inconsistency. This suggests that for
Mill prescriptions of deductive logic will be derived along
the lines of methods 11-B, and perhaps we can add II-C:
If a set of propositions is inconsistent then
one ought not believe all of the members of
that set.
t~o~eover 1-A and I -B wOL,1 d mai ntai n the .. c:ond it i onal val i d i-
ty" of a set of beliefs,
consistent to begin with.
given that the iniitial set was
Only II-A is to some extent at
odds with the spirit of the quotation, since it prescribes
that (ever so many) particular beliefs be held, while the
quotation suggests that deductive logic alone does not pres-
cribe that we have any particular beliefs at all.
It is hard to say anything more substantive about the
f orc:e of any .. OL\ght to bel i eve" that conf arms to I I -B, I I -C ~
and perhaps I-A and I-B as well.
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Certainly such prescrip-
ti ons mL(st be very weak, and one sign of their weakness has
already been brought to light. Conforming to the principles
(0. p.ecepts) of deductive logic is~ as Mill says, C\ pre-
condition for attaining IImaterial trL,th li • BL,t f rom none of
the potential prescriptions alone does it follow that there
is anything that we ought to believe. Moreover even if we
=ould unfailingly follow (that is~ conform to) the prescrip-
tions of deductive logic~ we are guaranteed only consistency
and not trL(th --- we st i 11 cOL,1 d be prey to some II systemat i c
error ll • The goal of reasoning (or logic:, in Mill:'s e>:'tended
sense) i 5 to at tai n trL\th or knowl edge. So the pr inc: i pIes
and prescriptions of deductive logic provide only one small,
though important, aspect of a theory of reasoning.
Perhaps this point is more dramatic when the (presuma-
bly common) case of inconsistent beliefs is considered.
Just to give one example, we see that from instances of I-A
and I-8 it would follow that (for countless cases) one ought
to believe p and one ought to believe the negation of p; but
from II-C it would follow that one ought not believe p, and
also believe its negation, and so on. Indeed it becomes
c:lear that SLlCh a system of "obligations ll that I am trying
to build in accordance with Mill~s suggestions could not be
obligations" to QQ anything at all. There is no clear sense
in which we can be said to follow or act upon them, and in
this e>:ample they certainly can give no indication of how to
re~.love the i nconsi stenc:y --- of whi eh bel i efs to gi ve LIp.
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Frege saw this point~
deductive logic generating obligations to believe must be
absolutely trivial. He agr-eed that IfRLtles for asserting~
That is, given any law of truth~
thinking~
[4J
trLtth II •
jLtdgi ng ~ inferring, follow from the laws of
any (trLte)
generalization about the truth relations between propo-
sitions, one can find a precept that ~follows~ from it along
the followi .. g lines:
one "ought not believe p, believe q, and be-
lieve z if the conjunction of p, q, ••• , z, and X
is inconsistent~ where X is some law of truth.
And this is just a long-winded way of saying II-C.
But Frege also saw that
any law asserting what is, can be conceived as
prescribing that one ought to think in conformity
wi t.h it, and i s thLtS in that sense a 1 aw of
thought. This holds for laws of geometry and
physics no less than for laws of logic. The
latter have a special title to the name ~laws of
thought~ only if we mean to assert that they are
the most general laws, whic:, prescribe Ltnivesally
the way in which one ought to think if one is to
t hi n ~:: a tall. ( BLA , P • 12) [ 5 J
That is, precepts aboL,t how one oL,ght to thi n~~ can be de-
rived from any truth whatsoever. Take any trLtth yOLI 1 i ke
and call it I. Here are some additional, and clearly justi-
fiable precepts --- rules that one ought to follow if one
wants to avoid falsehood:
one ought not believe the negation of T;
one ought not believe the negation of p, and also
believe a conditional with T as antecedent and p
as c:onseqL,ent.
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.. . :-
In general,
one OL\ght not bel i eve p!' bel i eve q, ••• ,
believe z, where the conjunction of p, q,
z is inconsitent with T.
and
and
These precepts are justifiable because anyone who has
beliefs contrary to these precepts m~§~ have at least one
false belief; that is~ what he believes is inconsistent with
which is T. I-A, 1-B, II-B and II-C are just
special case. Thus Frege has collapsed the force of the
prescriptions into the following principle:
F One ought not believe any false propositions.
And that is a perfectly useless piece of advice.
1 • F'art i CL\l ar l.y sect ions 8 and 9 of B~~. I I Chapter I I I !'
and all of Bk. II Chapter VII of the eClQ£t2l~ Qf
bgst£. All of these changes appear in the final
(eighth) edition.
2. J.S. Mill, en S~2m~QetiQQ Qt §~~ ~tii~2m ~2ml~tQO:2
En~~QEQ2n~, University of Toronto Press, 1979. All
referenc:es to this work will be abbreviated by 'WH~
followed by a page number.
3. Similar views are expressed in Section 9, Chpater III,
Boo~~ II of a 2~~t~m Qf bQgt~. This section is one of
the late additions to §b, roughly contemporary with the
previous quotation from ~~.
4. Gottlob Frege, liThe ThoL,ght, a Logical InqL\iryll:- in
Eblig~Qebl£~l bQg~~ (Ed. Strawson), Oxford U.P., 1967,
p. 17. I shall refer to this paper as "Til.
5. "BLA" stands for Frege:'s E!2~!.~ b~~E Qi a!:!.~b.m~tl£
(trans. Furth), Univ. of California Press, Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1964.
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So far I think that the main tenets of Mill~s system
have been opposed to various forms of psychologism. His
theory of import and his explanation of validity give the
outlines of a systematic theory that opposes any psycholo-
gistic reduction of significance and validity to a subjec-
t i ve and psychol og i c:al f oL'ndat ion. Mi 11 :' S crL'C: i 81 d i, st inc··..
tion between principles of validity and genuine principles
of inference (or of justification) bolsters this anti-
psycholigism even further. For it is quite plausible that
principles of reasoning and justification are (or are in
part) dependent on or reducible to facts about our practice
of reasoning and about what we accept as correc:t or justi--
fied reasoning. Such facts compose at least part of what I
called the contextual nature of justification. I have no
way of Q~QY1ng this, but I suspect that the apparent psycho-
logical nature of principles of inference, coupled with a
confusion between principles of inference and principles of
validity, is a fundamental motivation for psychologistic
claims about the nature of logic. But Mill's clear dis-
tinction between principles of validity and principles of
justification allows for the possibility that principles of
inference really are psychologistic in nature~ without un-
dermining the non-psychological nature of principles of
validity. Of course Mill chooses to call principles of
inference or justification principles of logic --- but if it
is only such principles that are psychologistic in nature
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then psychologism with respect to logic is not (as far as I
am concerned) a troubling thesis.
Even with all of this frLti tfLll thinking about the
natL\re of logic Mill still feels a pull toward some more
serious form of psychologism. It is during his discussion
of the prescriptive natLlre of logic that Mill makes his most
dramatic and prominent statement that commits him to psycho-
logism with respect to logic. He writes:
Logic is not the theory of Thought as Thought~ but
of val i d ThoLlght; not of th ink i ng!' bLlt of correct.
thinking. It is not a Science distinct from~ and
coordinate with~ Psychology. So far as it is a
science at all~ it is a part!' or branch~ of Psy-
chology; differing from it, on the one hand as a
part differs from the whole, and on the other, as
an Art differs from a Science. Its theoretical
grounds are wholly borrowed from Psychology~ and
includes as much of that science as is required to
justify the rules of the art. (WH~ p. 359)
vJe acknowledged this contrast between an art and a science
in the previous section~ and recognized an e~·:ample in which
a science or a body of knowledge is presupposed by, or
jL\sti f i es~ an art. Mill's psychologism is his commitment
to the view that it is the science of psychology that is
presupposed by and justifies the art of logic.
We saw how deductive logic can be viewed as an art,
providing (very weak) precepts for correct reasoning, and we
saw that there is a science, a body of true generalizations,
that justifies those precepts. The science that justifies
those precepts is composed of the generalizations about
truth relations between propositions --- what Frege calls
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and the j Llst i f i cat i on takes place vi a1 aws of trLlth
schema II-B or II-C. 8i yen th i 5 gr-oLtndwor ~~, it seems that
Mill~s appa~ent psychologism can a~ise in one of two ways.
On the one hand it could be that the science of psychology
justifies the art of logic because the science of the laws
of truth is itself part of (or justified by) the science of
psychology. On the other hand it COLtld be that some part of
psychology justifies the art of logic independently of the
science of the laws of truth. There are certain passages
that at least suggest that Mill sometimes endorsed the first
alternative~ and I have found none that suggest that he
supports the second. What I will do first is to layout
what evidence I can find for the first alternative, and
evaluate the force of the evidence and the prospects for
psychologism based on it. Then I will look at the second
alternative, and generate an a,gument, based on the results
of Frege~s argument in the previous section~ that undermines
the fruitfulness of the second alternative.
I want it to be clear that the first alternative really
is open to Mill. In the first place, the distinction be-
tween laws of truth and precepts is one that Mill himself
makes, and I am ntit imposing Frege's distinction on him.
Generalizations about the validity of syllogisms, and the
principles of apparent inference (section 6) are laws of
truth. And in the Hamilton work he explicitly contrasts
laws of trLtth with precepts: liThe law of Contradiction does
not 'enjoin the absence of contradiction~; it is not an
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in j Ltnct i on at all II (WH ~ p. 377) a Those who formulated the
law used the terms ~law~ and ~principle'
in thei~ proper scientific, and not~ as Sir W.
Hamilton does~ in their moral or legislative
sense. And by the Law of Contradiction they
meant one of the properties of contradiction~
namely, that what ;s contradictory cannot be true.
(WH~ p. 377)
An alternative formulation of the law of contradiction is
that "an affirmative proposition and the corresponding nega-
tive proposition cannot both be true'l (SL, Bk.II~ Ch.VII~
Sec. 5) ~ and this is just a Fregian law of truth. Another
1 aw of trL,th that Mi 11 eH pI i c: i t 1 y ac: knowl edges i s the 1 aw af
exclu~ed middle, and once these two laws have been acknow-
1edged we can aSSL\me t~~at they all come in.
In the second place there are some hints~ at 1east ~
that the precepts of logic are really to be justified by
appealing to the laws of truth, as I have suggested. The
laws of truth are said to be Q~lD~!e!~§~ and for the authors
of the laws II ••• the word Principle ••• means a particular
kind of Doct~ine, namely, one whi ch is the groL,ndwor~,~ and
justifying authority, of a whole class of operations of the
mind" (WH, p. 377). Mi 11 does not e>: pl i ci t 1 y say that part
of what the laws of truth justify are the precepts of logic.
But he does say that the end or goal of thought is 'the
att~inment of truth~. ThLtS, si nc:e
the most important ••• and at bottom the only
important qL\al i t Y of a thOLlght ••• (i 5) i ts trLtth,
the laws or precepts provided for the guidance of
thought must surely have for their principle pur-
pose that the prOdLtcts of thin~~ing shall be trLte.
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(WH~ p. 365)
If the purpose of the precepts of logic is to guide thought
to true conclusions (or to true conclusions given that one's
premises are true)~ then surely the precepts must be ground-
ed in~ or justified by~ an investigation into truth and into
the truith relations between propositions. That is~ they
must be grounded in the laws of truth themselves.
So on ~his first alternative the question of Mill~s
psychologism about logic turns on his treatment of the laws
of truth~ Some well-known passages do appear to commit Mill
to psychologism about these laws. One claim that Mill
certainly makes is that the laws of truth are derived from~
and so are justified by, It is this doctrine
that Mill uses in support of his view that the laws of logic
(clearly,
eriori.
writes:
the laws of truth) are non-necessary and a post-
With reference to the law of excluded middle he
The original foundation of it I take to be~ that
Belief and Disbelief are two different mental
states, excluding one another. This we know by
the simplest observation of our own minds. And if
we carry our observation outwards, we also find
that any positive phenomenon whatsoever and
its negative~ are distinct phenomena~ pointedly
contrasted~ and the one always absent where the
other is present. I consider the maxim in ques-
tion to be a generalization from aJl these facts.
(SL, Bk.II, Ch.VII, Sec.5)
The doctrine that laws such as excluded middle are derived
from experience is not simply a consequence of some general
empiricist thesis, such as the claim that all justification,
any evidence that we could have for a generalizati~n, is
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from e~·:perience. For Mill actLlally thin~,s that he ~~nows how
the deri vati on of the 1 aw wor~::s. He can e>:hibit the ='posi-
tive and negative~ phenomena of which it :.5 a generaliza-
tion. Moreover to say that the law is based on the :'sim-
plest observations of our own minds=' is, I SLtppOse ~ Mill"s
way of conveying its (relative) indubitability.
One problem is to decide what 2n~QQm~Qs are, and in
particula~ what positive and negative phenomena are. It is
tempti ng to SLlppose that phenomena are jLlst bi ts of e>:peri-
ence, that is, ideas and sensations. This would help us
make some sense of the supposition that there are positive
and negative phenomena; for in the empi,icist tradition it
is usual to treat ideas, or complexes of ideas, as (among
other things) truth-bearers and beliefs. It is not that
truth-bearers are intrinsically positive or negative
rather that one truth-bearer can be negative relative to
another, its negation. If phenomena are ideas or complexes
of ideas, and in effect truth-bearers, then the law of
excluded middle is actually a generalization about those
ideas. It is a generalization about the g££~~~~Q£~~ of
those ideas. This interpretation helps to e>:plain another
claim that Mill sometimes makes~ that the laws of excluded
middle and contradiction are themselves laws of thought,
although not in the way that precepts are.
trL\th
The laws of
mayor may not be capable of alteration by expe-
rience, but the conditions of our existence deny
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to us the experience which would be required to
alter them. Any assertion~ therefore, which con-
flicts with one of these laws --- any proposition,
for instance~ which asserts a contradiction,
thought it were on a subject wholly removed from
the sphere of OL\r e~·:perience, is to L'S Ltnbel ieva-
ble. The belief in such a proposition is~ in the
present constitution of nature~ impossible as a
mental fact. (WH, p. 381)
So the laws of truth put certain constraints on what beliefs
we can and cannot have. And this is perfectly comprehensi-
ble if beliefs are occurrences of ideas, and if the laws of
truth are laws about occurrences of ideas (in particular)
and phenomena (in general).
The situation can be summarized in this way. Mill has
said a surprising number of different things about laws such
as the 1 aw of e>:cl Ltded mi ddl e. In the first place the laws
are said to be laws of truth; they are generalizations about
truth-bearers and the truth relations that hold between
them. In the second place they are said to be about the
occurrences of positive and negative phenomena. In the
third place they a~e said to govern or constrain what be-
liefs we can and cannot have. An interpretation th~t ex-
plains how someone could say all of these very different
th.i ngs aboLtt the 1 aws is one that identifies phenomena,
beliefs, and truth-bearers. They are ideas.
This is perhaps the most obvious interpretation~ but it
is problematic on several counts. This certainly would
commit Mill to a pretty blatant version of psychologism
the laws of truth would be laws about the occurrence of
ideas, or at least laws about what combinations of
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ideas
cannot OCCLtr. But it is hard to see how this theory could
escape Mill's original objection to an unsophisticated psy-
chologism, that we can think contrary to the laws of truth
and to the precepts that are based on those laws. For to
think contrary to the laws or precepts is for certain ideas
and complexes of ideas to occur in the mind~ while the laws
on this interpretation, laws that determine
what combinations of ideas can occur. Moreover this inter-
pretation inherits the hosts of difficulties that beset
earlier versions of a theory of ideas --- the kind of theory
that Mill himself criticizes when he presents his theory of
import (see section 4). For as we have seen, Mill does
emphatically distinguish propositions or truth-bearers from
what is believed, which is a fact; and what is believed is~
in tL\rn, distinguished from mental states of belief. So
Mill cannot accept this interpretation of the laws of truth
that collapses these three distinct things into ideas.
What is interesting, however, is that when we reject
this blatantly psychologistic interpretation of the laws of
trL,th, it becomes very ha.rd to see how we can pi n any ~,i nd
of psychologistic view on Mill, his occasional assertion to
the contrary. The error in the previous interpretation was
to take phenomena to be si mpl y 'bi ts of e>:peri ence='
ideas and sensations. Rather they are what is Q~g§§O~gg in
experience, facts or things, as opposed to the thing that
[1]
does the presenting, the ideas and sensations. But re-
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member that facts are not only e>:pressable by propositions
but are also the objects of belief. Thus when Mill says
that the law of excluded middle (and other laws of truth)
are, variously~ generalizations about relations between
propositions, generalizations about the occurrences of phe-
nomena~ and generalizations about what can be believed~ we
can see that the term ~law of e>:cluded middle~ is systemati-
cally (but from Mill's point of view quite innocently)
ambiguous. The ambiguity is both systematic and innocent
because, in outline at least~ Mill~s theory of import re-
lates propositions and (a subset of the) facts or phenomena
--- which is also to say it systematically relates proposi-
tions and what is believed.
But nothing on this interpretation shows how laws of
truth could be conceived as laws of thought. Mill does
actually hint at a solution that is ccmpatible with this
second interpretation. Concerning three of the traditional
[2]
laws of truth he writes:
I readily admit that these three general proposi-
tions are universally true of all phenomena. I
also admit that if there are any inherent necessi-
ties of thought, these are such. I express myself
in this qualified manner, because whoever is aware
how artificial, modifiable, the creatures of cir-
cumstances, and alterable by circumstances, most
of the supposed necessities of thought are (though
real necessities to a given person at a given
time), will hesitate to affirm of any such neces-
sities that they are an original part of our
mental constitution. Whether the three so-called
Fundamental Laws are laws of our thoughts by the
native structure of the mind~ or merely because we
perceive them to be universally true of obse~ved
phenomena~ I will not positively decide: but they
are laws of our thoughts now, and invincibly so.
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Mill
(WH~ pp. 38()-81)
offers us two ways in which these laws might turn out
to be laws of thought. They COLtl d be 1 aws of thot_,ght :'by
the native structure of the mind~, or :'merely because we
perceive them to be true of observed phenomena~. I think
that the first unsatisfactory psychologistic interpretation
of Mill takes the first alternative. The 1 aw of e>; c: 1Ltded
middle, for example, would actually be about the ~structure~
of the mind', because it is a law about the occurrences of
ideas and sensations. But we saw lots of reasons for re-
jecting this as a viable interpretation of Mill. The whole
point of his theory of import, and his rejection of Lochean
subjectivism~ legislates against this first possibility. So
we are 1ef t wi th Mi 11 :- s second al ternat i ve: the 1 aw of e>:-
eluded middle is a law of thought ~~~e~2~ ~§ g§L£~i~§ tn§
of all facts.
They help to determine what we do or do not believe, what
thoughts we can and cannot have, simply because they deter-
mine what phenomena or facts we actually will experience.
For if it is universally true of all phenomena then we could
never have experience that would disconfirm it~ or in any
way run contrary to it.
[3]
trL,th.
And this holds for any other law of
This is very mL,,:h the line Mill takes when he criti-
cizes the use of the inconceivablity of a state of affairs
as a criterion for its impossibility, or for the falsehood
of a proposition that expresses that the state of affairs
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obtains. He gives many examples of the occurrence of states
of affairs that at one time ~~~~~~~g to be inconceivable,
and so were tahen by many to be impossible. His analysis is
that the apparent bounds of conceivability a~e set by the
law:· of association working on the e>:periences that we do
actLtall y have. A state of affairs is difficult to conceive
if no closely ~esembling state of affairs has been experi-
enced.
When we have often seen and thought of two things
together, and have never in anyone instance ei-
ther seen or thought of them separately~ there is
by the primary law of association an inc~easing
difficulty~ which may in the end become insu-
perable, of conceiving the two things apart. (SL,
B l~. I 1:- eh • V , Sec: • 6 )
Mill argues that this mechanism of association can explain
all the phenomena relating to the conceivablity and incon-
ceivability of states of affairs. And this is exactly the
kind of mechanism that is suggested by the second interpre-
tation of the way in which the laws of truth are laws of
thOL,ght. Given that the laws of truth govern what states of
affairs can (or bett.er, cannot) oCC:Ltr, these laws will
govern our thoughts in the sense that our lack of ~~e~~i~Q£§
of cases that contravene them will maka it difficult for us
to ~m2g~n~ or ~~li§Y~ in cases that contravene them.
The upshot is that the laws of truth are laws of
thought in a very trivial sense --- true physical, chemical,
and biological laws would be laws of thought in exactly the
same sense. For they determine what phenomena can and
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ca.lnot OCCL\r (or at least constrain what combinations of
phenomena can occu~), and so, by the same mechanisms that
work in the case of the 1 aws of trL\th ~ determine what be-
liefs we can and cannot have (and, for that matte~, deter-
mine what states of affairs we find conceivable).
have found almost all of the pieces of the puzzle:
So we
a sense
in which deductive logic provides precepts of thought~ a
sense in whi ch a body of sci ence (the 1,;.. ·· .. :5 ..Jf trL\th) groL,nds
or justifies the precepts of logic, and a sense in which the
laws of truth are laws of thought. The one piece that is
missing is a commitment to psychologism! The obvious psy-
chologistic interpretation is just too inconsistent with
Mill's central wor~~ on the theory of import and his rejec-
tion of subjectivism to be at all plausible. This sec:ond
interpretation gives a much more satisfying picture of
Mill's work on all counts except that it does not 5ub-
stantiate his suggestion that the precepts of logic: are
[4]
j\..\s+:.ified by or groLInded in the science of psyc',ology.
Of ,C:OL,rse the genLti ne 1 aws of reasoni ng or inference (i f
there are any, as Mill supposes) are likely to be based on a
psychological or sociological study --- they will be based
on what inferences we actually do find justified or warrant-
[5]
ed. But we have found no reason for thinking that the
precepts of deductive logic are grounded in such a study.
The only remaining appearance of psychologism is contained
in the prescriptive 'ought~ or ~ought not~, but this trivia-
lity is even endorsed by Frege.
25(1
At the very beginning of this section I pointed out
that i n theory at 1 east ~ ther"e i s a sec:ond way that psyc:ho-
logism could emerge in Mill~s system. Perhaps the precepts
of logic a~e justified by psychology independently of the
laws of truth. The attraction of this alternative for
psychologism is not hard to see. If the precepts of logic
can be justified directly by psychology, it may be that the
laws of truth, and hence issues about the nature of the laws
of trL\th ~ can be completely avoided. Or, if the laws of
truth are to be formulated, it may be possible to justify or
ground the laws of truth in the precepts of logic, which are
themselves justified independently by psychology. I have
found no evidence that Mill ever tries to work out his
tendency to psychologism in this way. But I want to formu-
late an argument to the conclusion that it would be point-
less even to try to find such a direct psychological justi-
fication of the precepts --- for it is not possible to
ci rCLtm'vent tile 1 aws of trLtth in thi 5 way.
The argument is based on the conclusion of the previous
section that result from Frege's considerations. Frege
agrees that laws of logic generate precepts for how one
ought (or ought not) think, but he goes on to point out that
any truth can be used in exactly the same way to generate a
prescription about what one ought to beJieve. What we want
to add is that these additional precepts are not iQg~£el
precepts. BLlt how do we know thi s? I t seems that we ~~now
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this QQ1~ because they are justified by non-logical truths.
All of the precepts we can generate are perfectly good
precepts about how we ought to think if we want to avoid
falsehood. They are "gL\i di ng pri nci pI es of thOL,ght in the
attainment of trLtth ll (BLA~ p. 12). But the force of Frege's
observation is that the term 'logical precept~ is not co-
extensive with ~law of thought~ or 'guiding principle of
thought in the attainment of truth~. What is essential to
the logical precepts is that they are justified by the laws
of trLtth; and we can distinguish the logical from the non-
logical precepts only by appealing to the laws of truth.
Frege does make one SLtggest ion: perhaps the logical pre-
cepts are the mg§t 9~D~C~! precepts. But I do not think
that we should hold out much hope for this suggestion. Is
there any clear sense in which the precept
one ought not believe that anything travels faster
than light
is any less gener~l than any precepts generated by II-B or
II-C? If not~ then the point stands.
The consequences of this are quite interesting. It is
not just that there is no point in studying the logical
precepts rather than the laws of truth~ given the triviality
of their derivation. It is rather that one £Q~lg DQ~ go
about examining the logical precepts independently of the
I aw~ of trLtth. What we determine to be the distinctly
logical precepts depends upon our discovering the laws of
trLtth. One can always move from laws of truth to precept5
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(by I1-B or II-C), but there is no guarantee that a precept
is based on a law of truth.
psychologism in Mill~s system.
The point can be applied to
I ~uggested the possibility
of trying to sustain a psychologistic thesis (while avoiding
a crude identification of laws of truth with laws of psycho-
logy) by looking for a direct psychological ..lLtstificatior. of
the precepts of logic. But if Frege~s point is correct we
need to determine the laws of truth in order to determine
what the logical precepts are. No direct psychological
j L,st i f i cat i on of the precepts of 1 og i C COLll d si destep ar~
appeal to the laws of truth, and so it cannot sidestep
questions about what the laws of truth are and how they are
to be 'justified~ in turn. So it is not surprising the
question of Mill~s psychologism ultimately should turn on
his treatment of the laws of truth.
1 • For example~ see the use of ~phenomenon~ in Sec.
SL. Bk. I, eh. V.
5 of
2. That is, the law of excluded middle~ the law of contra-
diction, and the law of identity.
3. It is this more coherent strand of Mill~s discussion
that I suggest is being picked up by H.W.B. Joseph. He
sLlggests that wh i 1 e the 1 caws of contrad i ct ion, e>: c: 1Llded
middle, and identity
are called laws of thought, and in fact we cannot
thi nk e>;cept in accordance wi th them, yet they ar-e
really statements which we cannot but hold true
about things. We bsDDQt ~b1D~ contradictory pro-
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positins~ because we see that a tbiag £~QQQi b~~§
at once and not have the same characte~; and the
so-called necessity of thought is really the ap-
prehension of a necessity in the being of things.
(H. W. B. Joseph, Bn 1[l~!:.QQ!:!£~i.QD ~g b99i.i; ~ 0>: f ord ~
19()6 , P • 13 )
This passage occurs, by the way, in a parenthetical
remark that comments on a distinction that Joseph has
made between "ql,testions aboL,t OLtr thinking, and what we
mL\st think things t.o be" (Joseph, p. 13). Joseph is
clearly accepting the conclusion of this second strand
of Mill, that these laws are not [~~l!~ (ie. directly)
laws of thought. As it happens~ he thinks that laws of
1 ogi care 1 aws of thOLtght --- so he concl Ltdes that ,the
1 aw of e>: c 1Ltded mi dd 1e, and so on, are DQ! 1 aws of
logic (though they are closely related to laws of
log i c) •
4. There is one additional possibility that miyht seem to
lead to a version of psychologism. For there is an
idea that surfaces in Mill~s work of a final grand
reduction of the facts and objects of the external
world (the phenomena presented in experience) --- a
reduction not to ideas or sensations per se~ but to the
~permanent possibilities of sensation' (see WH~ p.
184). But again I do not think that this leads to any
genuine psychologism about the laws of tr~th at
least any more than to psychologism about physics or
chemistry. If all laws of phenomena would turn out to
be laws about the possibility of the occurrence of
ideas~ then there would be nothing especially psycholo-
gistic about the laws of truth!
5. See section !t) for a brief additional diSCLtSsion.
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MIll has helped us get clear about the enormous differ-
ence between principles of reasoning or inference and prin-
ciples of validity. We have also seen how this distinction
helps to dispel a very strong tendency to psychologism that
is based on a confLlsion between principles of validity and
principles of inference, coupled with the plausible hypothe-
sis that principles of inference or reasoning are psycholo-
gical generalizations (about what we accept as correct or
justified reasonings), or at least that they are based on or
[ 1 ]
derived from psychological facts. I have come across
another case in which this distinction helps to dispel!
conf Ltsi on. Interestingly the example generates a line of
argument that is supposed to be ~g~tn~t psychologism with
respect to logic.
[2]
JLtdson Webb has unearthed ~n argument against psy-
chologism by C. s. F'ei rce, that comes out of a series of
discussions about the logic machines of Jevons and Marquand.
In describing the logic machines Webb says that liThe ma-
chines .... were not desi gned to chec~~ whether a gi yen 1ogi-
cal argument is valid, but to indicate implicitly conclu-
sions that £Q~ig be drawn from given premises which alone
were fed into them" (Webb, p. 26). This is not very clear,
but I gather that the machines display a disjunction of all
the possible conjunctions of terms that occur in the pre-
mises. It then computes which conjunctions are falsified by
any valuations that make the premises true.
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Of COL,rse there
could be many more than one such conjunction of terms that
is compatible with the truth of the premises.
The issue that Bradley raises is whether or not the
and he argues (specifically
with reference to Jevon5~ machine) that they do not. He
agrees that .. it is i mpossi bl e to deny that it e>:ecL,tes SL\ch
work, as mL,st otherwi se be done by a process of thi nki ng. II
I do not hesitate to say that it performs mechanically
(F'L,
..
p. 383) Rather misleadingly~ I thi n ~~!' he adds that
an operation which, if performed ideally, would be an infer-
ence II (F'L, p. 383). The main reason why the machine has not
made an inference is that
The result that comes out and is presented by th~
machine, is not really the conclusion. The pro-
cess is not finished when the machinery stops; and
the rest is left to be done by the mind. What is
called ~reading' the conclusion is to some extent
making it. (F'l, p. 384)
Peirce wants to challenge Bradley on a number of
poi nts. In the f i yost pI ace F'ei rce argL,es, qLli te correctl y~
that a further examination of the mental process of think-
ing will have no bearing on logic --- that is, on principles
of validity. For logic depends on truth, and describes the
truth relations between propositions. To accept this is to
deny a version of psychologism~ bL\t it is not, as yet~ to
say anything against Bradley~s previous comments. However
Webb and, apparently, Peirce think that they have a special
argument against Bradley. For Peirce argues the further
point, that logical machines really do perform inferences;
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for
If from true premises they always yield true con-
clusions, what more can be desired? Yet those
machi nes have no SOL\1 s that we know of. They do
not appear to thi nk. • in any psychi cal sense;
and even if we should discover that they do so, it
would be a fact altogether without bearing on the
logical correctness of their opinions.••• [3J
So Webb concludes that the existence of logic machines pro-
vi des arl argLlment agai nst E.2~£b.Q!.Qg!.2m, and against ~CeQ=
l~~~§ psychologism in particular. For IIthose who insisted~
with Bradley, that machines do not really reason or infer
we,,-e gLtilty of psychologism ll (Webb!, p. 27).
I think that Webb and Peirce are sLlbject to great
conf Ltsi on here. It seems to me that Bradley is more or less
clear about the distinction between valdity and inference
--- or at least if he is not, then Webb and Peirce have not
shown that he is not. Indeed one indication that Bradley is
aware of the distinction is that he admits that the machine
does perform operations that could be part of reasoning, and
a second indication is that he says, in his admittedly
misleading way, that the machine does something which, if
done by a mind, would be an inference. But whether or not~
in the end~ Bradley is completely clear about the dis-
tinc:tion~ what is clear is that in this particular context
Bradl ey is tal ki ng aboL,t inference in the Mi 11 ean sense.
That is, he is talking about real inference --- the asser-
ticn of~ or belief in, the truth of one proposition on the
basis of one~s belief in other propositions.
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What Bradley
i s argLti ng!'
that sense.
of validity
e:one: 1Ltsi on.
here~ is that Jevon~s machine does not infer in
He agrees that it correctly displays relations
--- but it does not reason to or infer any
This is what Bradley means when he says that
after the machine does its work the conclusion still has to
be 'read' by the ope~ator. The machine displays a whole set
of ~cone:lusions~ (conjunctions of terms) that are consistent
with the truth of the premises. Sometimes there is just one
such possible conclusion, sometimes there is more than one.
If there is more than one then there is no way that the
machine can be seen as asserting any conclusion --- because
the various possibilities, while all c:omaptible with the
truth of the premiese, are themselves incompatible. And if
it is making no assertion in that case, then why think that
it is making one in the case where the premises rule out all
but one possible conclusion? And even if this argument
were somehow rejected for the case where there is only one
possible ~conclusion~, we could add something more. For the
machine does not believe or believe with justification the
premises, and so cannot be said to tQf~~ the ~conclusion~
--- that is, believe it on the basis of its beliefs in the
premises.
So it seems to me that Webb and Peirce are the ones who
are conf Lised. They certainly have not been arguing that
machines assert or believe propositions, or make judgements.
since we know that inference really does involve
making assertions, having beliefs,
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or maki ng jLldgements!,
then they are just wrong that the machines in question
[4J
infer. Bradley is correct on this point, and both sides
can agree that the machine properly displays relations of
validity, which are not psychologistic in nature. Apparent-
ly Peirce and Webb hav~ not distinguished the two notions of
principles of inference: argument forms and principles of
validity, on the one hand, and acts of inference and princi~
pIes of correct inference, on the other. To be SL\re Brad-
ley~s notion of inference is psychologistic. BLtt it is
justifiably psychologistic, since inference is, or at least
preSLlpposes~ mental activity. So this is no argument a-
gainst psychologism in igQt£. Bradley may be convicted of
psychologism on other grounds --- if, for e>: amp 1 e ~ he does
not accept a non-psychologistic account of the validity of
argL,ments. But this has not been shown. So it is Webb and
Peirce who are subject to confusion, when they say that
logic machines ~draw inferences' as a consequence of their
failure to distinguish the validity of arguments from the
correctness of (acts of) inference.
1 •
,.,
""- .
lowe the example to Leslie Burkholder, who
sent me the reference. He did not send any
about the argument, so he cannot be blamed
interpretation of it!
JLldson C.
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recently
comment
for my
ii£.§, D. Reidel:r Boston, 198(),
to qL,otations from this work
'Webb'~ and a page number.
pp. 26-7.
with the
I will refer
abbreviation
3. F·ei rce ~ C. S. ~ II Log i c Mach i nes II ~ i n em~!:!.£2D. JQ!:!CQ~!. Qt
E§~£bQ1Qgy~ 1887~ pp. 164-71.
4. Of course someone else could argue that machines do
think~ do have a mental life ••• and on that supposition
it WOLll d make sense to thi nk that they inferred or
reasoned. Such a position might be more plausible with
more complicated computing machines, but it is certain-
ly not the position of Webb and Peirce in this argu-
ment.
I want to return to the important issue raised in the
Introduction to Part II, Dennett~s suggestion that his mouse
(and presumably people too) follow logical 1 aws sLtch as
mOdLtS ponens. The one interpretation of that claim that I
offered there was that perhaps there are certain ~rul2s of
rationality='
as:
that any rational entity ought to follow such
if x believes p, and also believes a conditional
with p as antecedent and q as consequent, then if
x is rational he also believes q.
The discussions in sections 6 and 8 suggests a frame-
work from which this principle can be evalLtated. On the one
hand, in section 6 it was argL,ed that IIstrong ll principles of
reasoning, what were called principles of jLtsti f i cati on ~
ac:ceptability, or proof, are not obtainable from principles
of deductive logic. On the other hand in both sections 6
and 8 "weaker ll . principles were derived from dedL,ctive logic~
but such principles did not show that any particular beliefs
were justified or acceptable in the stronger sense. ThL\S
depending on how one interprets the IIOLtght to bel ieve", the
following prescription mayor may not be acceptable:
if x believes p, and also believes a conditional
with p as antecedent and q as consequent, then he
ought to believe q.
On the one hand if the II OL\ght to bel i eve II has the f oree of
II bel i eves wi th j L\st i f i cC\t i on II , then it is not acceptable
because the beliefs in p and the conditional may not be
I"
jLtstified, or because x may have some other belief that he
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accepts, that justifies the negation of q. On the other
hand i fit i s the tr i vi al Mi Il-Frege II OLtght to bel i eve II ~
then the principle may well be acceptable. It is jL\st that
because of other circumstances it may also follow that x
ought to believe the negation of q!
In fact I think that the problems with this proposed
principle of rationality do parallel the arguments about
jL\st i f i ed bel i ef (or abOLtt the II OL\ght to bel i eve II that t1as
that force). For I take it that if either my belief in p or
my belief in the conditional is OQ~ rational,
undermine the rationality of believing q.
then this may
Indeed given my
other beliefs,
negation of q.
it might be rational for me to believe the
So this prirlc:iple of rationality is LtnaC-
ceptable, and it is certainly not identifiable with~ and
[2]
does not in any way follow from, mQg~§ eQn~D§.
Still there may be some intuition that this principle
of rational ity WOLtld work within some conte>~ts, and so might
be part of a complet systemization of a theory of ration-
ality. For example, suppose that x is justified in believ-
ing p and the conditional (ie. it is rational for x to
believe them). Well, given the previous argument we would
have to add further conditions~ for e>:ample that >: does not
believe, and does not have grounds for believing~ the nega-
tion of q. In tb.!.§ conte>:t the principle seems to apply ---
because it would be rational for x to believe q. ActLtall y
it is not really the previous principle of rationality that
applies, but rather a more complicated surrogate (which, for
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eC'.se of e>: pressi on I wi 11 state by mi >: i ng the :' r- at i onal i t y:'
and 'justification~ talk):
if x believes p and a conditional with p as ante-
cedent and q as consequent, believes them with
justification, and neither believes nor has
grounds for believing the negation of q, then it
i s rat i onal for >: to bel i eve q.
At one level I have no objection to this as a principle
of rationality. It does not get us into any of the kinds of
problems that the precepts or the other principle of ration-
ality have gotten us into. For e>:ample, as far as I can
tell it will .lever follow from this principle that t.hel~e are
situations in which it would be rational for me to believe
something whose negation it would also be rational for me to
believe~ and so on.
The problem I have with this principle is ~ather that
it could never be applied in any real situation
never be useful to any genuinely rational person.
it WOL\l d
For- how
COL\l d one ever know that the antecedent of the pri nci pI e is
satisfied? My argument is this. I will suppose for the
sake of argument that there is n~ problem knowing of parti-
cula~ beliefs that they are justified --- that is not the
point I want to question. So there is no problem with the
fact that x believes p and the conditional, and I am SLlppO-
sing that there is no problem with (his or OLl,) knowing that
both beliefs are justified. But how do either x or we find
out that x has no grounds for believing the negation of q?
It is a much harder problem then it looks to be at first
263
and eHamining all of >:='5 jL\stified beliefs in order t.O see
whether or not some subset of those justified beliefs imply~ '
or otherwise justify~ the negation of p. Forget about th~
~or otherwise justify~ clause, for the condition that they
do not imply the negation of q is hard enough. It amOL\nts
£QD§i§~~Qt~ since two of those beliefs already imply q. But
how can we~ or >;, in general be e>:pected to ~~now thi s7 For
one thing this set of justified beliefs will not be small in
any real sitL\ation. Even worse, by Church~s theorem it
follows that there is no proof procedure for (first order)
[3]
consistency. Of course this does not mean that one can
Q~~~C know whether or not a set of justified beliefs is
consistent~ and so whether or not this final condition of
the antecdent is satisfied. For there will be cases in which
we do know that a set of sentences is consistent or incon-
sistent!' but such knowledge will be a case by case affair.
Since one~s beliefs can be both numerous and complicated
this is a practical as well as a theoretical problem~ and it
is a major difficulty with the principle. Again~ 1 am not
denying that the principle reflects some of our intuitions
abOL\t ratior,ality.
application.
I just do not see that it has any real
I thi n~, that there is a pretty systemati c probl em here.
This last principle of rationality is ~global~ in that it
implicitly sets conditions on all of one~s justified beliefs
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--- and it fails in usefulness because of this general
appeal. The first. principle of I"'ationality~ or a modifica-
tion such as that
if >: has jLlstified beliefs in p and in
tional with p as antecedent and q as
then it is rational for >: to believe q,
a condi-·
c:onseqL,ent
are :'local:' in that they do not make any appeal to more than
a (small) subset of one~s Justified beliefs. BLlt thei r
inadequacy stems from just this local nature, since what
foilows from them may contravene what is determined to be
rational in the broader context of the whole set of one~s
justified beliefs. So while I do not claim to have refuted
the global princ:iple~ in the way I have refuted the local
principles!, it seems that we cannot fQl!Q~ such principles
of r-ationality. And we have come no closer to seeing how it
is that we,
ponens.
or Dennett's mouse, can be said to follow modus
Of course on the one hand there is a sense in which we
~QDfg~m 12 modus ponens and other laws of truth --- it is
just the way in which we conform to laws of physics~ mathe-
matics~ and indeed any truths whatsoever. For nothing we
can do can falsify the (real) laws of physics or mathema-
tics, or falsify any truth --- and the same thing holds for
the laws of logic. On the other hand there is another sense
in which we can 'think contrary' to the laws of logic
bL,t agai n in that sense we c~,n :' thi n.~ contrary;' to the 1 aws
of physics and mathematics, and to any other truth whatso-
ever" t1oreover sect ion 8 showed L\S the sense in wh i eh we
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Q~gb~ ~Q £QofQcm tQ the laws of truth (physics, mathematics~
and so on)~ but these are not laws or precept~ that one
could ~£tiY~i~ fQllQ~ except by believing what is true. And
it is not any more useful to be told to conform to the truth
then it is to be told (as the global principle of rationali-
ty in effect told us) to be consistent. Perhaps Dennett has
something else in mind when he says that the mouse follows
modus ponens --- but again~ we have not found what it is.
No substantive interpretation of the psychologistic
slogan has been found. This does not mean that deductive
logic has no important role in thinking or reasoning. As I
have put it~ facts about deductive logic, about the deduc-
tive relations between propositions~ are used in our prac-
tice of reasoning. Some fact about the deductive relations
that hold between some propositions that I believe may be
part of my justification for another belief. That the
conclusion of some argument is accepted as correct may
result in part from the fact that the premises deductively
imply the conclusion. That the mouse is said to act ration-
ally may be because we attribute to it beliefs that deduc-
tively imply some conclusion upon which it acts. In all of
these kinds of cases facts about deductive implication play
a role in decisions about justification, acceptance, and
rationality. But we have seen that this is not generaliz-
able into principles about what I am justified in believing,
what conclusions I ought to accept, or which of my beliefs
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are I~ational .
1 • See page p. 4 of part I I •
2. Note that there i~ an interpretation of this principle
that is qL,ite pljALlsible. If we interpret Ilit is ra-
tional for >; to believe ll as having the force of ">: has
reason to believe", then this principle has the force
of one of the B-principles in section 6, and is per-
fectly acceptable. For my beliefs in p and the condi-
tional do provide reason for a belief in q --- it just
that they might be poor reason, if they are unjustified
or irrational.
3. That is~ it follows from Church's result that there is
no decision procedure for validity, combined with the
fact t,hat there !.§ a proof procedLlre for validity, that
there is no proof procedure for satisfiability. For if
there were a proof procedure for satisfiability then we
could construct a decision procedure for validity. So
there is not in general any way, for arbitrary sets of
sentence~ to determine their consistency --- that is~
the satisfiability of their conjunction.
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TherE are a number of relevant issues that it would be
appropriate to canvass further. Except for several passing
remarks I have made no attempt to discuss epistemological
questions about the nature and justification of principles
of logic. In particular there are a number of important
issues raised by Brian Ellis in his monograph B~tiQO~!
He argL\eS that 1 aW5 of log i c are "I aws
governing the structure of ideally rational belief systems
[ 1 ]
on idealized languages". Some of his program meshes
nicely with various points I have made in this dissertation,
but one of his central goals is to argue for an epistemolo-
gical account of truth, and a logic of acceptability. While
I think that Ellis~ arguments for his account of truth are
not persuasive, they warrant serious discussion.
There is a second set of issues that also are raised
by Ellis' work, as well as by that of Dennett and others~
that surround the question: is there any sense in which we
follow laws of logic? So far we have found no very inter-
esting sense in which we do follow the laws of logic, or
that our belief~ conform to, or are governed by, the laws of
logic:. Ellis~ model of ~ideally rational belief systems~ is
one attempt to work this out, and another strategy is ex-
pressed by Elliot Sober who suggests that "laws of logic and
the ma>;ims of epistemology are (among other things) the laws
[2]
of cognition". He suggests that laws of logic have a
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psychological reality~ and function as laws of information
processing. There ate very i nteresti ng i SSL,es here~ not the
least of which involve getting clear on the obvious parallel
with psychologism in linguistics --- and getting clear on
[3]
that thesis itself. This is the form of ~psychologism~
that I WOlt} d 1 i ke to try to defend. But I think it is a
per-f ect 1 y innocent kind of psyct101 og i sm ~ and i s qL\i te compa-
table with what has been argued in this thesis. To give a
hint about where I think the previous discussions have gone
wrong, or at le~st where I think they have missed an impor-
tant point~ is that the kinds of rules or principles that
ar-e likely to be psychologically real (rL\les of information
processing) will be analogous to rules of proof in a system
of natural deduction,
of deductive logic.
rather than to principles or theorems
2. Elliot Sober, IIFlsychologism"~ p. 167.
3. See Jerry Fodor=-s IIThree Cheers for F1ropositional Atti-
tL\des" , especially pp. 117 - ff.
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